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ABSTRACT

OUTLINE OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF EMOTION
February 1986

Bram Michael Fridhandler, B.A.

,

University of California

M.S., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor James

R.

Averill

A psychoanalytic theory of emotion is presented and

elaborated.

The theory is psychoanalytic more in its

applicability to psychoanalytic issues than in its being
drawn primarily from psychoanalytic sources.
important single source is Averill

's

The most

(non-psychoanalytic)

"social constructivist" perspective on emotion.

After

a

brief introductory chapter, the psychoanalytic

literature on affect is reviewed.

In Chapter II, Freud's

several affect theories are traced in detail.

Conclusions

are drawn that differ in significant respects from those of

previous reviev/s of Freud's affect theory.

Separate

theories are isolated in Freud's views of hysteria,

obsessive-compulsive neurosis, anxiety neurosis, and in
early, middle, and late periods of his writings.

Freud's

"clinical" writings are examined separately from his meta-

psycholog ical works, and several themes emerge in these

clinical writings, particularly

a

view of affects as

inherently justified.
Post-Freudian, particularly ego psychological, writings
viii

,

on affect are reviev/ed in Chapter III.

The reviev/ is

organized according to six sets of issues: metapsychology

defense and unconscious affect, biological theories,
anxiety, ego and cognition, and object relations and

representations.

Major papers in each area are critically

discussed.
In Chapter IV the theory itself is presented.

Emotions

are described as schematic organizations (structured wholes,

made up of heterogeneous components, and understandable in
terms of the concept of schemas)

.

These schemas are

contained in and activated by the ego, and consist of

physiological, psychological, and social responses.

The

importance of addressing emotions at the level of

organizations of responses is stressed.

Elaborations and

implications of the theory are presented, focusing on
causation, adapt iveness

,

The

irrationality, and repression.

relationship between the present theory and psychoanalytic
theory in general is critically explored.

Chapter V consists of

a

discussion, from the

perspective of the present theory, of the major issues
psychoanalytic affect theory that are reviewed
III.

in

in

Chapter

In addition, the issues of anxiety and psychotherapy

are briefly discussed.

Finally, in

a

concluding chapter,

the theory is critically assessed, and views on the

importance of the theory are presented.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

For nearly fifty years, psychoanalysts
have lamented

their lack of a satisfactory theory of affect.

Time and

again, analysts have returned to the topic in
efforts to

devise

a

theory that would be conceptually viable and would

meet their theoretical and practical needs, but, by
their
own consensus, without real success.

theory of affect, but
with one another.

a

Freud did not leave

a

series of theories, unreconciled

It was some years afte.r Freud's death

before sustained efforts were again made to construct an

adequate general theory of affect; these efforts mostly took
place among emigre analysts in the United States and their

American successors.

After a series of panels and many

papers, it was still possible for a prominent analyst to

write that "every analyst who has approached the subject has
begun by emphasizing the meager and unsatisfactory state of
our theoretical knowledge"

(Brenner, 1974b, p. 532).

One can isolate two kinds of approaches in the efforts
of analytic theorists to construct a psychoanalytic affect

theory.

These two approaches could be called the endogamous

and the exogamous.

Some theorists (e.g., Jacobson, 1971a?

Rapaport, 1953} have sought to devise

a

theory through ever

more elaborate extensions and coordinations of the existing
terms of psychoanalytic theory, particularly those contained

1

.

in Freud's

It

metapsychology

.

This is the endogamous approach.

is not clear how successful this approach
ever was in

gaining the allegiance of psychoanalytic theorists and

practitioners.

Although in some instances the efforts were

widely cited, it is hard to detect

a

progressive

dissemination of even these most prominent papers

contemporary writings.

in

In any event, the endogamous

approach has by now lost most of the influence it once had.

Freud's metapsychology simply no longer carries the

authority it did, and without this authority, theories based
on it seem hollow.

Even Charles Brenner, noted for his

defense of the adequacy of Freudian views (e.g., Brenner,
1979)

,

in his affect theory shows little interest in past

metapsycholog ical considerations
A second factor in the decline of efforts to construct

an account of affect out of the existing materials of

psychoanalytic theory is simply the relative failure of such
efforts after decades of attempts.

Early post-Freudian

theorists recognized that the prospects were poor for
producing an adequate affect theory from the available
concepts, and they blamed the predominant interest in
instincts for this situation (Brierley, 1937; Glover, 1939).
Their predictions have been borne out.

instinct or drive have not provided

a

The concepts of

foundation on which

theory of affect could successfully be built.

a

They have led

post-Freudian theorists, as they led Freud himself, into

3

exceedingly complex and often inconsistent
formulations
which fail to serve the purposes of theory.
For such reasons, current theorists have
turned, by and
large, to the exogamous approach to building an
affect

theory.

Most theorists in the past ten or twenty years who

have addressed themselves to analytic affect theory have

based their theories on concepts from other fields and modes
of thought than psychoanalysis, and have devised original

conceptions far less constrained by the Freudian explanatory
framework.

The decline of metapsychology has opened the way

for a greater infusion of new thought.

There is reason to

hope that these borrowings from other fields and the

original approaches based on them will enliven psycho-

analytic theory and lead to more successful solutions to the

problem of affect.
Borrowing from other fields, though, is

a

consequential

procedure and will not leave psychoanalysis as it was.
Incorporating solutions of psychoanalytic problems which are
based on the theories or assumptions of other disciplines
must alter the character of psychoanalytic thought,

particularly when an area as fundamental as affect is
involved.

These solutions, insofar as they are accepted,

bring changes that can occur unobtrusively
speak

— and

— silently,

so to

these changes can potentially affect even the

most fundamental principles of psychoanalysis.

Borrowings,

then, should involve reflection on whether the new solutions

4

are in harmony with the essential
features of psychoanalysis
one wishes to preserve.
In this dissertation, a new theory of
affect is

proposed.

The theory is intended for use in psychoanalysis.

Whether it would find acceptance and by whom cannot
be
known, but the effort has been guided by an interest

in

addressing psychoanalytic questions.

This theory,

I

hope,

has features to recommend it even to those who are not

adherents of any form of psychoanalytic theory and who are
not concerned with psychoanalytic problems,

it

is not only

the psychoanalytically oriented who are interested in

a

successful account of affect and emotion, and the present
theory will be the more valuable if it captures the interest
of a wider audience.

Nevertheless, it has been devised with

the primary intent of finding application to psychoanalytic

problems.
This theory is of the exogamous variety.

have its origins in Freudian metapsychology

,

It does not

nor is it based

on other traditional psychoanalytic metatheoretical

entities.
ego

— and

It employs only one such traditional entity

not without first subjecting this concept to

critical examination.

— the
a

If it may be considered a psycho-

analytic theory, then, this is not because it is built from
readily recognizable psychoanalytic materials.

borrowings are from two main sources.

Its

First, it draws

heavily on Averill's "social construct ivist" perspective on

emotion.

The present theory has been guided
at a great many
points by Averill's framing of the issues
in emotion
and by

m

the answers he has proposed,
are directly adopted here;

some cases, Averill's views

in other cases, the approach

taken here parallels Averill's.

The second main non-psycho-

analytic source for the present theory is cognitive
psychology, from which it borrows the concept of a
schema.
This concept,

I

will attempt to show, can be made to do

valuable work in the effort to understand emotion, in ways

psychoanalysis can use.
Eefore this theory is presented, the psychoanalytic

literature on affect is reviewed.

Of course, not all

psychoanalytic writings on affect are included.

Although

the literature is not as extensive as one might imagine,

still to review all papers and books which take affect as
their primary focus would be highly demanding and beyond the

scope of this project.

Therefore, the review focuses first

on Freud, whose changing conceptions are closely examined.

Freud offered so many conceptions of affect that, as is
often true in Freud, he raised

a

great many of the issues

that recur in later psychoanalytic efforts, and therefore

close study of his views is well repaid.

critical review of Freud,

a

Following the

selection of the subsequent

literature on affect is reviewed.

Major papers are

discussed as they fall into enduring themes, and the

discussion aims to pick out from these papers some of the

a

recurring concerns and the difficulties
these theorists have
encountered and often foundered upon.

Following this presentation of the most
prominent and
pertinent analytic accounts of affect, I
present my own. To
make the task more manageable, I begin by
restricting the
domain of the theory. Mine is a theory of
emotion only,
which I define. Then, drawing on Averill, I
claim
that

emotions need to be described as organizations of
component
responses, and

I

argue that they are well described as

schematic organizations, borrowing the concept of
1

a

schema.

place these phenomena in the ego, where they are part of

the ego's adaptive repertoire;

I

describe the factors in the

activation of emotion, and particularly the kinds of
problems on which the ego brings emotions to bear.
In the closing section of the chapter,

I

address the

question of whether this theory is psychoanalytic.
a

question that has not often been addressed.

This is

In general,

psychoanalytic affect theorists, even when borrowing their
theories from elsewhere, have been satisfied simply to
assert that their theories are analytic, and have relied on
their own status as psychoanalysts and on the publication of
their work, for the most part, in psychoanalytic journals to

substantiate the claim.

This procedure holds the danger

I

described above, that concepts brought in from other fields
will change psychoanalysis in ways of which no one is

clearly aware and which few would desire.

Providing

a

forum

for a discussion of these issues
would be an advance.

Moreover, my own theory is in particular
need of an account
of its claim to be psychoanalytic,
since it cannot rely on
institutional or historical factors.

Whether the theory is genuinely psychoanalytic
can be
separated from the issue of whether it addresses,
in

productive ways, the issues analytic affect
theories have
struggled with. There is only a difference of
degree,

perhaps, between

psychoanalytic affect theory and one

a

which addresses psychoanalytic issues well and which
does so

while preserving the essential features of psychoanalysis.
Rigid distinctions need not be drawn, if terms for

discussion are available.

a

Such terms will be more available

here once all the issues have been presented, so we can
return to this issue of whether the present theory is

a

psychoanalytic one in the concluding chapter.
The theory is offered as a viable and illuminating

account of emotion.
offered as

a

More specifically, though, it is

new and more useful way of addressing issues

the psychoanalytic theory of affect.
is

Accordingly,

devoted to trying the theory out, so to speak.

a

in

chapter

Each of

the major issues which emerge in the course of the

literature review is addressed, at least briefly, and

a

few

other areas which are closely related to affect theory are

also considered.

These discussions, of course, are not

meant to be fully adequate considerations of these complex

issues in terms of the present theory;
that is

a

task for

the further research that the protocol
of dissertations and
other beginnings entitles one to call for.
They are ways of

demonstrating something of this theory's usefulness,
and
they may in turn help clarify the nature of
the theory
itself.

CHAPTER

II

FREUD'S THEORIES OP AFFECT

Introduction

Freud did not have a single theory of affect.

Whether

one draws distinctions as Rapaport did (Green, 1977;

Rapaport, 1953; Valenstein f 1962), or in some other way,
such as the expansion of Rapaport' s scheme employed here, it
is clear that Freud's understanding of affect underwent

fundamental changes as his theory developed, and that he
often held more than one view at the same time.

The present

review is organized so as to isolate Freud's several

theories of affect.

These are examined as they appear in

Freud's writings, and their connections with selected
aspects of Freud's metapsychology and his theories of

neurosis are highlighted.
When Freud discussed affect in general, he did so
almost without exception in metapsychological terms.

The

literal meaning of "metapsychology" is correct here; the
terms of these discussions were above, or outside of, the

psychological.

In the earlier years, this meant affect was

discussed in terms of the ambiguous psychological or
physiological, literal or metaphorical energy that Freud
came to identify with sexuality and to call libido.

9

Later,

.

10

and its mechanisms and goals.

When Freud turned to

particular affects, on the other hand, he tended
to discuss
them in psychological terms, free of references
to energy,

structures, and mechanisms.

These discussions fall into

what Klein (1973a) has called Freud's "clinical"
theory.

These two sorts of theory, the clinical and metapsychological yield theories of affect that bear only
though distinct, relation to one another.

a

distant,

Although it is

the metapsychological theory that Freud identified as his

theory of affect and that has been the exclusive focus of
the major reviews of Freud's theory of affect, both the

clinical and metapsychological theories are reviewed here.

Early Theories

Freud's metapsychological theories of affect are among
the most obscure and confusing aspects of Freud's theory,
and they are formulated in some of the most highly technical

terms.

For this reason, the following review gives

extensive consideration to the earliest forms taken by

Freud's affect theory.

These early forms, which preceded

the distinctively Freudian theoretical framework, betray the

roots of the later theories and reveal with particular

clarity the assumptions that persist in the later theories
but which are often obscured by the technical terms of

Freud's metapsychology

11

Hysteria and affect theory
The concept of psychic drive energy is
central to
Freudian theory. In popular conceptions, on the
other hand,
the central feature of psychoanalysis is probably
its

emphasis on the pervasive influence of emotions.

These two

central features— energy and emotion— are united in
the

origins of Freud's thought, where affect and energy
are
equivalent, or rather, the roles that would later be filled
by psychic energy are filled by affect.

Psychoanalysis originated in Freud's study, with Josef
Breuer, of the etiology and treatment of hysteria. The

distinctiveness of Freud's and Breuer

's

views on hysteria

did not lie in the adoption of a psychological framework.

Other physicians regarded hysteria as

phenomenon

— indeed,

a

psychological

this was their reason for dismissing

hysteria and hysterics from the proper realm of medicine
(Freud, 1910/1957)

— and

moreover, Freud and Breuer adopted

a

mixed psychological and physical model (see Freud,
1894/1962, where Freud describes the model as "psycho-

physical").

The distinctiveness of their approach was in

the primary role they gave to affect.

That is, the first

step toward psychoanalysis was the explanation of hysteria
on the basis of the vicissitudes of affect.

Freud (1910/1957)

recounts the origins of

psychoanalytic theory and therapy in the first of five
lectures he delivered at Clark University in 1909.

In this

12

lecture, Freud describes Breuer

's

treatment of Anna 0., and

in particular the great strides
made in the treatment after

Breuer and his patient discovered that her
hysterical

symptoms— paralyses, disturbances of posture and vision,
nervous cough, inability to drink fluids, inability
to speak
or understand her native language, and more—
disappeared
when she recalled the occasion of the first appearance
of a
symptom, if (and only if) the recollection was accompanied
by an energetic expression of emotion.

Breuer and Freud

concluded that the symptoms were the result of the lack of

expression of aroused affect.
One was driven to assume that the illness occurred
because the affects generated in the pathogenic
situations had their normal outlet blocked, and that
the essence of the illness lay in the fact that these
"strangulated" affects were then put to an abnormal
use.... a certain portion of our mental excitation is
normally directed along the paths of somatic
innervation and produces what we know as an "expression
of the emotions".
Hysterical conversion exaggerates
this portion of the discharge of an emotionally
cathected mental process; it represents a far more
intense expression of the emotions, which has entered
upon a new path.
(Freud, 1910/1957, p. 18)
This passage highlights the close connection Freud

initially drew between affect and hysterical symptoms, and

demonstrates as well the physicalistic nature of this
connection, notwithstanding statements in the same lecture
that this was a "purely psychological" theory.

Some

features evident in this passage recur throughout the course
of Freud's theory of affect.

Freud and Breuer

(1893/1955, 1895/1955; Freud,

13

1894/1962) devised a model of the mind or
brain based on
their findings in hysteria, and this
model is reflected in
central features of Freud's later metapsychology
.
Affect,
they held, is principally aroused by
experiences, that is,
by perceptions and ideas. Once aroused,
the affect

constitutes an increase in the normally prevailing
optimal
excitation in the nervous system, and the nervous system
is
so designed as to attempt to relieve this excess
excitation
in some fashion and to return to the optimal level.

The

customary and ideal method of returning to optimal

excitation is through the movements, sounds, secretions
(e.g., tears), and actions that are known as "expression of

the emotions".

So long as these processes can proceed

freely, no lasting difficulty is encountered; the

debilitating effects of emotion on thought and action are
only temporary.

However, should any factor interfere with

this means of eliminating excess excitation, hysterical

symptoms result.
Freud and Breuer maintained that two separate factors

were responsible for interfering with this process.

Of the

two, only the one favored by Freud endured in later

psychoanalytic thought
inhibition or defense.

— this,

naturally, was the factor of

Emotional expression could become

the object of defense for a variety of reasons, including

restrictions of social propriety or other situational
constraints, but Freud considered the more common basis to

14

be the unacceptability of the underlying
feelings to the

person's own moral strictures.

The second factor blamed by

Freud and Breuer for blocking emotional
expression was
"hypnoid states". Hypnoid states, the explanation

particularly favored by Breuer, consist of an altered
state
of consciousness, similar to that induced by
hypnosis, in
which normal processes of emotional expression do not
take
place.

When either factor is present, the normal

dissipation of excitation fails to take place, with the
result that the excitation attaches itself to the relevant

perception or idea, which then persists in the mind in an
abnormal and pathogenic fashion.
Such charged ideas differ in two ways from ideas

without an abnormal degree of energy attached to them.
First, they are more potent and persistent than ideas in a

normal state, and second, they are less accessible to the

process of conscious association.

As a consequence of their

greater potency, these ideas exert a disproportionate
influence over mental life; hysterical symptoms are the
chief indication of this.

As a result of their

inaccessibility to ordinary association, separate networks
of associations, dissociated from one another, are built up,
so that when one of the networks is active, only those

associations are available to consciousness.

Blocked

emotional expression and "splitting of consciousness" are

therefore two aspects of the same phenomenon.

15

Hysterical symptoms represent an attempt to
discharge
the energy attached to charged ideas in the
split-off

association network.

The attempt does not succeed, though,

because each time the emotion-arousing idea or event is
reencountered, the split-off associations receive
charge of energy.

a

fresh

Freud and Breuer's cathartic therapy

resolved this situation by relieving the pathogenic ideas of
their charge of affect (through abreaction)

and by bringing

the split-off ideas back into the conscious network of

associations.

According to this model of the mind, there are two

paths open to emotion, once it is aroused,

it can either be

literally expressed (i.e., expelled), or it can attach
itself to an idea.

consequences.

The latter event has two major

First, the mind is split into conscious and

unconscious portions, and second, the emotional energy

presses constantly for release, and finds this release,
albeit inadequately, in the form of neurotic symptoms.

This

model contains the essential features of the final Freudian
model of mind, but with affect occupying the place later
taken by drive.

In later theory, it is the energy of drives

that becomes attached to ideas ("cathexis") and that is

expressed in neurotic symptoms, and it is the kind and

quantity of drive energy attached to an idea that determines
whether the idea is permitted into consciousness.

a
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Anxiety Neurosis and Affect Theory
Affect appears in another context, entirely
independent
of hysteria, during this pre-psychoanalytic phase of
Freud's

work, and some implications of this second context run

virtually counter to those of the first.

During the same

period of time in which he was collaborating with Breuer in
the development of their theory of hysteria, Freud's
(1895/1962) attention was drawn by another clinical

syndrome.

Among patients suffering from "neurasthenia"

—

commonly diagnosed syndrome at that time, primarily

characterized by tiredness, intracranial pressure,
dyspepsia, and various other symptoms of malaise (Laplanche
&

Pontalis, 1973)

— Freud

distinguished a sub-group whose

primary symptom was intense and chronic anxiety, including
both physical and mental aspects.

In other words, in

contrast to hysteria, where the symptoms were considered by
Freud and Breuer to be abnormal physical substitutes for

emotional expression, the main symptom of "anxiety
neurosis", as Freud proposed to call this new syndrome, was
itself an emotion.

Freud's theory of anxiety neurosis merits discussion in
some detail.

This is not merely because it contains the

most sustained discussion of affect of that period of
Freud's work, although that alone v/ould make it worthy of
attention.

The theory's importance goes beyond its

historical role, for not only was it maintained in some form
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as a theory of anxiety almost
throughout Freud's life, but
it profoundly influenced the body
of Freud's work.
This

influence was at least equal to the influence
of the early
theory of hysteria, and yet it has been far
less widely
appreciated.
The argument Freud (1895/1962) advanced for

distinguishing anxiety neurosis from neurasthenia was
twofold.

First, Freud argued, they formed distinct clusters
of

symptoms, and thus there was a prima facie basis for

distinction.

a

Second, the illnesses were caused by two

distinct etiologies,
with his patients.

a

conclusion Freud based on experience

Freud adhered to the position, already

prevalent in medicine, that neurasthenia was caused by

masturbation, whereas for anxiety neurosis Freud held the
cause to be failure to discharge sexual arousal in

a

normal

and complete fashion.

Freud (1895/1962) reported he found anxiety neurosis in
cases where sexual arousal was present but where, for

various reasons, it repeatedly failed to end in "normal

coition under the most favorable conditions"

(p.

109)

.

Some

circumstances cited as fitting this description were coitus
interruptus, prolonged courtship, voluntary abstinence, and,
for a woman, marriage to a man suffering from premature

ejaculation.

That such circumstances have in common sexual

frustration has led some writers (e.g., Rangell, 1968) to
state that Freud held the sole decisive factor to be simple

.

-
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absence of physical sexual discharge.

Freud encouraged this

view by describing the essential condition as
an
"accumulation of excitation"

(p.

114).

However, a close inspection of Freud's (1895/1962)

discussion reveals that it would be incorrect to describe
the anxiety in anxiety neurosis as a simple conversion
of

sexual arousal, due to its excessive accumulation.

An

anxiety neurosis does not come into existence, according to

Freud's account, solely due to the absence of physical
discharge, but requires also a failure of mental mastery—
"the mechanism of anxiety neurosis is to be looked for in a

deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical
sphere, and in a consequent abnormal employment of that

excitation"

(p.

108)

What is meant by this deflection of somatic excitation,
and what are its causes?

Freud had developed

a

model of

sexual satisfaction (described cursorily in Freud, 1895/1962
and in detail in Freud, 1895/1966a) which required a full

involvement of sexual ideas in coitus in order for an

adequate discharge to be achieved.

For this mental

involvement to be accomplished, a well-developed set of
sexual ideas had to be present in the mind and their

activation by somatic energy had to be permitted, and had to
be maintained during the sexual act.

Any factor

interrupting this process was likely, in the short or long
term, to produce anxiety neurosis through the mechanism of
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insufficient mastery or binding of somatic
excitation by the
mind, or more specifically, a failure
of ideas to adequately
absorb energy and then discharge it as required
for
full

release of excitation.

Coitus interruptus, Freud held, produced anxiety

neurosis in men not through lack of physical discharge-

orgasm being readily possible— but through the mental

distraction imposed by the task.

In fact, any factor making

intercourse less mentally exciting and satisfying, such as
condoms, premature ejaculation, or coitus interruptus, was

thought to act similarly to produce anxiety neurosis by

blocking the full activation of sexual ideas (Freud,
1895/1962, 1894/1966).
Sexual abstinence would be the simplest case if Freud's

theory involved simple accumulation of excitation, but the

explanation of anxiety neurosis in cases of abstinence is

actually more complicated than cases of physically adequate
but mentally unsatisfying intercourse.

Abstinence in adults

leads to an accumulation of sexual energy, but this need not
lead to anxiety neurosis; it may lead merely to

intensification of "libido"

(used here by Freud to mean

conscious sexual interest).

However, if the energy is

"defelected into other paths, which hold out greater promise
of discharge than does the path through the psyche"

(Freud,

1895/1962, pp. 109-110), anxiety neurosis develops and

sexual desire diminishes or disappears.

Freud seems to hold
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that constitution primarily determines
whether sexual

abstinence leads to anxiety neurosis or
simply to
intensifying sexual desire (see Freud,

1894/1966); in any

event, anxiety neurosis was not regarded
as an inevitable

consequence of abstinence, even prolonged abstinence.
A final pertinent case in point is "virginal
anxiety",
in which newly aroused somatic excitation leads
to anxiety

because sexual ideas are not yet sufficiently developed
to
be capable of absorbing the energy.

Here again, it is not

deprivation per se which leads to anxiety neurosis, nor
over-excitement, but "psychical inadequacy".

Virginal

anxiety should subside, presumably, with increased sexual
knowledge, regardless of whether sexual activity takes
place.

Anxiety in anxiety neurosis serves as

a

substitute

discharge of the energy deposited in the nervous system by
the genitals.

Ordinarily, this energy is discharged in

sexual intercourse with full psychological involvement,

together with physical components such as "accelerated

breathing, palpitation, sweating, congestion, and so on"
(Freud, 1895, p. 111).

In anxiety neurosis, certain of

these physical components are preserved and serve as an

avenue for partial, somatic discharge; in other words, the

physical form of anxiety is determined by the natural

discharge paths of sexual excitement.
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Comparisons
We can now turn to the differing conceptions
of affect
indicated by Freud's theories of hysteria and
of anxiety
neurosis.
One notable difference between the theories of
hysteria
and anxiety-neurosis is that energetic emotional

expression— "abreaction"

— is

considered to hold very great

curative powers in hysteria, but not in anxiety-neurosis,
where the expression of anxiety, no matter how energetic,

produces no change in the neurotic symptomatology.

difference might be taken to indicate

a

This

plain contradiction

in Freud's views, but further consideration suggests that it

demonstrates instead that Freud, again, held two distinct
conceptions of affect, or perhaps subsumed two different
entities under the heading of affect.

In abreaction, affect

is expressed with a full mental involvement;

that is, the

emotional expression is integrated with the memory of the
event which originally provoked the affect.

Thus, affect in

abreaction differs from anxiety in anxiety-neurosis by
virtue of having mental content.

Years later, Freud would

again vacillate over whether affect intrinsically had mental
content.

Defense is

a

second area where the two different views

of affect carry divergent implications.

Freud was

developing his concept of defense concurrently with these

conceptions of affect (Freud, 1894/1962, 1896/1962).

He

described defense as the removal from
consciousness of
unacceptable ideas; ideas were elemental
entities in the
mind, derived from images or perceptions,
in hysteria,
affects were considered to attach themselves,
in a quite
literal way, to ideas; therefore, in the theory
of hysteria,
affective energy could be defended against,
the theory

m

of anxiety-neurosis, however, the process of
defense could

have no relevance to affect, as the anxiety was
solely

somatic entity, and defense was against mental ones.

a

This

ambiguity, too, persists in Freud's later work, where he

alternates in his views on whether affect can be the object
of defense or be unconscious.

Although there are several areas of divergent
implication, each with connections to more than one area of

Freudian theory as it later unfolded, one difference
predominates.

Affect as presented in the theory of anxiety

neurosis originates in somatic sources and remains

a

somatic

entity, whereas the affect of the theory of hysteria

originates in psychological sources and is both

psychological and somatic in nature.
(195 3)

Thus, Rapaport's

"first phase" of Freud's affect theory is not

unitary, as Rapaport views it, but instead contains two

quite discrepant views.
Under the view connected with the theory of hysteria,

affect is produced as

a

purely psychological reaction to

external events, and requires no internal source.

This is
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the basis of Freud and Breuer's
characterization of their
theory as an "ideogenic" theory of
hysteria (Freud s Breuer,
1895/1955), or simply a "psychological" one
(Freud r

1910/1957).

Once the psychological process of
affect

arousal is accomplished, the energy that
has been created in
the nervous system normally makes a
rapid transition from
psychic to somatic energy and is discharged
in emotional
expression. However, we have seen that it may
instead

remain in the mind, attached to ideas, and at the
same time
be "converted" to physical energy in the form
of hysterical

symptoms.

Affect in the theory of anxiety-neurosis does not make
these transitions from the mental to the physical.

contrary, in fact,

a

On the

causal precondition of anxiety-neurosis

is precisely the failure of somatic excitation to become

mental.

In other words, anxiety is a strictly somatic

phenomenon here.

In more contemporary terms, anxiety in

this theory seems to be

a

purely physiological process; one

may speculate that its mechanism would involve primarily the

sympathetic nervous system.

In any event, no ideas,

beliefs, wishes, memories, or other psychological entities
are involved, even as causal agents.
In short, Freud maintained both psychological and

physiological theories of affect during this early period.
One can find the descendants of these two views interacting
in complex and sometimes confused ways throughout Freud's

.

theoretical writings, and both the interaction
and the
confusion continued after Freud's death.

Broadly, one may

say that the views of affect derived
from the theory of
hysteria formed the basis for Freud's theories
of psychological conflict and defense and for other
aspects of his

"clinical- theory, whereas the main terms of the
theory of
anxiety neurosis soon became the foundation for the
meta-

psychology
We have seen that Freud's theories of hysteria and

anxiety-neurosis differ sharply with regard to their
conceptions of the nature of affect, their assumptions about
the effects of abreaction, and the ways they construct the

relation of affect and defense.

Yet commentators have often

overlooked these important differences.

Rapaport (1953),

for example, stated that Freud's theory during that period

"equates affect with the quantity of psychic energy, which
was later conceptualized as drive-cathex is"

(p.

This

179).

formula applies only to affect within the theory of

hysteria, where affective energy attaches itself to ideas,
in precisely the same way drive energy was later described

as attaching itself to ideas in the process of cathexis.

the theory of anxiety-neurosis, though, affect is not

psychic energy at all.
Rapaport (1953) referred to the theory of anxiety-

neurosis when he stated:

"...the anxiety-affect was

explained as affect or libido (these terms were at this

In
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point still interchangeable) transformed by
being repressed"
(P.

179).

Rapaport is incorrect here on two points.

First,

the terms affect and libido were clearly not
interchangeable
at this stage of Freud's theory.

Affect, we have seen, was

used in two senses, and neither corresponded with libido,

which was used to mean conscious sexual arousal.

The

technical definition of libido as psychic energy only

developed later, and when it developed, it did not duplicate
either of Freud's early conceptions of affect.

Rapaport's

false equation of affect and libido led him to believe

incorrectly that affect in the theories of hysteria and

anxiety-neurosis is the same entity, only transformed.
Second, repression had little place in Freud's theory of

anxiety-neurosis.

He considered unacceptability of sexual

excitement only rarely to be the cause of the failure of
ideas to absorb genital energy; either distraction or

"inadequacy" of the ideas themselves relative to the

quantity of energy were the main causes, in his view.

The Discharge Theory of Affect

In 1900, Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams,

where he brought forth many of the conceptions he had
developed during the preceding years.

In so doing, he laid

the foundation for his overall theory, and the book is

frequently cited as the beginning of psychoanalysis (Fine,
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1979; Jones, 1953).

m

The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud

offered a new theory of affect, in rudimentary
form, and
this was the first theory of affect to be developed
within
the broader set of terms that we recognize as
Freudian
theory.

The central feature of Freud's theory of affect
as

presented in The Interpretation of Dreams was the view that
affect represents a discharge of psychic energy (Rapaport,
1953).

This view was to remain in place for more than
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years, and during that period provided the essence of the

classical psychoanalytic theory of affect.
Two lines of thought jointly produced Freud's 1900

concept of affect.

The first was the model of mind he had

developed, of which some details had been published (Freud,
1895/1962, 1900/1953) and some had been shared in written

form only with Freud's close friend, wilhelm Fliess (Freud,

1895/1966b).

The second line of thought was that concerning

the unconscious.

This latter topic, of course, was

emphasized by Freud in a large proportion of his published
writings, and received extended discussion on many
occasions.
In The Interpretation of Dreams, affect in dreams is

described and classified through the use of examples, and

a

limited theoretical account of some features of dream affect
is provided.

A more basic discussion of the theory of

affect is provided in the final chapter of the book, where
Freud gave his metapsychology its first published
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expression; the concept of affect as discharge
of psychic
energy was also stated there for the first
time.
The two
views of affects expressed in these two different
places are
not incompatible, but have relatively little
connection with
each other. This is an early instance of the
divergence
of

the "clinical" and "metapsychological" theories
(Klein,
1973a) the two views each stand independently, not

conflicting with each other, but not supporting each other
either.

Before turning to the metapsychological discharge

theory of affect let us consider the other views on affect
in The Interpretation of Dreams, which appear mainly in the

discussion of affects in dreams.
In Freud's discussion of dream affects, he advances

four assumptions, of which the first has the broadest

implications.

This first assumption is that affects in

dreams are always appropriate to some aspect of the "dream
thoughts"

(i.e., the thoughts that underlie the dream but

are not permitted into it due to the influence of
censorship)

.

Sachs (1982) argues that Freud believed this

to be true of all affects, that is, an affect is always

appropriate to and proportional to its object or cause;
Sachs calls this Freud's "doctrine of emotions".

This

theory of affect is essentially the common-sense one (i.e.,
that one feels emotions naturally in response to appropriate

situations)

,

with the crucial difference that in common

sense, one must be aware of the objects of one's emotions.
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This assumption of Freud's implies
that an emotion is never
unrelated to cognitive content; when there
seems to be no

ideational content, the emotion is based on
an unconscious
idea, and if one were aware of the idea
there would be
nothing anomalous about the emotion.

(This assumption is

discussed further below, in the section "Inherent

justification of emotions".)
Freud advances three other assumptions in his

discussion of affects in dreams.

The first is that affects

in dream thoughts often conflict with each other, with
the

result that the affect in the dream is relatively mild.

mechanism of this is not described.

The

The second assumption

provides an additional explanation for the relative mildness
of affect in many dreams; Freud assumes that the state of

sleep reduces the intensity of affect, because he believes
that affect involves motility and motility is reduced during
sleep.

This second assumption bears a close relation to the

concept of affect as discharge.

The final one is an

argument that affects can be turned into their opposites in
the course of "dream work", which produces a dream out of
the dream thoughts.

Again, the mechanism is not described,

and this proposition seems to conflict with the argument for

the appropriateness of dream affects to some element of the

dream thoughts.
The "discharge theory of affect", introduced in the
final chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, probably best
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deserves the title of "the Freudian theory
of affect-, since
it is framed in the terms of Freud's
formal
theory, since

Freud adhered to it through most of his career,
and since
its account of affect is based on
characteristic and

original Freudian hypotheses.

Among Freud's statements of

the theory, there is none which summarizes it
completely or
defines it in a way that can be understood independently

of

context.

One is required to synthesize Freud's comments

from various places and to place these within the relevant

theoretical context.

The discharge theory of affect states

that affect is the release of psychic energy (derived from

instinctual drives, which have somatic sources) through

physical processes (mainly expressive or physiological ones)

which do not constitute gratifications of the drive.

From a

functional point of view, the role of affect is to unburden
the "mental apparatus" of excessive tension when preferable

methods are unavailable, typically due to conflict.
A critical change was under way in Freud's theory of

anxiety during the preparation of The Interpretation of
Dreams, accompanied by concomitant changes in the concept of

psychic energy.

In Freud's theory of anxiety neurosis,

anxiety was seen as the result of a deflection of sexuallybased somatic excitation from the mental sphere.

By the

time Freud wrote the final chapter of The Interpretation of

Dreams, anxiety represented
sexual excitement.

a

transformation of mental

Mental sexual excitement was transformed
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into anxiety due to the repression of
sexual thoughts;

in

fact, Freud described the experience of
anxiety in place of
sexual excitement as "the essence of repression"
(Freud,

1900, p. 604).

Psychic energy now came to be identified

with sexual wishes, and the concept of libido,
or mobile
energy derived from sexual drives, came into being.

The old

views of anxiety as a purely physical process were

abandoned, and the theory of the production of anxiety due
to deflection of excitement was adapted by Freud, and
became

the theory of anxiety due to repression.

The earlier logical framework was preserved, but the

boundary between the physical and the mental became blurred.
Libido, in particular, was ambiguous.
a

A theory of affect as

discharge of mental energy could only exist within the

context of an ambiguous notion of mental energy

— in

particular, such energy has to be assumed capable of fluid

transformation between the mental and the physical spheres.
This fluidity had a precedent in Freud and Breuer's theory
of hysteria, where "affect" attached itself to ideas and was

subsequently released in physical expression.

In The

Interpretation of Dreams these theoretical threads were
brought together and produced the discharge theory of
affect.

The statement of the discharge theory of affect in The

Interpretation of Dreams contains some, but not all, of the
elements of the theory.

References to affect are scattered
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in various places in the theoretical
discussion; only at one

point does Freud make a unifying statement.
[Affect] is viewed as a motor or secretory
function,
the key to whose innervation lies in the
ideas in the
Ucs.
(Freud, 1900, p. 582)

Here Freud asserts that affect consists of
physical

processes, and specifies the types of physical processes.
The statement constitutes a discharge theory by
virtue of
the fact that tension phenomena are excluded; in
particular,
the concept of affect as a charge of energy attached to
ideas (as in the original theory of hysteria)

is superseded.

However, such important elements of the discharge theory are
not mentioned here that the view of affect in The

Interpretation of Dreams is reasonably viewed as a precursor
to the discharge theory.

Another important element of the discharge theory made
its appearance in Freud's paper on the two "principles of

mental functioning", the pleasure and reality principles
(Freud, 1911/1958).

There Freud distinguished between

affect and action as methods of discharge; of the two, only

action could represent
underlying drive.

a real

gratification of the

Affect thus was seen as an essentially

inferior form of tension-reduction, a substitute to be

employed when action was impossible for some reason.

The

most typical reason was conflict over the drive, and this

provides the relation of affect and conflict in the

discharge theory.
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The final formulation of the discharge
theory appeared
in the 1915 papers on metapsychology
(Freud, 1915/1957a f
1915/1957c r 1915/1957d). The relation between
affect and
drive energy is made fully explicit, and
the importance of
affect as a "safety-valve" is specified. A
fundamental
'

distinction is drawn between ideas and affects
in terms of
their status in the mind; although both are
"instinct-

representatives"

,

ideas, Freud wrote, persist as actual

structures in the mind even when they are not in
consciousness, whereas affects exist only while they are

consciously felt, or in other words, while the actual
process of discharge is under way.

These formulations

further consolidated the identification of affect with

discharge.

Between the papers on hysteria and obsessional neurosis
of the 1890's and the papers on metapsychology of 1915 Freud

radically changed his views on the relation of affects to

unconscious ideas.

In the 1890's Freud held that a felt

affect always indicated the presence in the unconscious of
an idea for which that affect was appropriate.

This was

implied by the view that unconscious ideas carried the

potential for specific affects, which was a prominent
component of Freud and Breuer's theory of hysteria.

A

related assumption was that an affect, once stimulated by an

unconscious idea, emerged into consciousness as that same
affect (i.e., anger, shame, sadness, etc.), even if it was

detached from its original idea and attached
to another one.
Freud considered this particularly clear in
cases of

obsessional neurosis, where senseless combinations
of affect
and idea appeared in the patient's conscious
experience.
In 1900

(Freud, 1900/1953) Freud continued to advance

this notion in his discussion of dream affects.

He made an

exception, however, in the case of anxiety, and this

exception gave an indication of further modifications to
come.

Anxiety in dreams, he maintained, did not indicate

unconscious dream thoughts for which anxiety would be
appropriate.

Instead, it indicated unconscious sexual

wishes which were under repression.

Freud offered no

theoretical account of how sexual wishes could give rise to
anxiety, side-stepping the question by comparing the

relation of the dreamer's conscious and unconscious mind to
the relation between two people, each of whom could have

different reactions to the same event (Freud, 1900/1953).
The reasoning closely follows Freud's theory of anxiety

neurosis, except that instead of somatic sexual tension it
is unconscious sexual wishes that give rise to anxiety.

The

most important factor for the present discussion is the

alteration in affect between the unconscious and conscious
realms.

Not only did Freud introduce the possibility of

such a change, but he made it central to his theory.
The fulfillment of these wishes would no longer produce
an affect of pleasure, but one of pain; and it is just
this conversion of affect that constitutes the essence
(Freud, 1900/195 3, p.
of what we call "repression".
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604;

emphasis in original)

By 1915

(Freud, 1915d) Freud had essentially
reversed

his 1890* s view of the determination of affects
by

unconscious ideas.
It is possible for the development of affect to
proceed
directly from the system Dcs.; in that case the affect
always has the character of anxiety, for which all
^repressed" affects are exchanged. Often, however, the
instinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a
substitutive idea in the system Cs. The development of
affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute,
and the nature of that substitute determines the
qualitative character of the affect.
(Freud,
1915/1957d, p. 179)

Here, the only affect that can emerge from the "system Ucs."
is anxiety,

regardless of what affect would be appropriate

to the unconscious idea.

Such anxiety would be "free-

floating" anxiety, appearing in consciousness unconnected to

any idea.

When affects appear in consciousness in

connection with some "substitutive" idea, this idea

determines which affect is experienced, no matter how
different this idea is from the affect's source in the
unconscious.
The implications of this shift were far-reaching.

Affect was no longer at the center of psychic functioning,

component of all psychic entities and operations.

Affect

was also no longer thought to be determined through

subjective experience of objects, as in the common-sense
view.

Instead, affect was placed at the periphery of

psychic functioning, and was thought to be determined

a
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quantitatively by the vicissitudes of drive
energy and
qualitatively by arbitrary linkages with conscious

ideas.

In short, affect had become an epiphenomenon.

Brierley (1937) and others have cited the crucial
shift
that took place in Freud's focus between his
earliest
theories and the later work, from affect to drive.

It would

be more accurate to state that Freud gradually transformed
his earlier concept of affect into his later concept of

drive energy, with the essence of the transformation being
loss of quality

— i.e.,

a

Freud shifted from a concept of

energy with qualities (affect) to a concept of energy

without qualities (drive).

In the earliest theory, the

theory of hysteria, affects of a particular kind were
attached to ideas in the unconscious.

In the theory of

anxiety neurosis, affect based on energy without any
particular quality made its first appearance.

In The

Interpretation of Dreams, ideas were no longer charged with
affect, but instead with the energy of sexual wishes, or
libido.

Libido was protean, and could take on many forms;

anxiety, in particular, was among them.

Soon other affects,

like anxiety, were derived from this energy that had no

intrinsic quality.

[1]

Freud (1915/1957d) specifies that affect cannot be

unconscious.

In part, this principle is a re-statement of

the shift to quality-less energy.

The "system Ucs."

contains energy, but only when this energy is discharged can

it take on the qualities of felt
affect.

There were other

reasons for Freud to deny that affect could be
unconscious.

During the period in which the metapsychological
papers were
written Freud though of affect in terms of feelings,
and it

would have been a contradiction to conceive of
unconscious
(i.e., un-felt)

feelings:

"It is surely of the essence of

an emotion that we should be aware of it."

1915/1957d, p. 177)

(Freud,

However, Freud had in earlier years

been able to affirm a latent, unconscious state for affects.

Only with the shift from affect to quality-less energy did
the concept of unconscious affect become untenable.

These considerations

— loss

of quality and the

theoretical exclusion of unconscious affects
nature of the discharge theory of affect.

— amplify

the

Affect was seen

as one of the possible "vicissitudes" of drive energy, which

appears in the presence of repression.
The quantitative factor of the instinctual
representative has three possible vicissitudes, as we
can see from a cursory survey of the observations made
by psycho-analysis: either the instinct is altogether
suppressed, so that no trace of it is found, or it
appears as an affect which is in some way or other
qualitatively coloured, or it is changed into anxiety.
(Freud, 1915/1957d, p. 153)

Without repression, there would be no affect.

In the

presence of repression, sexual drive energy

compelled tc

is

seek some avenue other than sexual action and sexual

pleasure, and affect provides one such substitute outlet.

Relatively pleasurable affects offer an advantageous means
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of disposing of energy, since it avoids
the necessity of

expending energy to suppress the instinct altogether
and it
also avoid the experience of unpleasant affects,

particularly anxiety.

In principle, any affect can serve

the function of discharge; the workings of the
psychic

economy are not affected by the "qualitative" factor in
affect, except insofar as a distinction between pleasure and

"unpleasure" is concerned, since unpleasure sets defensive

processes in motion.

Affect Forms (Origins of Specific Affects)
The discharge theory specifies the function and general

nature of affect, but it does not explain the forms; that
is,

it does not account for the origins of specific affects.

Freud provided different explanations at different times for
the origin of specific affects, and he neither integrated

these explanations nor explicitly abandoned earlier ones for
later ones.

Freud's earliest view (Freud

&

Breuer, 1895/1955) that

emotions were remnants of actions which had served a purpose
earlier in the history of the species was adopted from

Darwin (1872).

Concurrently, in his theory of anxiety

neurosis, Freud was claiming that the elements of severe

anxiety

— rapid

breathing, sweating, palpitations, etc.

borrowed from sexual intercourse.

— were

Thus, Freud held

simultaneously that affects were determined by physiological

discharge paths and that they were
vestiges of
phylogenetically old actions.
Some time later, Freud broadened
the Darwinian theory
to include any experience (not
just adaptive actions)

as a

possible basis for an affect, and suggested
that experiences
of the individual, as well as the
species, could provide the
prototype for affects; the experience of birth
was
the main

exampjp.

In a Lamarckian premise, Freud

(1916/1963) wrote

that experiences repeated for many generations
become part
of genetic inheritance, and are passed on
as affects,

m

this same vein, Freud

(1916/1963) described affects as

hysterical attacks which had become
individual's inheritance.

hysterical attacks as
affect"

n

a

a

part of each

Conversely, Freud described
freshly constructed individual

(Freud, 1916/1963, p. 396).

This analogy between

affects and hysterical symptoms had been anticipated in

Freud's earliest account of hysteria.
Eventually, Freud (1926/1959) emphasized individual

experience as the principal source of affects; specifically,
he stressed birth as the prototype of anxiety.

Inherited

experiences and vestiges of adaptive actions tended to drop
out of Freud's account, and physiological discharge patterns

adopted from intercourse were nc longer mentioned.
(1926/195

9)

Freud

agreed with Otto Rank that birth provided the

first experience of anxiety, or rather that birth produces
the pattern of responses that later, with some
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modifications, becomes the affect of anxiety.

The Signal Theory of Anxiety

In the papers published in 1915, Freud
finalized the

discharge theory of affect that had been implicit
in many
aspects of his thinking to that point. Many areas
of

Freud's thought were integrated in these "papers on

metapsychology"

,

and the theory of affect was one.

This

culmination of a long period of development of the theory of
affect was followed neither by a period of refinement of the

theory nor by a turning away from affect as a focus of
investigation.

Instead, it was followed by a period,

lasting perhaps ten years, during which Freud overturned the

theory which had taken 20 years to evolve.

It was not only

in the area of affect that Freud entered on new directions

of thought; the papers on metapsychology were followed by

profound modifications in Freud's thought (Green, 1977).

It

is only in the area of affect, however, that Freud can be

said to have altered his basic beliefs entirely.

The new view appears in Freud's 1926 book Inhibition,

Symptom and Anxiety.

Some anticipations appear in The Ego

and the Id (Freud, 1923/1961).

There Freud states that "the

ego is the actual seat of anxiety"

(p.

more than that affects are conscious.

57).

This means far

The ego was defined

by Freud as the adaptive portion of the personality, so to
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cite it as the "seat" of anxiety was
to imply that anxiety
was primarily an adaptive phenomenon.
This trend, evident
by implication only in 1923 f is fully
developed
in

Inhibition , Symptom and Anxiety.
A second change implied in The Ego and the
Id is the

re-attribution of quality and content to the energy of
affect.
In the second chapter of the work, Freud

returns to

the question of whether affects or feelings can be

unconscious.

He searches for a term for the energy of

feelings in a state prior to becoming a feeling, and settles
(in desperation, one supposes)

on the term "something".

Clinical experience. . .shows us that this "something"
behaves like a repressed impulse. It can exert driving
force without the ego noticing the compulsion. . .We then
come to speak, in a condensed and not entirely correct
manner, of "unconscious feelings", keeping up an
analogy with unconscious ideas which is not altogether
justifiable.
(Freud, 1923/1961, p. 22)

Whereas in 1915 (Freud, 1915/1957d) Freud had denied
that unconscious feelings could exist, because energy only

acquired content in the course of discharge, he changes that
position here and states that the energy of potential
conscious feelings

— the

"something"

— has

impulse, and quality, like a feeling.

reversed himself.

direction, like an

He has, in effect,

The formulation in The Ego and the Id

contradicts the 1915 position that affect is represented in
the "deeper layers of the psyche" only as a quantity of

quality-less energy, and that all the qualities (which is to
say, almost everything that we recognize as emotion)

is
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added on inconsequentially in consciousness.

This reversal

is only a step toward the basic changes
of 1926.

The essence of the discharge theory of affect
is that
affect constitutes a discharge of psychic energy,
and that
the basic nature and function of affect lies in
this fact.
In Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety, Freud specifies
an

entirely different nature and function for anxiety, and
gives little attention to other affects, which are thereby
left without a theoretical account.

The new theory of

anxiety is known as the "signal" theory.

It is not an

"economic" theory; that is, in the signal theory, psychic

energy plays no role in the explanation of anxiety.

It does

not depict affect as an epiphenomenon, but instead as an

important causal entity.

Finally, it does not describe the

production of anxiety as an "automatic" process, returning
instead by and large to a psychological, common-sense

understanding of what makes a person anxious.

According to the signal theory of anxiety, anxiety is
produced by the ego in "danger situations".
one becomes fearful in fearful circumstances.

In other words,

The "danger

situation" includes objective, external dangers.

The fear

one feels when in genuine danger Freud calls "realistic

anxiety".

He investigates realistic anxiety no further,

implying that this common-sense response is self-evident and
in no need of explanation.

"Neurotic anxiety" is of more importance to the theory.

—

.
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In neurotic anxiety, one is afraid
of something that,

if it

were actually present, would warrant fear,
so the fear
itself, in Freud's analysis, does not
require explanation.

Anxiety is neurotic when one is unaware of
the object of
one's fear. The issue is not whether one's
fear
is

exaggerated or inappropriate, given what prompts it,
but
rather that, being unaware of what one is afraid,
one
is

not

in a position to judge whether the feared situation
actually

exists.

To take one example, in an adult man with oedipally

based neurotic inhibitions, some strivings are unconsciously
equated with forbidden oedipal wishes to supplant the
father, and therefore arouse fear of castration.

This

anxiety is neurotic if, as is almost always the case, the
man is unaware that he fears castration.

If and when this

fear becomes conscious, it ceases to be neurotic anxiety
(and it ceases to exist altogether, since castration is not

actually threatened)
There are characteristic objects of neurotic anxiety

characteristic danger situations

— at

different stages of

childhood. The main ones Freud cites are threatened loss of
love, threatened castration, and threatened "loss of the

super-ego's love"

(i.e., self-disapproval).

These dangers

loom unconsciously when forbidden drives are activated.

In

childhood, these objects of fear may be conscious, and may
even be justified, at least within the limits of the child's

understanding.

In neurotic anxiety in later life, one
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continues to have an unconscious conviction
that these
dangers are present.

There are deeper determinants of danger situations.
Here, Freud is not satisfied with common sense,
which would

hold that fear in the face of loss of a loved one's
love or
loss of one's penis requires no explanation.

A danger

situation, Freud explains, is one which appears to portend

"traumatic situation", and this latter is

a

a

situation in

which the organism is utterly unable to master or discharge
excitation.

Such excitation can be external, such as

military battle or birth, but the source of excitation is

generally internal

— i.e.,

instinctual.

A danger situation

is one in which it appears one may be deprived of the means

of disposing of excitation.

(Freud acknowledges that this

formulation applies less well to the threat of loss of the

super-ego's love.)
The signal theory of anxiety is named for the function
it specifies for anxiety.

The signal is of danger, and the

function of the signal is to initiate coping operations.

When the anxiety is neurotic, the coping efforts are
neurotic defenses or symptoms.

The signal is necessary in

order to motivate defense; Freud described the ego as weak
in itself, but when it has the power to emit the signal of

anxiety it can employ the omnipotent pleasure principle as
an ally.

The "transformation" view of anxiety is largely

—

abandoned,

where Freud had previously held that anxiety
was
a transformation of libidinal energy
that was under
repression, he now said that energy had "little
importance"
in connection with anxiety.

An increase in drive energy

still precedes the experience of anxiety, in the
signal
theory, but the relation between the two events is

completely altered.

Whereas in the discharge theory the

energy was "directly transformed", in the signal theory the
ego "recognizes" a danger that the drive impulse seems to
pose, and reacts to this with anxiety.

[2]

Anxiety is no

longer the result of repression; instead, repression is the

result of anxiety.

And yet, Freud at points retains the old theory side by
side with the contrasting features of the new one.

He

maintains that anxiety can be produced "automatically"
through an excess of stimulation, and that precisely this
takes place in the "actual neuroses"

— anxiety

neurasthenia (Freud, 1926/1959, p. 141).

neurosis and

He equivocates on

the question of whether the energy of repressed impulses

finds expression in anxiety, stating that this is "very

possible"

(ibid)

before dismissing the entire question.

He

adopts a common-sense view of the objects of fear, but only
to a point, and claims that the ultimate fear and the source

of all anxiety is the situation of being unable to discharge

excitation.

Freud's retention of both theories

"automatic", physiological anxiety and signal anxiety
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"produced" by the ego-was to lead to
continuing controversy
(Blau, 1952; Brenner, 1953; Rangell,
1955; Zetzel, 1949).

Nevertheless, the change was profound.

Although he

equivocated on some changes (e.g., the
transformation of
libido to anxiety) and retained heterogeneous
elements in
the theory, the theory of affect presented in
Inhibition,

Symptom and Anxiety was sweepingly different than
the one
that had preceded it. The discharge theory had been
overturned.

[3]

Freud's Clinical Theories of Affect

George Klein isolated two theories, or really types of
theory, in Freud: the metapsychology , and a

theory (Klein, 1973a, 1973b).

n

clinical w

Other writers have recognized

Klein's distinction or have drawn a similar one (Rubinstein,
1976; Schafer, 1976; Spence, 1982).

clinical theory, Klein referred to

In speaking of a
a

set of propositions

cast in terms of personal meanings and aims, as against the

metapsychological terms of instinct, energy, and structure.
Klein's term "clinical" is misleading, since he is not
referring only to propositions that apply in psycho-

therapeutic settings.

Rather, he is referring to any

propositions cast in the ordinary-language terms of meaning
and intention, with the special extension of these terms to

include "disavowed", unconscious meanings and intentions.
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Alongside Freud's specifically theoretical
(i.e., metapsychological) propositions about emotion,
he advanced other
propositions that he did not attempt to link
up to the

fundamental metapsychological entities, and
which therefore
are cast in terms of the clinical theory
Klein described.
Some authors (e.g., Rubinstein, 1973) would
deny
that these

are truly theoretical statements, and Freud
himself might

have given them an ambiguous status, somewhere
between

explanation and description.

Regardless of how one

classifies such propositions, though, they offer new and
often deeper ways of understanding emotions, highlighting

new connections and providing new interpretations.

Such

propositions have been more influential within and outside
of psychoanalysis than Freud's systematic theories of

affect.

Since neither Freud nor any of his followers and

interpreters have systematized the clinical propositions on
affect, a comprehensive review would be exceedingly

difficult.

Instead,

I

trace an important theme, then

examine some examples of Freud's treatments of specific
affects.

Inherent Justification of Emotions

There is an important theme in Freud's treatment of
affect which finds some expression in formal theoretical

statements but which is more clearly evident where Freud
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does not attempt to formulate
matters in metapsychological
terms. Despite being relatively
unsystematic and informal
in comparison with others of
Freud's propositions,
it is a

characteristically Freudian assertion,
arguably one of his
most central. Sachs (1982) calls it
-Freud's doctrine of
the emotions", and although Sachs
overstates

Freud's loyalty

to it, it does constitute an important
dimension of his

conception of affect.
The assumption in question is that emotions
which seem
irrational, excessive, unrelated to the current
situation,
or

in any other way anomalous are in fact related
to and

justified by unconscious thoughts or wishes,

in other

words, "irrational" emotions are only seemingly so;
they are
as rational, appropriate, and justified as any other

emotion, only the state of affairs which justifies them is
out of awareness.

This assumption appears in

a

rudimentary form in Freud

and Breuer's understanding of hysteria.

There, hysterical

symptoms were understood as distorted affects that had been

appropriate in the situation that first generated them.

The

assumption achieves its first full expression in Freud's
theory of obsessive-compulsive neurosis (1894/1962,
1896/1962).

This theory holds that the shame, guilt, and

self-reproaches over trivialities that are the pathognomonic
feature of this neurosis are not irrational or unjustified.
Instead, they are prompted by wishes and fantasies which are
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fully intelligible as sources of such
feelings, but which
are unconscious.
(Ambivalence toward loved ones, sometimes
including death wishes, was a frequent
example.)
This
clinical understanding was the basis for
Freud's concept of
the splitting of affects from ideas, which
in turn was
central to the metapsychological concept of
unbound,

displaceable libido.
Sachs (1982) writes that Freud never stated this

principle explicitly, but in fact Freud did so in his

discussion of dream affects.
In the case of a psychical complex which has come under
the influence of the censorship imposed by resistance,
the affects are the constituent which is least
influenced and which alone can give us a pointer as to
how we should fill in the missing thoughts. This is
seen even more clearly in the psychoneuroses than in
dreams.
Their affects are always appropriate, at least
in their quality, though we must allow for their
intensity being increased owing to displacement of
neurotic attention. If a hysteric is surprised at
having to be so frightened of something trivial or if a
man suffering from obsessions is surprised at such
distressing self-reproaches arising out of a mere
nothing, they have both gone astray, because they
regard the ideational content the triviality or the
mere nothing as what is essential; and they put up an
unsuccessful fight because they take this ideational
content as the starting-point of their thought
activity. Psycho-analysis can put them upon the right
path by recognizing the affect as being, on the
contrary, justified and by seeking out the idea which
belongs to it but has been repressed and replaced by a
substitute.
(Freud, 1900/1953, p. 461; emphasis in

—

—

original)
Thus, as with the affects in obsessive-compulsive neurosis,

Freud held that affects in dreams were inherently justified
by conscious or repressed ideas.

.

49

In Freud's discharge theory
of affect, he contradicted

this view.

There, affect had no inherent
basis in the
unconscious, and acquired its character
only through
accidental connections with conscious
ideas,
it appears
that in a clinical context, Freud
believed affects provided
a reliable guide to the contents
of the unconscious,
but

that simultaneously, in the context of
metapsychology , he
attributed little meaning to affect. The
metapsychological
concept of quality-less energy dictated that
affect had to
be inconsequential, except as far as its
intensity was

concerned
With the shift to a signal theory of anxiety, clinical
and metapsychological affect theory came closer
together.

The central proposition of Freud's signal theory of anxiety

was that anxiety reflected an "internal danger situation",
and was thus justified by an unconscious state of affairs,
if not a conscious one.

This feature of the theory led

Freudian analysts to greet it as an important new insight
with far-reaching benefits (Rangell, 1968; Schur, 1953),

while some non-Freudian analysts characterized
a

it as

merely

belated recognition of common sense (Kardiner, Karush

Ovesey, 1959).

In fact,

it was neither.

&

Rather than a new

insight or an adoption of simple common sense, it was an

extension into metapsychology of the longstanding clinical
view of affects as inherently justified.
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Clinical Views of Specific Affects
Further insight into Freud's understanding
of affect
can be gained by examining some of his
discussions
of

specific affects.

In general, one finds Freud, in the

clinical writings on affect, either extending
common sense
with a piece of theory and thereby making
some anomaly

comprehensible, or conversely, importing the common
sense
understanding of affect into psychoanalysis in order

to deal

with a clinical problem.

The chief example of the former is

found in Freud's discussions of love, the essentials of

which are well known.

An example of the latter is Freud's

use of the concept of guilt to help understand the "negative

therapeutic reaction".

These and other examples are

discussed below.
Freud discussed love several times in connection with
instincts, using the everyday meaning of the term ("the

spirit of our language" [Freud, 1915/1957a]) to support the
successive versions of his dual instinct theory (Freud,
1915/1957a, 1923/1961).

When these writings are set aside

and one turns to the clinical writings, Freud's essential

addition to the understanding of love lies in his conviction
that adult love expresses longings established in infancy
and childhood, and that in some sense, love objects in

adulthood are substitutes for the parents of early
childhood.
of it"

"The finding of an object is in fact a refinding

(Freud, 1905/1953, p. 222).
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Freud elaborated this theme in
his discussion of
"transference love", the love of
female patients for their
analysts which Freud described as
inevitable (Freud,

1915/1957b).

Freud advised analysts not to turn
away from

this love, nor to attempt to pursue
the analysis "in spite
of it".
Instead, he advocated a thorough
analysis of it, in

preparation for which one should point out
to the patient
that the love is not genuine, but is
merely a transference
onto the analyst of feelings toward
infantile prototypes.
However, he is compelled to admit that such
statements to
the patient are "the truth, but not the
whole truth

regardless of the consequences"
is,

there- are no firm

(1915/1957b, p.

J.f 8)

That

,

grounds for denying that such love is

rea], since all love reproduces infantile prototypes
and

depends on them.
In addition to the general consequence of the

derivation of love from infantile attachments, namely the
seeking after love objects who duplicate characteristics of
the parents, Freud saw particular consequences of the origin
of love in infancy

(Freud,

1912/1957).

attachment to his mother, which

The boy's original

is sexual,

is

repudiated and

repressed at the dissolution of the oedipus complex,
replaced by

a

sublimated, "tender" attachment.

arr!

is

At puberty,

there is another surge of sexual interest, which must find

another object than Mte mother.

Optimally, these two

streams are united, so that sexual satisfaction with

a

woman
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heightens tender feelings for her

(the "normal over-

estimation of the sexual object in men").

However, sexual

fixation on incestuous infantile objects
disrupts this
bringing together of tenderness and
sexuality, and requires
that only "degraded" women can be
objects of sexual
interest, so as to avoid any conscious
association with the
mother.
This state of affairs exists to some
extent in all
men, Freud writes.

He has less to say about women in this

connection, except that he believes them to be
relatively

unaffected by a need to degrade sexual objects.
Freud commented on
love.

a

variety of emotions apart from

A 1922 paper contains

a

representative example.

In

the paper, Freud discusses the mechanism of projection
in

jealousy, paranoia, and homosexuality.
into three types

— normal,

He divides jealousy

projected, and delusional.

Of the

normal type, he writes that "there is net much to be said
from the analytic point of view"

(Freud, 1922/1955

He describes the components of jealous feelings

,

p.

223).

(grief,

pain, enmity, and self-criticism), but indeed, these remarks

are not psychoanalytic; that is, they do not find hidden or

forbidden meanings.

Still, Freud finds

a

place for analytic

hypotheses, as he argues that jealousy has roots in

unconscious oedipal ties and in repressed bisexuality.
These factors, he writes, establish that

although we may call it normal, this jealousy is by no
means completely rational, that it,- derived from the
actual situation, proportionate to the real
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circumstances and under the complete
control of the
conscious ego.
(Freud, 1922/1955, p. 223)
Rationality, then, establishes the
boundary of
relevance for psychoanalytic study
of this emotion,
insofar
as jealousy is -derived from the
actual situation", there is
not much for analysis to say about
it.
This position is in
sharp contrast to the metapsychological
writings, where
Freud had a great deal to say about all
affects,
it is
evident that Freud pursued different explanatory
projects in
the metapsychological and the clinical
writings on
affect.

In the former, he attempted to explain
the nature,

mechanisms, and functions of affect in general.

In the

clinical writings, he accepted common-sense views of
emotion
(e.g., that emotions which are proportionate to
the

circumstances require no explanation), and takes up only
where common sense leaves off.
One other instance of Freud's clinical affect theory
has already been described, but it may be mentioned again

here.

This is the explanation of shame, guilt, and self-

reproach in obsessional neurosis.

Here again, Freud takes

up where common sense leaves off.

In common sense, one

feels ashamed when one has done something shameful.

Freud

asserted that shame and related feelings in obsessional
neurosis were not essentially different, but that the

neurotic harbors shameful unconscious wishes, which in the

unconscious are not distinguished from actual deeds.
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Freud not only brought his theory to
bear on the
common-sense understanding of affect, but
he sometimes
employed the common-sense view of an affect
to deal with a
theoretical problem. This was the case with
the

-unconscious sense of guilt", which he used to
help explain
the "negative therapeutic reaction"
(1923/1961).

Freud was

faced with the puzzling fact that a number of
patients

responded with intensified symptoms and suffering
whenever
their analytic treatment went particularly well.

He solved

this riddle by noting that these patients were behaving
as
if they were feeling guilty; like a guilty person, they

denied themselves pleasure or gain, and saw to it that they
suffered.

Freud was satisfied with this account of the

problem, but he could not entirely reconcile himself to

violating the common-sense view of emotion by speaking of an

unconscious guilt (Freud, 1933/1964).

Summary

In the preceding review, we have seen the succession of

Freud's views of affect and the varied conceptions he held
even at single points in time.

We have seen affect fade

from its position at the center of Freud's concerns, as

instincts in particular and metapsychology in general came
to dominate.

We have seen the clinical and

metapsychological theories diverge, and have seen affect
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retain an honored plaoe in the
clinical writings while being
depicted as an epiphenomenon in
metapsychology. Finally, we
saw Freud return to some of his
earlier views, in the final
theory of anxiety.

—

CHAPTER

Hi

POST-FREUDIAN AFFECT THEORY

Introduction

Psychoanalytic theory has sometimes been thought
of as
constituting, in its entirety, a theory of affect,
so that

to review the psychoanalytic theory of affect
would require
a

review of the whole body of theory (Mandler,
1984).

Indeed, affect is pertinent to virtually all the
concerns of

psychoanalytic theory and practice, and

a

great many psycho-

analytic writings, from every school, have implications for
the understanding of affect.

Nevertheless, it is possible

to isolate a set of writings on the theory of affect per se.

Although every psychoanalytic author encounters affect or
implicates it in the course of his or her work, only some
only a relatively small number, in fact
an understanding of affect itself.

— set

out to devise

For the most part,

psychoanalytic theorists incorporate affect into their
theories without inquiring into its nature, and therefore
adopt either the common-sense views of affect (Lewin, 1965)
or some other understanding that was "in the air" at the

time.

Most of the theorists to attempt an explicit and

original formulation of affect were either directly involved
with the early Freudians or members of the predominantly
56
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American "ego psychological- movement.
is confined to these figures.

The present review

Even within this relatively

homogeneous group, the range of interests and
assumptions is
great enough that the various works sometimes
seem to occupy
different domains. The review has been divided
into four

sections, both to recognize the diversity of the
interests
and make the review more manageable.
In the first section,
the major post-Freudian metapsychological statements
on

affect are reviewed.

In the second section, a number of

prominent theoretical statements involving the relation of
affect and defense are discussed.

Thirdly, several theories

are reviewed which, although devised by psychoanalysts for
use in psychoanalytic theory, are essentially biological

theories.

Finally, the views of a number of authors who

include affect in the ego are reviewed, together with

related discussions of the place of cognition in affect.
At no point since Freud has there been a theory that

could be called the psychoanalytic theory of affect.

This

is more than an issue of the failure of any theory to be

convincing and satisfying to the majority of analysts,
although indeed no theory has been able to accomplish this
(Brierley, 1937; Brenner, 1974b; Green, 1977; Rapaport,

1953).

Beyond this, there is the question of what defines a

theory of affect as psychoanalytic.

All of the theoretical

positions reviewed here were seen by their authors as

psychoanalytic, but their grounds for viewing their state-

58

ments in this light varied greatly,

m

some cases, it was

because they constructed the
theories out of the terms of
Freud's metapsychology (Jacobson,
1971a; Rapaport, 1953),
whether or not the theories coincided
with any of Freud's
views of affect.
In other cases the justification

lay in a

supposed consistency with the spirit of
Freud's views on
affect, though concepts foreign to these
views were employed
(Brenner, 1974b; Schur, 1969).

m

still other cases the

relation of a theoretical statement to
psychoanalytic theory
in general was still more varied and
complex.
In
the end,

only historical and institutional continuity
and the

intention to advance psychoanalytic theory define
all these
views as psychoanalytic.
In the present chapter, the most pertinent
papers are

reviewed.

(A

number of other important or interesting

papers are reviewed in the Appendix.)

The four sets of

issues which provide the framework for the present review

will again appear in Chapter V, where each

is

considered in

light of the present theory of affect.

Metapsychology

No other theorist pursued the metapsychology of affect

with Freud's intensity.

This is especially the case if

metapsychology is defined as it is defined here, namely, as
explanations in which psychoanalytic metapsycholog ical

s

concepts are the final explanatory concepts,

it may be that

most Freudian authors did not feel they
had sufficient
authority to enter into this discussion,
while non-Freudian
analysts (i.e., "British school- object
relations theorists
and post-Freudians in the United States)
rejected

metapsychological concepts as explanations.

In any case,

there were only a handful of original
metapsychological

hypotheses of affect proposed by authors other than
Freud.
One such theory is contained in a 1937 paper by

Marjorie Brierley.

The paper touches on many important

topics, and it is discussed below, in the section "Object

Relations and Representations", as well as here.

metapsychological proposition is that affect is

Brierley'
a tension

phenomenon. This view, she notes, is in direct contradiction
to Freud's discharge view of affects

to the James-Lange theory).

(and, she also notes,

Brierley's assertion of

a

tension view of affect has been the occasion for many,
perhaps most, of later references to this paper, and she
herself emphasizes the importance of the assertion by
stating it early in the paper, as preliminary to her later

argument and as part of its basis.

Brierley states that affect represents instinctual
tension that has risen beyond a certain threshold; below
this threshold, she implies, tension does not emerge into

consciousness as affect.

As instinctual tensions rises

still further, affect becomes intolerable and discharge
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becomes imperative.

In this way, Brierley
reconciles her

premise with the concept of instinctual
energy, but raises
further problems, which she must then
address.

Freud initially equated tension
with pain (precisely,
"unpleasure") and discharge with pleasure.
This view fit
neatly with his fundamental conception
of the mind as an
apparatus designed for the discharge of
tension.
However,
he was compelled to acknowledge the
difficulty caused for
this theory by the pleasurable nature of
erotic tension. He
never fully resolved this contradiction.
Brierley resolves
it

within her own framework by adopting

a

premise from the

psychology of emotion, one that was at variance with
the
Freudian psychoanalytic tradition.

Citing McDougall (1918),

she adopts the view that there exist multiple instincts,
and
that each instinct is associated with its own affect.

Tension derived from some instincts is pleasurable, and that
derived from others is painful.

Brierley is unable to maintain her positions on the
relation of affect and instinct.

Early in her paper, she

had stated that affect corresponds to instinctual tension

raised beyond

a

certain threshold, and that different

affects result from different instinctual impulses.

In her

account of affect in development, however, she reverts to
the more firmly established psychoanalytic view:

"The

affect manifested is... the index to the fate of the
impulse.... A good external object is one which satisfies

s
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instinct and so produces a state
of contented feeling."
(Brierley, 1937, p. 262).
other words, the nature of an
affect is determined by whether
instinct is discharged
("satisfied-); good affect ("a state of
contented feeling")
results from either the process of
discharge or the

m

consequent state of low tension.

Brierley- theory, then, is

inconsistent.

She did not resolve the conflicting
trends in
psychoanalytic thought, the one toward affect
as primary
tension, the other toward affect as secondary
discharge.
To address affect within the context of
tension and

discharge, as Brierley does, is to address it in
terms of
the most fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic
theory.
Freud's original theory of the mechanics of mental
life
(Freud, 1895/1966b) was based tension and its discharge.

But the issue is not a "purely theoretical" one,

exercise in manipulating terms.

discharge theory of affect, it

a

mere

As we saw in Freud's

is— or

can

be— a

translation

of basic positions on emotion into the language of

metapsychology .
this way:

The relevant position here can be stated in

If affect is discharge,

it

is an

epiphenomenon

,

a

secondary consequence of the fundamental factors
(instinctual energy, and ideas), whereas if affect is
tension, it is of causal importance in its own right, and
can be a basic explanatory concept.

Thus, Brierley'

assertion of the tension view of affect is an attempt to reestablish the importance of affect in psychoanalytic theory.
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The first major metapsychological
studies of affect
after Freud's later papers
appeared in a symposium on
affect
theory held at the 1952 meetings
of the American

Psychoanalytic Association.

Two of the three papers

delivered there, one by Edith Jacobson
and the other by
David Rapaport, were subsequently
published, and they both
became major works in the metapsychology
of affect.
However, they were not followed by a
significant renewal of
interest in the Freudian metapsychology
of affect,
in fact,
they are perhaps the last papers to deal
with affect in a
purely metapsychological framework.
Edith Jacobson produced a study of psychoanalytic

affect theory as part of her extended study of
affective

disorders (i.e., depression and manic-depression or,
currently, "bipolar disorder").

In 1953 her symposium paper

appeared as a book chapter, "The Affects and Their PleasureUnpleasure Qualities, in Relation to the Psychic Discharge
Process".

In 1971 a revised and expanded version appeared

under the title "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects",
as the first chapter of a book in which Jacobson collected

her views on depression.

The earlier title gives the more

accurate indication of Jacobson's concerns.

Her discussion

centers on basic metapsychological issues; in fact, she
makes

a

consideration of affect the occasion for an argument

for altering basic psychoanalytic assumptions.

Jacobson's concerns are particularly with Freud's
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Pleasure principle and its connections
with discharge and
with affect,
Freud's metapsychology the
pleasure
principle held that the ultimate
determinant of all mental
events was the tendency toward
pleasure.
Pleasure, however,
was defined by Freud in an abstract
way, as the discharge of
energy or tension,
in Freud's writings it is often
unclear
whether such pleasure is necessarily
consciously

m

experienced.

,

By the same token, he did not draw
an equation

between this pleasure and affect.

Pleasure and affect tend

to be considered separately in Freud's
work, and in fact

they are theoretically opposed to one another
in the

discharge theory of affect; there, affect arises when
direct

gratification— pleasure— is blocked.

Jacobson, on the other

hand, takes pleasure as the prototypical affect.

She

asserts that the "pleasure" in the pleasure principle must
refer to a conscious feeling, asserting also that Freud

agreed on this point (see Jacobson, 1971b, p. 25; see also
Rapaport, 1953, p. 193, where he emphatically disputes

Jacobson

's

interpretation of Freud).

Jacobson

's

attention to pleasure as a prototype for

affect leads her to focus her theoretical interest on the

relation of affect and discharge.

One might have

an ticipated that Jacobson would advance a discharge view of
a

ffect, given the traditional Freudian equation of pleasure

and discharge and Jacobson's equation of affect and

pleasure.

In fact,

she takes

a

different direction.

She
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disputes the equation of pleasure
and discharge, aware that
she is seeking to overturn Freud's
most fundamental
metapsychological assumption, she cites
the doubts that
Freud himself expressed on this
issue in his paper on
masochism (Freud, 1924/1961). she also
points to the
Pleasure associated with increasing tension
(e.g., sexual

arousal), which Freud had also cited as
throwing doubt on
the theory.

Jacobson seeks to substitute

a

"constancy principle"

for the pleasure principle as the basic
determinant of

psychic functioning.

Jacobson's "constancy principle"

states that the psychic apparatus seeks to maintain

a

generally constant level of tension, not to reduce tension
to a minimum.

Her wish to make this change in

metapsychology appears to have been

a

reaction against

Freud's Hirvana principle, which was the logical—and
extreme

— extension

of the pleasure principle, and which

stated that the ultimate tendency of the mind was toward
death.

In any event, Jacobson seeks to unseat pleasure as

the primary motivation.
In addition to altering the place of pleasure in

psychoanalytic theory, Jacobson seeks

a

more refined

metapsychological understanding of pleasure itself, and

it

is this aspect of her writings on pleasure that bears

directly on affect theory.

Jacobson denies that pleasure

can be equated with discharge.

However, she does not

,

,
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depart from the "economic- view of
pleasure, that is, the
view that pleasure is based on psychic
energy,
instead, she

proposes that pleasure (and unpleasure)
can be the result of
either increases or decreases in psychic
tension.
Instead
of increase or decrease in tension as
the determining factor
of the quality of feeling (pleasurable
or unpleasurable)
she suggests the rate of increase or decrease
as a more
relevant factor. She proposes that tension
simultaneously
rises on one part of the "psychic apparatus"
and
is

discharged elsewhere, and pleasure corresponds to
optimal
fluctuations in tension.

Although Jacobson points to the importance of affects
other than pleasure and unpleasure, her theory of affect

focuses almost exclusively on these.

Thus, her theory of

affect is essentially a complex re-alignment of the psycho-

analytic concepts of tension, discharge, pleasure, and
unpleasure.

Rapaport's paper at the 1952 symposium (Rapaport, 1953)
has been cited most often for its review of Freud's affect

theories.

Rapaport himself seems to be more interested, in

this paper, in making an original statement on metapsycho-

logical affect theory, within the "structural" version of

metapsychology he favored.

Thus, he proceeds from his

review of Freud, in the first part of the paper, to a review
of such theorists as Brierley (1937)

,

Jacobson (1953)

Fenichel (1941/1954), and Landauer (1938), praising or
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faulting each according to whether
their formulations are
compatible with his own. Finally,
he attempts to "sketch
the outlines of a theory as it
seems to emerge from this
review" (p. 194).
The main terms of Rapaport

affect channels,

2)

theory are:

1)

inborn

inborn affect thresholds,

3)

similar

's

channels and thresholds for drives, and

4)

progressive

taming of drive-based motivations during
development.

Rapaport maintains that affect exists in early
life in the
form of inborn channels for drive energy.
These channels
direct the energy that cannot be directly discharged
through

satisfaction of drives into either the interior of the
body
(i.e., Freud's "secretory and motor innervation")

or perhaps

to the exterior of the body in the form of instinctive

adaptive responses (e.g., the infant's smiling or startje
responses)

.

As new obstacles are placed in the way of drive

gratification, greater and greater use is made of these
affect channels to carry off energy.
In the course of development, there is a progressive

"taming" of affects, as the inborn affects are supplemented
by subtler, more complex, and less "peremptory" ones.

process is the result of three factors.

This

First, the drive

energy which affects dispose of becomes tamed itself, and
the tamer quality of this energy is passed on to the

affects.

Second, new affect-channels are developed.

Rapaport provides no examples of such acquired affect-

67

channels, so one can only surmise
what they might be.
Third, there are changes in
the affect-thresholds (that
is,
the amount of energy that must
be diverted into affectchannels before discharge occurs),
the mature adult, one
therefore finds "mobile" affect energy,
evident in the form
of "affect storms", and more
restrained, controls, and

m

subtle affects.

Rapaport is reluctant to accept affects
as motives or
as objects of defense.
He acknowledges that

in some cases

affects appear to play

a

role similar to drives, and admits

that it may not always be possible to
attribute these

features to the underlying drive.

He states that one may

have to adopt some aspects of Freud's first
(tension) theory
of affect to accommodate these instances of
affects playing

the part of drives.

Rapaport emphasizes that in his view, affects have an
actual existence even when they are not in the process of

discharge.

He criticizes Freud's discharge theory for not

accommodating this fact, and argues that his own concept of

affect-thresholds does so.

He also favors Freud's concept

of signal affects which are freed from dependency on energy

and can be "actively produced" by the ego.

Like Jacobson, Rapaport in this paper vigorously

pursues a metapsychological account of affect.

He does so

with an even greater disregard of clinical utility or

intelligibility.

His constructs have no clear everyday
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referents, and deliberately so.

They are intended to relate

only to one another, so as to
build

a

dependent postulates and hypotheses,

system of inter-

m

evaluating his

theory, then, it is important to
distinguish between its
success in terms of Rapaport's goals
and success in

elucidating affect in more generally accepted
terms.

For

the former, one may accept Rapaport's own
estimation that
the theory was only "one possible interpretation"
of where

psychoanalytic theory stood at that time, to which
one may
add that Rapapcrt was one of the foremost
systematize!
s

the abstract principles of psychoanalytic reasoning.

of

For

the latter goal of elucidating affect per se, however,
it is

difficult to identify any real contribution

in

Rapaport's

original formulations.

Defense and Affect

Psychoanalytic theory has been ambivalent about the
relation of affect and defense.

On the one hand, many

theorists have routinely referred to defenses against affect
and to affects employed as defenses

(Novey, 1959).

himself did so, when he was writing in

a

"clinical" vein,

unconstrained by metapsychological formalities
1922/1955).

Freud

(e.g.,-

Freud,

On the other hard, Freud and others have denied

that affect could either be defended against or serve as

defense.

a

Only instincts or drives could be the legitimate

]
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objects of defense, according to
this reasoning, and as for
affect serving as defenses, this fit
neither with the
discharge theory of affects as epiphenomenal
residues of
other processes nor with the signal theory,
which described
anxiety as a signal for defense but not as
itself defending
against the dangerous internal situation.
The four writers discussed below raise various
aspects
of the issues in the relation of affect and
defense. The
early paper by Earnest Jones is widely cited on this
theme.
The Zilboorg paper is almost never cited, and
yet it

develops important specific possibi

?

t

j

has been an important statement on the

and affects.

es .

Fenichel's paper

relations of the ego

Finally, Schafer's writings on affects as

"disclaimed actions* are included here.
In 1929, Earnest Jones published "Fear, Guilt and

Hate," one of the very few papers by early members of the

Freudian movement directly to address emot Jons

.

The paper

is most often cited by later analytic writers in connection

with its discussion of the "layering" of affects (e.g.,
Brierley, 1937; Novey, 1959).
formula:

Jones begins the paper with

Each of the "emotional attitudes" of the title

exists in three "layers", the surface one of the apparent
(and conscious)

emotion,

a

deeper one consisting of one of

the remaining two, and a still deeper one consisting of the

initial emotion in an ego-dystonic

threatening form.

,

primitive, and

This layering reflects

a

developmental

a

70

progression as well as

a

continuing dynamic interaction

(though these two are not clearly
distinguished by Jones).
Matters soon become less orderly as
Jones develops his
argument, specifying the interactions
among pairs of the
three, then analyzing each emotion
separately,
it emerges
that only fear and hate conform to
the three-layered pattern
described in the paper's opening paragraphs,
and that

moreover the nature of the layering
involved-developmental
progression, dynamic conflict, or some
combination of the

two— varies

from one emotion to the other, in ways
that

Jones makes no attempt to systematize.
Jones examines first hate, then guilt, and
finally
fear.

Hate is described as

three-layer construction, in

a

which only the first layer— anger— is conscious.

This anger

covers guilt or anxiety (or fear), which in turr is
produced
by an infantile "primary hate n

,

composed of frustration-

generated rage and sexual sadism.

Developmentally , Jones

describes the eventual overtaking by guilt and anxiety of
early satisfaction in hate.
of
is

impotence "

,

In order to overcome this state

the guilt is projected outwards

viewed as guilty of wrong-doing

— then

— some

person

this person is

"identified with" the originally thwarting person, the
object of the primary hate.

This primary hate thus finds

modified expression in conscious anger or righteous
indignation, with the added benefit of relief from guilt,
owing to the projection of the forbidden impulses

(i.e./

a

.
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"I'm not bad f s/he is")
Jones postulates two functions of conscious
anger, to
defend against guilt and anxiety and to
express primitive
hate.
Each postulated function carries important

implications.

To claim that affect per se serves as a

defense was a departure from the prevailing view
of defenses
as occurring in the domain of meanings, thoughts,
symbols,

and other specifically mental or cognitive contents,
with

secondary effect on affect.

This continued to be, and

remains, a minority view, and contrasts both with Freud's

discharge view of affect as

a

release of instinctual energy

and with his later view of signal anxiety. In Jones*

formulation of anger, anxiety and guilt are defended against
(rather than being signals for defense)

,

and the defense is

itself an emotion, though an emotion based in part on mental

operations (viewing some person as guilty and in terms of an
earlier, thwarting object
ment)

— i.e.,

projection and displace-

.

Following hate/anger, Jones takes up guilt.

The

account of guilt differs from that of hate in that Jones
does not describe a layering of the same sort.

describes two developmental stages of guilt.

Instead, he
The first, a

preliminary, "pre-nef ar ious" form, consists only of the

renunciation of libidinal strivings when these are
frustrated and therefore produce unbearable anxiety.

(Here

Jones employs a version of Freud's view of anxiety in his

72

theory of anxiety neurosis.)

Jones' terms the second stage

of guilt "true guilt", and states
that it is constituted by
the turning against the self of the
rage and sadism evoked

by frustration, this turning against the
self being

motivated by dread of punishment and by love for
the person
who is simultaneously hated.
Jones cites his clinical experience that guilt
is, for
most people, virtually intolerable, and poses a
question:

How can guilt be both more and less intolerable than
the

emotions

— fear

and hate

— that

it defends against?

His

answer is that "guilt" refers to both the "pre-nefarious"
stage and to guilt in the full sense.

However, his account

grows confused at this point, in part due to a failure to

maintain the distinction between developmental and dynamic
issues

— he

implies that guilt becomes intolerable when, in

the course of development, it becomes true guilt, whereas at

another point he describes the defensive layering in

question as

a

dynamic, ongoing one, and therefore not one in

which one form of guilt is supplanted by

a more

mature one.

For present purposes, two points are particularly

noteworthy.

First, guilt, unlike fear and hate, is not

depicted in a primitive, basic, unacceptable form.

This is

consistent with other psychoanalytic views, in which guilt
is described as an amalgam of more basic forces, constructed

to solve a conflict.

Second, in Jones* account of guilt we

find indications of aspects of the process by which one

.

emotion can defensively replace
another.

Guilt emerges when

the hated and feared object is
internalized, that is, when
there is a re-arrangement of selfand object-images and the

relations between them.
Finally, Jones discusses fear.

Be begins by inquiring

whether hate and guilt are necessary
conditions for fear,
since in clinical situations fear is
accompanied always by
hate and usually by guilt. He concludes that
it must be

possible in earliest infancy for fear to occur
alone, and
his evidence is that such seems to be the case
in animals.
In making this phylogenetic connection, he is
compelled to

note that he js using the term
^fear' in this paper in the clinical sense of anxiety
and apprehension, not necessarily in the biological
sense of alertness with its appropriate responses
(Jones, 1929, p. 389n)

Jones proceeds with his discussion of fear with

reference to Freud's 1926 discussion of anxiety,

a

in

particular the distinction between primal, pre-ideational
anxiety caused by traumatic libidinal over-excitation and
signal anxiety deployed by the ego in response to the danger
of an approaching traumatic over-excitation.

Freud's claim that primal anxiety is purely

Jones rejects
a

product of

undischarged libido, and argues instead that, although it
has no ideational content, it does constitute a defense.

Here Jones introduces an original concept: aphanisis.

Aphanisis "means total annihilation of the capacity for

sexual gratification, direct or
indirect"

(Jones, 1929, p.

By sexual gratification Jones
means any satisfaction
or pleasure resulting from any
activity in life. Jones
seeks with this concept to unite
castration anxiety, fear of
loss of love, and the quasi-physiological
concept of libido.
For both Jones and Freud, the fundamental
danger posed by
391).

castration or loss of love— that is, the reasons
these
constitute catastrophes for the "personality"
(Jones)

or the

"psychic apparatus"

(Freud)— is that they make discharge of

libido impossible.

According to Jones, the infant undergoes

an exhaustion of libido after prolonged build-up
(similar to

the cessation of hunger after prolonged fasting), and
this

provides the infant with an experience of aphanisis against
which all subsequent defenses are ultimately directed,
including the defense of primal anxiety.

This anxiety

offers a defense against dangerously mounting excitation

through mental and physical inhibition and over-excitation.

Inhibition "isolates the ego" from the excitation, and is
akin to repression; over-excitation provides some measure of

discharge.
In Jones' conclusion, he notes that there exist two

stages in the development of each of the three affects under

discussion; in all three cases the external world of object

relations plays a greater role in the second stage.

Next,

Jones calls attention to the lack of inhibition in hate,

which distinguishes it from fear and guilt and which Jones
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relates to the deleterious social
and psychological
consequences of hate. Finally, he
formulates the paths of
inhibition and defense as the two
alternatives available
when libidinal excitation accumulates
beyond the infant's
capacity to tolerate it, and describes
as the aim of
psychoanalytic therapy to induce tolerance
of guilt, hate,
and fear, which requires increased
confidence
on the

analysand's part that wishes can be held in
abeyance without
being inhibited (i.e., renounced) forever.
In this bold formulation, we find the
familiar mingling

of psychological and physiological reasoning,
in the context
of which an affect can exist without an
object and yet serve
a

defensive function,

we find a new process through which

emotion provides a defense; it is

a

relatively automatic

process, relatively mechanical and non-purposive.

bition and avoidance play

a

Inhi-

role, as does partial discharge.

Finally, it is worth noting, given the controversy in

psychoanalytic affect theory over whether affect signifies
tension or discharge, that Jones' description of primal

anxiety includes excitation itself as

a

form of discharge,

and includes also inhibition (which may be seen as a third

possibility, neither tension nor discharge) as

a

basic

component of anxiety.
In 1933 Gregory Zilboorg, a Mew York analyst, published

"Anxiety Without Affect", which he had delivered as

a

paper

to the New York Psychoanalytic Society the previous year.
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Zilboorg gives little preface to
his remarks, and gives no
indication of whether any current
controversies prompted
them.
He states that the formulations
he offers grew out of
thoughts on a particular case, which
he reports on in
detail.

Zilboorg has to justify his surprising
title, since
anxiety was considered an affect; indeed,
this was perhaps
the only aspect of anxiety that was not
in question.
Zilboorg was compelled to bring even this into
question by
one analytic case, in which the patient
described every

aspect of his life— homosexual and heterosexual
experiences,
his difficulty devoting himself to a career,
details of his
medical studies, his father's progressive illness— in
the
same flat, unemotional tone.

As the analysis proceeded, the

patient described dreams and thoughts representing

castration in symbolic forms, which Zilboorg regarded as
inevitably anxiety-provoking.
however, was undisturbed.

The patient's aplomb,

During the same phase of the

analysis the patient experienced several episodes of

physiological responses corresponding to acute anxiety; his
pulse raced, his face paled, his breathing quickened, and so
on.

He was aware of these changes, but denied any feelings,

describing the episodes as "purely physiological".
Zilboorg described this man's thoughts and responses as

"anxiety without affect".

He considered the dreams and

thoughts with implied connections to castration as the

"ideational component" of an anxiety
response, and the
physical reactions he considered the
physiological
component. Despite these factors, the
patient had no
subjective sense that he was anxious; this
subjective sense,
or "feeling tone"

,

Zilboorg considered the affective

component of the anxiety reaction.
Thus, in Zilboorg »s formulation, anxiety
is something
to be defended against.

He implies a specific mechanism for

accomplishing this, namely, splitting up the normally
unitary anxiety reaction and suppressing the "subjective
experience", which Zilboorg believed was possible even if
the physiological reactions take place.

Freud had

emphasized the possibility of splitting affect from
cognition, but Zilboorg was the first to suggest that

affective phenomena could themselves be split in the process
of defense.

Otto Fenichel, best known for his comprehensive
textbook The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, was also

a

prolific author of articles in clinical and metapsychological theory.

Among the latter is "The Ego and the

Affects", written in English after Fenichel had emigrated
from Berlin to Los Angeles, and published in 1941.

In this

paper, Fenichel depicts affects as closely similar to

instincts, and in particular as having similar relations

with the ego, such as pressing for expression and being held
back by defensive efforts of the ego.
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Like Brierley's 1937 article, Fenichel's
elevates
affects to a central importance, but unlike
Erierley, he
does not set out to do so; instead, the
centrality of affect
emerges in the course of Fenichel's coordination
of

observations on emotional behavior with basic
features of
psychoanalytic theory of ego and neurosis. He readily
concludes that, in practice, there is

between instinct and affect.

a

virtual isomorphism

He states that defense against

instinct is always defense against affect, that
is

a "weak"

ego

overwhelmed by primitive affects, just as it is with

instincts, whereas

a

strong ego treats affects as it does

instincts, modulating them, sublimating them, and employing

them toward its own ends.

Unexpressed affects, like

unexpressed instincts, accumulate and press for discharge,
requiring energy to contain them and betraying themselves in

derivatives, in lability or rigidity, or in general fatjgue.
In short, the parallels between instinct and affect are so

complete that one is left wondering what necessity

is served

by instinct theory.

Fenichel was a knowledgeable and careful exponent of

Freudian metapsychology

,

with the result that the

contradictions and ambiguities of classical psychoanalytic
affect theory are highlighted in the article.

For example,

Fenichel must reconcile his description of affect as

virtually equivalent to instinct with the firm distinction
drawn by Freud between affect and instinct.

In Freud's

view, instincts and their
associated energy are the sour,:ce
of psychic tension, and affect
is one form of the discharge
of such tension.
Affects, per se, cannot be
repressed,
since they are active processes
of discharge; only a

"disposition" toward affect can be
repressed.
his equation of affect and instinct,

Fenichel, in

is hard pressed to

maintain these views of Freud's.

He affirms them

(Fenichel,

1941/1954, p. 221), but virtually all the
implications of
his position stand in contradiction to
them.
He is closer
to Freud's earliest views of affect in
the theory
of

hysteria (cf. Fenichel, 1941/1954, p. 220).
An even more fundamental ambiguity of the
classical

view emerges with clarity in Fenichel' s paper.

Irrationality is regarded with considerable ambivalence in
psychoanalysis.

The instincts are the enemy of psycho-

logical health, and reducing their influence is the goal of

psychoanalytic treatment
be"

— yet

— "where

id was,

there shall ego

Freud also advocated the view that all the acti-

vities of human life were expressions of the instincts, and
insofar as they are gratifying, are so for this reason.

Fenichel

's

In

paper, affects largely take the place of

instincts, and a similar ambiguity emerges.

He begins by

describing fully discharged affects as always representing

a

loss of the ego's usual control over the body, and therefore
a

regression from healthy adult functioning.

Affects are

described as embattling the ego, forcing their way through
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despite the ego's efforts, and consuming
energy that is then
unavailable for adaptive pursuits.
However, Fenichel also
depicts affects as beneficial, within
a strong
ego.

a

strong ego is capable of "synthesizing"
the affects, that
is, integrating them within its
overall functioning, to its

considerable benefit.

This situation makes itself manifest

in the "autonomous, active, free play
of the victorious ego

with its multiplicity of affects- (Fenichel,
1941/1954, p.
226).
Defenses against affect should be secure but not
rigid.

Roy Schafer has produced a large body of theoretical
and metatheoretical psychoanalytic writing, in which
affect,

although not a consistent theme, has received considerable
attention.

His most sustained treatment of affect is in his

1976 book, A New Language for Psychoanalysis, in which he

advocates abandoning the traditional psychoanalytic meta-

psychology in favor of what he calls "action language".

One

aspect of this action language is to regard emotions as
"disclaimed actions", that is, actions for which the person
does not wish to take responsibility.

This process of

disclaiming action is the model, for Schafer, of all
defense, and emotions, therefore, are all involved in

defensive operations.
The consideration of emotion in the context of action

language was preceded by an earlier paper.

Here,

I

that paper, then discuss emotion in action language.

review

In his first major discussion
of affect, "The Clinical

Analysis of Affects"

(1964), Schafer comments on
a broad

variety of issues; the comments
are unified mainly by the
proposition that the theory of affect
had suffered

from far
too much abstract, metapsychological
formulation and a
neglect of the actual thoughts and
actions of clinicians in
the analytic situation.
The paper benefits from Schafer
>«

exceptional appreciation for subtlety,
nuance, and
ambiguity, and the view of affect that
emerges
is

extraordinarily rich and multif aceted .
remarks or central tenets are attempted.

Few summarizing

Schafer's intent

in the paper is not to advance a theory
but to "re-examine

the means by which we learn about affects in
the clinical

situation"

(p.

275).

He explores eight categories which, he

believes, analysts "have in mind" when they do analytic
work
with affects.

These include affect existence, affect

formation, affect strength, affect communication, and
others.

The explorations provide

a

context for many remarks

on the nature and importance of affects, their development,

and the central role of the analysis of affects in

psychoanalytic treatment.
Schafer is able to make his points without taking

a

position on any of the controversies that had gone on for
years or decades in the psychoanalytic literature on affect.
For example, he does not discuss whether affect represent

tension or discharge, and he describes patients avoidance
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and defense against their affects
without pursuing the metapsychology of unconscious affect.
This neglect of

theoretical disputes is not through lack
of familiarity or
disinclination to theoretical discourse,
as Schafer's

a

later

work

(1968, 1976, 1983) makes clear,

it seems instead to be

demonstration of his point that clinicians
function every
day in intimate interaction with affects,
without
a

requiring

answers to the controversies that had been
pursued with such
vigor in metatheoretical discussions; and
therefore the

everyday conceptions, far from depending on metatheory,
could be the basis for it.

Schafer does take an implied position on one basic
issue.

Nowhere in his discussion are affects depicted as

physiological entities, nor as automatic or innate.

Ever

when he discusses affect "location" in terms of areas of the
body, there is no implication that affects actually occur in

distinct parts of the body, or that if parts of the body

become specially involved in an affective experience, that
this is

a

necessary part of experiencing that affect.

It

is

clear that for Schafer, psychology is the basis for all

aspects of affective experience, and that he believes

physiology to be extraneous to clinical work with affects,
and probably also to a satisfactory psychoanalytic theory of

affect.

Turning now to the action language book

(Schafer,

1976), we find that in this instance Schafer's work is
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guided by a specific purpose apart
from expanding the
understanding of emotions. A polemical
interest guides the
presentation, as Schafer was arguing
that a technical
language in which all psychological
entities are described
as groups of actions and modes of
action could and should
replace psychoanalytic metapsychology
.
Emotions posed a
critical test for this system, and Schafer
endeavors to show
not only that they can be rendered in
his action language
but that this rendering clarifies our
understanding
of them.

Schafer objects strenuously to the reification
and

substantialization of emotions.
to emotions doing

He describes all references

things— "having effects"

on people's

thoughts and actions—as crude metaphors at best, and
more

commonly as concretistic , infantile ways of thinking and
talking incorporated into psychological theory.

He has the

same criticisms of the entities of psychoanalytic meta-

psychology, such as id, ego, and superego.

He argues that

it is critically important for psychoanalysts to stop using

such metaphors as if they corresponded to real entities, and

proposes that they employ instead

a

comprehensive set of

terms in which all references to entities other than the

person are specifically excluded.
For emotions, this means eliminating references to

a

mythical entity which is "expressed", "controlled",

"experienced", "built up", and which "overwhelms" us,
"poisons our hearts", "lifts our spirits", "energizes" us,

etc.

instead, he offers examples
of translations into
actions and modes of action.
For example,

embrace on self *Ln?o™illl

(IchaL^m^

p?' 27?)

"

ll^'AoT.

P ° tentia11 * * ble to say so.

The action language was a proposal
for

a

truly radical

change in psychoanalytic theorizing, and
it called for an
equally fundamental change in the
ordinary-language ways of

conceptualizing emotion.
influence of Ryle (1949)

In the above passage, the
is evident,

both in Schafer's

objections to the concept of an entity "behind"
or "withinobservable actions, and in his use of dispositions
to

actions ("to be likely. ..to smile, laugh, sing,
and dance",
etc.)

as

b

means of eliminating concepts of entities.

He

denies that there is an experience of emotion that is

private in principle and inaccessible to others, and

discusses the personal experience of emotion as one possible
interpretive description of

a set of

actions.

The notion of "disclaimed action" is Schafer's way of

translating the psychoanalytic concepts of the impulses and

mechanisms that make up the "psychic apparatus".
or drives are "conditional actions"

Impulses

(i.e.- actions a person

would do under different circumstances), and many such
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conditional actions are disclaimed by
thinking and speaking
of them as concrete entities.
Similarly, "mechanisms- , such
as defenses and symptoms, are also often
disclaimed by
referring to them as things that happen
rather than chosen
means of coping and/or experiencing satisfaction.
There are
many reasons people disclaim so many of
their actions.

These include protecting relationships, protecting
one's
image or self-image, and reducing the "excitement
and

violence" of life.

The reasons, in fact, include all the

motives for defense.
Emotions are, for Schafer, the epitome of disclaimed
action, because they are invariably spoken of as things

which are passively experienced or -undergone", and never as
modes of action that are chosen for various reasons.
Schafer insists that emotions are best thought of as
"enacted", rather than undergone.

For all of the many

reasons that other actions are disclaimed, people often

prefer to avoid identifying with and taking responsibility
for the actions and modes of action that make up emotion.

Unconscious Affect
The issue of unconscious affect is conceptually related
to that of defense and affect, and its history in

psychoanalysis has been similar as well.

On the one hand,

Freud stated flatly, in the context of the discharge theory
of affect, that affect could by definition not be
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unconscious.

W"

sLuld^awarl
Known to

°th2?
consciouLess."^^
^HftJ^STSh.

concerned.

(Freud,

1913^4^1^77)

Some authors have followed Freud
on this point, at least
when they have attempted to be
conceptually rigorous (e.g.,
Blau, 1955; Fenichel, 1941/1954;
Moore & Fine, 1968), and
analysts continue to be uncomfortable
with the concept of
unconscious affect. However, uncomfortable
they may be,
though, they employ the concept readily,
just as Freud did.
There is, as we think, no doubt about
the origin of
this unconscious need for punishment
if only the
words went together better, we should be
justified for
all practical purposes in calling it an
"unconscious
sense of guilt".
(Freud, 1933/1964, p. 109)

Jealousy is one of those affective states, like
grief,
that may be described as normal,
if anyone appears to
be without it, the inference is justified
that it has
undergone severe repression and consequently plays
all
the greater part in his unconscious mental life.
(Freud, 1922/1955, p. 223)
In discussing affect and defense, we have already

encountered references to unconscious or repressed affect.
Jones'

(1929)

concept of layered affects implied unconscious

affect in some instances, and Fenichel (1941/1954) addressed
the issue specifically.

In the present section, though,

unconscious affect is the specific focus.

That is, the concern

of the present section is affect that has an "actual existence"

without being conscious (as opposed to
as Freud

a

"potential to develop",

[1915/1957d] described it), that is actively kept out of
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awareness, and which in addition
uon 1S
iq kk
ftl1 „u f
thought
to have important
consequences while unconscious,
a rew
few representative
r P nr Man f
discussions
are reviewed.
.

.

•

To return first to Jones'

(1929)

paper, we find that he

depicts hate, guilt, and anxiety as
possibly or even typically unconscious. The theoretical
necessity of unconscious
emotion in Jones' argument is less
clear than it might be
due to the lack of a consistent
distinction between
development and intra-psychic dynamics,
if the hate-guiltanger relation is one of individual
development,
it

is not

necessary to view the earlier emotions as
unconscious; they
could simply be supplanted over time.
However, Jones is
clear in stating that he does view hate and
guilt as
unconscious, not supplanted, which, together with
the
metaphor of "layering", leaves no doubt that Jones
is

departing from Freud on this point.

Brierley's (1937) discussion of affect includes

a

consideration of unconscious affect and its role in neurosis
and its treatment. Her advocacy of a concept of unconscious

affect is consistent with her metapsycholog ical position on

affect as

a

tension phenomenon, tension being something that

can have an actual existence without being active. Brierley

considered the making conscious of unconscious affects
central part of psychoanalytic treatment.

a

She regarded

repressed affects as dissociated fragments of the ego

(or

"self", as it might be called today in this context), and
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making these affects conscious,
she felt, constituted a
crucial bit of integrative
analytic work. Her description
of this process startlingly
anticipates Schafer
(1983)

and

other present day writers of
the psychoanalytic construction
of the personal "narrative"
(e.g., Spence, 1982).
What happens when a repressed
fragment of eqoexperience comes into consciousness?
The oatienf fp e1e
the emotion he was formerly unable
to endure!
It It
can reconstruct for him by
transference interpretation
P
tl0 S WhiCh finally provoked
?hIs feefinc
2
9'
Can recover the infantile
realitySIES
bases of the phantasies, the experience
will fall into
perspective as a part of his personal
history.
Tn
structural terms, the dissociated
ego-fragment can
m ln egrated Wi h the ^ality4go.
LSactiSn
do^
n^ Sdo away with^ the liability to feel,
does not
though it
the pathological intensity of the
infantile
ma3
uncfc ion is to open the hitherto
h^rr^S path *from ?5
barred
id f
to personal ego. Working-through
is, in part, a drainage of residual
affect
but, in essence, it is a stabilizing processpockets,
of eqoatl °n
re ' integration - (Brierley, 1937,
pp.
265-266

^n^?}
S^h" T

.

S

There have been a small number of papers devoted

specifically to the question of unconscious affect (Knapp,
1957;

Pulver, 1971; Reid, 1956).

been the most frequently cited.

unconscious affects exist.

Of these, Pulver

's

has

Pulver argues that

He explains Freud's theoretical

objections to this concept as

a

result of the discharge

theory of affect, and suggests that Freud retained these

objections despite discarding the discharge theory because
of the influence of linguistic conventions linking affect,

"feelings", and conscious awareness.

conventions are misleading.

Pulver believes such
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Pulver does not base his case
on conceptual analysis,
but instead provides empirical
evidence for the existence of
unconscious affects. However, he
requires a definition of
affect that does not rely on
subjective experience.
He

argues that we are justified in
inferring an affect when an
"individual shows physiological,
ideational and motor
behavior usually associated with a
central feeling state"
(Pulver, 1971, p. 350).
The feeling state at such" times
can be conscious, preconscious , or
unconscious; that is, the
individual may be aware of it, may be capable
of becoming

aware of it with "an ordinary effort of
attention", or may
be incapable of becoming aware of it through
ordinary

efforts of attention.
Among Pulver's examples of preconscious affect
are the

constant feeling states he asserts we are in, usually

without being aware of it, as well as stronger feeling
states aroused by particular events (e.g., an argument)

which eventually come to our awareness by intruding on some

other focus of attention or which are evident to others if
not to ourselves.

Among his examples of unconscious affect

are analytic patients who behaved angrily or elatedly, in

situations that would warrant these feelings, but denied
having these emotions,

Pulver successfully demonstrates that there are

affective phenomena that correspond to the descriptions of
conscious, preconscious, and unconscious ideas in psycho-
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analytic theory.

However, he does little to resolve
the

conceptual anomaly of unconscious
affect.

operationally defines affects as

As noted, he

a set of

physiological,

ideational, and motor phenomena "usually
associated with a
central feeling state". He argues that
we are justified in
inferring the central feeling state,
whether or
not the

individual feels it.

We are left with a definition of

affect as a central feeling state that one
may or may not
feel.
If Pulver provided a conception of affect
that did

not rely on the unexplicated concept of "feeling
state" he

might have provided a solution to the theoretical
problem,
but on the contrary, he is careful to state that his

definition of affect refers solely to the "pure feeling",
not to associated "affective phenomena", in the ideational,

physiological, or motor spheres.

Biological Theories

Biological theories of affect occupy

psychoanalytic theory.

a

special place in

In a broad sense they are meta-

psychological, in that they offer explanations of

psychological phenomena which are not themselves in
psychological terms.

However, Freud's metapsychology was

not a biological theory.

theory, one might say.

Rather, it was

a

para-biological

Its structure and logic were

biological, but its terms were sui generis

— they

occupied a
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special category between the
realms of biology and
psychology, and between the realms
of the literal and the
metaphorical,
in contrast to Freud's
theories of affect,
some of which were partly
biological and some of which were
purely in terms of his own
metapsychological , there have
been several analytic theories of
affect which have been
biological in a simple sense; that is
these theories have
r
employed explanatory concepts current
in biology and have
not used metapsychological concepts as
explanations.
Like Freud, other analysts have freely
referred to
biology in their discussions of affect,
and have sometimes
taken considerable liberties with biological
fact.
For
example, Jones' (1929) paper exemplifies certain
aspects of
the connections frequently drawn in
psychoanalytic theory

between psychological and biological reasoning and
evidence.
A continuity and basic identity is assumed
between non-human

responses and psychological ("clinical-) ones, and the
nonhuman responses are assumed to indicate the nature of the
earliest, perhaps pre-psychological human phenomena.

These

earliest phenomena are further thought to remain at the
deepest regions of the psyche throughout life, either as
mental phenomena or at the boundary of the physical and the
mental

(as in

Freud's definition of instincts).

Similarly, Franz Alexander, in

a

paper that is

discussed in more detail in the Appendix (Alexander, 1935),

effectively equates emotions and psychosomatic conditions,
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continuing a theme that had begun with
the Studies on
Hysteria concerning the ambiguously
psychological

and

somatic character of emotions,

where Freud and Breuer held

that psychological energy— affect—
could be dissipated
through physical emotional expression or
physical conversion
symptoms, Alexander maintained that an
unconscious logic
could cross the mind-body boundary and disturb
somatic

functions.

Questions about how such a transition could be
possible, and concomitant questions about the nature
of
emotion, did not arise or were ignored.

There have been frequent occasions in the analytic

literature in which

a

distinction has been drawn, in effect,

between biological and psychological affects; in some
instances, this contrast has been considered identical with
the contrast of id and ego.

For example, Rapaport (1953)

refers to Freud's discharge theory as an "id-theory",

because of its emphasis on physiology.
(1959)

Similarly, Novey

contrasts primitive, primary affects with later

affects that are based on psychological object images, and
Zetzel (1949) proposes a similar distinction.
(1955)

Rangell

argues that anxiety must be biological, since it is

"suffered" rather than voluntarily initiated, and Blau
(1955), in a paper discussed below, effectively divides

unpleasant emotions into biological and psychological
categories.

In each of these instances, no new psycho-

analytic theory has been proposed.

Instead, relatively
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unquestioned assumptions are
made about physiological
Processes or innate behavioral
sequences, and these are
applied to existing
psychoanalytic formulations.
In the Appendix, a
controversy over the theory of
anxiety which revolved around
issues of the relation of
biology and psychoanalysis is
reviewed,
the remainder of
the present section, several
other instances of biology

m

i„

the psychoanalytic theory of
affect are reviewed.
Landauer 's (1938) paper exemplifies
the casual use of

biological speculation that
characterized some of the work
of early analysts.
Blau's (1955) paper, as noted
above,
shows a combination of biology and
psychology.
Ero de (1980)
provides

more recent example of biological
theory brought
to bear on the psychoanalytic
theory of affect. Finally,
Bowlby (1969) provides an original
synthesis of biology and
Freudian metapsychological , including a
specific account of
emotion.
a

In 1936, Karl Landauer delivered -Affects,
Passions and

Temperament" at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical
Institute on the occasion of Freud's 80th birthday;
it was
published soon after (Landauer, 1938). Glover
(1939) cites
it as an important paper, and Jacobson

(195 3)

includes it

among her selective review of psychoanalytic papers cn

affect.

Among recent authors, Emde (1980) in particular

cites the paper with approval.
Even among works of psychoanalytic metapsychology , the
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Landauer paper is unusually
obscure.

Few passages can be
interpreted with confidence,
and the principal
points of the
Presentation remain elusive even
on careful reading.
Hapaport (1953) understates
the case when he refers
to the
paper as "not easy to follow-.
One suspects the paper
acquired its importance through
historical context, that is,
that Landauer 's varied
speculations and suggestive but
undeveloped themes achieved some
lasting impact owing to
their having been delivered in
Vienna, possibly in Freud's
presence, at a time when Vienna
remained the center
of

psychoanalytic thought.

One presumes that the meaning
of

the remarks was clearer to those
present than to later
readers less familiar with the issues
most urgent at that
time.
As for Emde's (1980) praise, he
appears to have seen
in the paper indications of a
view similar to his own

"organizational" view of affect.
Among Landauer

's

concerns in the paper, the theme of

affects as compromises in

a

conflict is prominent.

Landauer

ascribes the view to Freud that all affects are
the product
of conflict, on the basis of Freud's description
of affects
as "inherited hysterical attacks".

seems quite distant from Freud's.

In fact, Landauer's view

Whereas Freud thought of

affect either as a means of disposing of tension when
other
forms of discharge are inhibited by conflict or as
that

a

a

signal

conflict has become active, Landauer described the

affective expression as itself incorporating the enactment
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of two opposing instinctive
impulses,

-pulse

ftlJcb

^

^

^^

to conceal and the
unconscious impulse to display.

Thus, Landauer breaks down
Freud's distinction between
emotion and action. Affect
becomes, for Landauer a for,
of
action, and fails to achieve
the aim of the unconscious
impulse only because the
impulse and its opposite are
confounded in the same set of
actions.

Landauer's classification
scheme-affects, passions,
and temperaments-is one of the
earliest in the psychoanalytic literature of affect, it
is of
little use,

unfortunately, since Landauer

»s

definitions elude under-

standing.

Passions, for example, are defined
as those
affects which are libidinal, meaning
their activation
involves sexual zones of the body;
included are "sympathy,
longing, jealousy, modesty and similar
emotions" (p. 405).

Temperaments are described as combinations of
affects which
are more enduring than simple affects.
All three categories
derive from biological, inherited tendencies.
Landauer concludes with
zones, aims, and objects.

a

discussion of affective

He draws a very close parallel

between these aspects of affect and instinctual zones,
aims,
and objects as defined by Freud

(1905/1953).

Abram Blau presented his views on affect in two papers
(Blau, 1952, 1955).

The earlier of the two presents

a

purely physiological view of anxiety; this paper is reviewed
in the Appendix.

In 1955, Blau attempted to give an account
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of all unpleasant affect-*
arrects.

tk^
The account takes

a very
different direction fro, his
earlier effort, and suggests
that Blau was unable or
unwilling to sustain his
physiological view of emotion.

in his hypothesis of
emotion, Blau emphasizes
the need

to make distinctions
between various aspects of
emotion.

He

argues that "inner and outer
manifestations" of emotion
should- be distinguished, and
that among inner manifestations, physiological and
psychological components should be
differentiated. He further divides
the inner manifestation
'into "enteroceptive,
proprioceptive, and verbal" components;
he does not specifically classify
these three components
into physiological and psychological,
but does imply that
the first two are physiological
and the last, psychological.
Blau's hypothesis is essentially an
expansion of his
1952 view of anxiety as

entity.

a

distinct, inherited physiological

However, while the 195 2 paper was an advocacy
for

increased attention to physiology in
psychoanalytic theory
and practice, physiology is depicted in 1955
only
as

emotion's primitive basis.

Only a part of any emotion is

physiological, and this part takes on less and less
importance in the more highly developed emotions.
Regarding the three components of emotion,

it

is only

the "enteroceptive" one that is clearly physiological.

Blau

defines this component as "an awareness of visceral
reactions, such as accelerations of the heart rate, muscular
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tension, or

a

feeling of faintness"

(p.

At some
81J
points, Blau seems to regard
this as the most basic
component of all emotions, as
when he states "affect
.

consists of inner kinetic
perceptions of a pleasant or
unpleasant quality- (p.
The source of these
Physiological processes is in the
autonomic nervous system;
the sympathetic system is
responsible for unpleasant affect,
and the parasympathetic system
gives rise to pleasant ones.
Blau defines the proprioceptive
component

M

)

.

as "an

awareness of an action or an impulse
for some motor action"
(P. 82).
He states no position on whether
these actions are
innate; the use of terms like
"avoidance" and "flightsuggest that Blau had inherited action
patterns in mind when
he wrote his discussion of the concept,
but nothing about
the concept rules out voluntary action
or acquired impulses.
In his discussion, Blau acknowledges
the similarity
of his

formulation to the James-Lange theory (as he
might equally
well have done in discussing the enterocept ive
component);
The verbal component is depicted by Blau as

a

label

which is attached to the first two components "relatively
late" in development. He emphasizes the relative poverty
of

words as compared with the variety of affects.

Clearly Blau

does not believe the verbal component alters anything

essential in an affect.
The outward signs of emotion are given less attention

than the inner, and Blau seems to feel that they lie outside

,

)
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the domain of his hypothesis
of emotion.
He emphasizes,
though, that few of them are
innate, most iearned. The
learned aspects of emotional
expression include facial
expression; citing Landis (1934)
Blau states that cross,
cultural uniformities in facial
expression of emotion do not
exist.
(Given Blau's predilection for
biological

explanations in the 1952 paper, one
might have anticipated
he would be an advocate of nativist
theories of emotional
expression.
Blau distinguishes between primary,
secondary, and
tertiary emotions. The primary emotion
of displeasure is
anxiety, and it is innate. Secondary and
tertiary emotions
of displeasure are acquired modifications
of
anxiety;

secondary and tertiary emotions differ in terms
of the
greater maturation and autonomy implicit in the

latter.

secondary emotions of unpleasure

(or rather,

of these) are rage, fear, and depression.

The

the categories

Blau identifies

three groups of tertiary emotions of unpleasure— guilt
shame, and disgust— but states that there may be more.

Most

significant for present purposes is that all secondary and
tertiary emotions are, implicitly, psychological entities,
in that they incorporate thoughts,

images, memories, social

norms, and other distinctly psychological components.

Robert Emde (1980) has provided a more recent effort to
create a biological theory of affect for application in

psychoanalysis.

He draws on biologically oriented theories
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in the

psychology of emotion (e.g.,
Ekman , Priesen s
Ellsworth, 1972, Izard, 1977,
to devise what he calls
an
"organizational" view of motion.
Fro* this perspective

^^^^^^^^

inclode

Emde isolates a wide variety
of views in psychoanalytic
writings which he considers to be
evidence for the

pervasiveness of an organizational model
of affect.
views include attributing positive
functions

These

to affect,

viewing affects as indicators of
intrapsychic functioning,
and considering affects to be continuously
present. These
various views seem united primarily in
opposing a view of
affect as a unitary and disruptive agitation.
In the course of Ep.de' s exposition it
becomes clear

that he regards affects as biologically given
patterns of

thought, behavior, and feeling which have generally
adaptive

consequences.

Once they are triggered, these patterns, as

he describes them, have an autonomous life, and
influence

all aspects of functioning.

They are inherited, presumably

in the form of templates which,

singly and in combination,

organize responses in functional ways.
is as

This view of emotion

fully biological as the physiological theories brought

into psychoanalysis by Blau

(1952)

and Brunswick

(1954)

than two decades earlier, but it reflects the changes in

more
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biology in the interim,
particularly the influence of
ethology.
Bowlby's (1969) studies of
attachment are also an
outgrowth of modern ethology.
Bowlby set out to study
infant attachment and separation
within a broadly psychoanalytic perspective, and soon
had recourse
to the

developing field of ethology
(Hinde, 1966; Lorenz, 1963;
Tinbergen/ 1951). By bringing
together British
psychoanalytic views and ethological
thought, he created a
new view of instincts, which he
hoped could substitute for
Freud's dated theory of the instincts.
Bowlby offered a
radically new theory of emotion on the
basis

of his instinct

theory.

Bowlby's view of instincts was inspired by
the
information processing metaphors which were
exercising
widespread influence. He termed this the

a

"control systems-

viewpoint.

He proposed replacing the concept of
instincts

as "hard-wired" sequences of stereotyped
movements with a

concept of "goal-corrected behavioral systems".

Such

systems are organized around a goal with clear adaptive

significance for

a

young) and subsume

species (e.g., mating, nestiro, raising
a

number of behavior patterns which may,

depending on the circumstances, contribute to achieving the
goal.

Rather than calling such behavior systems "innate",

he proposes adopting Hinde »s

(195 9)

0

j

st inction between

"environmentally stable" and "environmentally labile"
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behavior systems, the former are
relatively uninfluenced by
different environments.
Bowlby's view of emotion is
derived from his concept of
behavioral systems and of the role of
"appraisal" in
initiating and guiding these
systems. The concept of goalcorrected systems holds that behavior
is initiated when it
is likely to lead to a goal,
and is corrected constantly
to
make success most likely. This process
requires constant
monitoring and appraising of both
the situation
and the

progress of the behavior sequence.

Bowlby's conclusion is

that
affects, feelings, and emotions are
phases of
individual's intuitive appraisals either of hisan own
organismic states and urges to act or of
the
of environmental situations in which he finds succession
himself.
(Bowlby, 1969, p. 104)
At some points during the unfolding
of a behavior

system, the appraisals of internal tendencies and urges
(which are part of the system) and of the
external situation

rise to consciousness, and are felt.

This feeling of

ongoing processes, Bowlby argues, should not be
construed as

having a causal influence on the process; at least, there
are no grounds for assuming that it does.

To assume this,

Bowlby writes, is to make the category mistake of assuming
efficient causality when there

is

only dispositional

causality (Ryle, 1949; see also Fridhandler
1982).

That is, feelings are

a

&

Averill,

reflection of the process

that gives rise to behaviors, not

a

cause of the process or
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the behaviors.

Bowlby cites Ryle (1949,
on the correct
dispositional interpretation of
emotions.
The statement "Tom bit hia

likely to attack h?«

Hm«

?

e was
ement "the

0t to Tom ' Tom wou

^

be

in other words, Tom does not
hit his sister because he is

jealous, but his hitting his sister
is part of being
jealous, as is his particular appraisal
of his mother's
tending to her (as opposed to an appraisal
linked to

indifference, or to helping mother).

Bowlby's characterization of emotion, then,
is as a
reflection of a complex process involving
physiological and

psychological components organized toward some end.

The

concept of the emotion causing or being caused by
aspects of
this process, such as appraisals of a situation
or

introspective appraisals, becomes meaningless in this
conception.

The emotion is a reflection of all these

processes, and serves to summarize them for the individual
or for others.
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Ego and Cognition

The history of the theoretical
views on affects and the
ego is not easy to trace, owing
to the many meanings that
have been attached to the concept
of ego. when Freud or
other theorists have drawn
connections between affects and
the ego it has not always been
clear on what basis, and when
authors have not specifically related
affect to the ego
it

has been difficult to say whether
such a connection is
implied. The connections to the ego
have been in three
broad areas— consciousness, adaptation,
and cognition.
In
some cases, it has been enough that
affects are generally or
always conscious for authors to place
them in the ego.

Freud, though, had more in mind when, in the
later periods
of his work, he placed affect in the
ego (Freud, 1923/1961).
In his earlier work, his views of affect
would have placed
them in the id, had the latter concept been
formulated,

although the conscious nature of affect would have led to
complications.

In the same work in which he formulated the

concepts of the ego and the id (Freud, 1923/1961), Freud

delivered his well-known formula "The ego is the actual
seat
of anxiety."

That, in Freud's view, anxiety was always

conscious, was one reason he included it within the province
of the ego.

A more important reason was that he was

beginning to develop the signal theory, in which anxiety
formed an integral part of the ego's intra-psychic adaptive
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efforts,

a third factor was Freud's
conclusion that anxiety
was a psychological product,
based on cognitive processes.
Formerly, he had retained his
special view of anxiety as an

automatic transformation of
libido, without psychological
participation. These themes were
expanded by the authors
reviewed in the present section.
Charles Brenner has offered an
ego-based theory of
affect (Brenner, 1974a, 1974b,
1975).
The cornerstone of
the theory is the proposition that
affects include ideas and
can only be identified through
a consideration of these
conscious or unconscious ideas. Brenner
regards his theory
as a substantial departure from
Freud's major proposals and
from highly influential metapsychological
statements
by

Rapaport (1953) and Jacobson (1971a).
Brenner's emphasis on ideas.

The departure is in

Rapaport, Jacobson, and at

times Freud offer accounts of affect that
depend primarily
or entirely on the concept of psychic energy and
its

expression in physiological processes.

Certainly these

theorists emphasized an opposition between affects and
ideas; for them, this distinction was fundamental.

Brenner,

like Lewin (1965), denies that affects exist without ideas,
and gives ideas pre-eminent importance in determining
the

nature of affect.
It is a measure of the distance between psychoanalysis

and academic psychology that Brenner's paper omits any

reference to the work of Stanley Schachter (1964), as

Brenner's main thesis duplicates
Schachter's proposals,
which had preceded Brenner's
by ten years. Schachter,
too,
argued that emotion had to include
physiological
and

cognitive components--*!* Schachter,
like Brenner, failed to
go beyond this statement to a
consideration of affect as a
whole, as opposed to its component
parts.
Brenner's
theoretical definition of affect closely
echoes Schachter's:
I believe that af f
ects. .are complex mental
phenomena
h
e
Se Sati ° nS ° f P leas ^e, un^asure?
or
o^aa mixture
mlxtirf of the ?two, and (b) thoughts,
.

o^h

f6

r

in a word

memories/

id *as.... ideas and sens at i on

toa^hl
K
fr conscious and unconscious,
both
constitute
» cax
and affect.
(Brenner, 1974b, pp. 534-535)

\

'

™
<

Brenner offers an indication of what
sorts of ideas are
associated with affect, by referring to theoretical
and

clinical psychoanalysis.

Although he states that the ideas

may be conscious or unconscious, all his examples
concern

unconscious ideas deriving from childhood.

For instance, he

cites Arlow's paper on smugness (Arlow, 1957) to suggest
that the thought in smugness is
I

have my mother all for myself.

have it better than you.
»"

in triumph, he suggests,

there is an unconscious idea that one has defeated a
rival
or rivals.

Borrowing from Fenichel (1934) and Greenson

(1953), Brenner suggests that boredom depends on an

unconscious attempt to convince oneself that one does not
want to gratify one or another forbidden wish.

These

examples leave it an open question whether Brenner believes
an affect's idea can be wholly conscious.
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Brenner does not provide a
theoretical account of the
relation between affects and
ideas, except to assert
that
they go together. His examples
confuse matters, since they
include instances in which
an idea characterizes an
affective state and could be considered
a constitutive part
of the affect, and instances
in which the ideas play
only a
causal role. The first two examples
above-smugness and
triumph-are of the first type, and
Brenner's theory
requires that all his examples conform
to this description.
But his example of boredom already
confounds
the issue-one

is not bored about the forbidden
wish, one is bored because

one desires to avoid the wish-and
further examples confuse
matters still more, as when he implies that
euphoria

contains similar ideas as depression, when
in fact he seems
to be referring to a causal relationship
(i.e., euphoria as
an avoidance of depression).

His more detailed clinical

examples only add to the ambiguities.

Despite its shortcomings, Brenner's views represented
an important advance.

For virtually the first time, a

prominent psychoanalyst had, in an explicit theoretical
statement, emphasized ideas and meaning as essential parts
of affect, departing radically from the ambiguous,

physicalistic, "economic" explanations.

By doing so,

Brenner dissolved a significant barrier that had obstructed

psychoanalytic understanding of affect, namely, the
artificial distinction between affect and ideas.

His
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examples, although confused,
demonstrate one benefit of this
achievement-he is able to bring
the familiar methods of
psychoanalytic reasoning about ideas,
symbols,

interpretations, and so on, to bear
on the analysis of
affect.
Even more broadly, he placed
affect in the context
of the ego, and thereby implied
a new set of fundamental
assumptions about affect. These
assumptions concern not
only the cognitive involvement
in affect, but include issues
of adaptiveness, relation to purposes,
relation to

unacceptable wishes, and the role of
affect in internal
psychological "regulation" and coping. These
assumptions
are reflected in the present theory
of affect,
and are

discussed further in Chapter IV.
Max Schur's views on the relation
of affects and the
ego are distinctive and were influential (Schur,
1953,
1969).

in the earlier of his two papers dealing
with this

topic he was concerned to systematize and clarify Freud's

views on anxiety, and in addition Schur took
issue with some
of Freud's positions and suggested improvements.

Schur's

basic proposition is that anxiety is a "response of
the ego"
to danger or potential danger, but contrary to Freud, it is

not "produced" by the ego.

What Freud called the production

of anxiety by the ego (as a "signal"), Schur argues is

better described as the ego producing danger (through

direction of attention or through fantasy) to which it then
responds with anxiety.

Different "parts" of the ego are
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held responsible for the
production of danger, the
experience of anxiety, and the
use of the signal.
It is not immediately clear
why Schur insists that the
anxiety is in the ego, since
he depicts anxiety as a
natural, pre-programmed response to
the perception of
danger, much as Blau (1952) had.
Schur's reason seems to
have been his concern to eliminate
Freud's concept of
"automatic- anxiety, which held out
the possibility of the
production of anxiety through purely
physiological

transformations.

Schur regards psychological
recognition of
danger as essential to anxiety, and this
is evidently enough
for him to call anxiety an
ego-response, as it was not for
Blau.

Schur distinguishes different types
and degrees of ego
regression in anxiety. The first type is regression
in

terms of the misperception of danger and
the second is

regression in the form of the anxiety response.

Neurotic

anxiety involves regression in the first sense
or in both
senses.

The most adaptive, least pathological form of

anxiety is one which Schur regards as "genetically
related
to anxiety" but better called "awareness of danger"

(with

little or no physiological discharge).
In a later paper, Schur turns specifically to the issue

of affect and cognition.

His thesis is that all affects

intrinsically involve cognition, by which he means "mental
processes" such as "scanning, evaluation, judgement,
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repression, etc.-

He argues that this view
was implicit in
Freud's signal view of anxiety,
and that it may be readily
extended to all affects.
Regarding the particular relation
of the cognitive aspect of
affects and the "feeling- aspect,
Schur is less clear. On the
one hand, he states that
the

cognitive process occurs first and
the feeling consists of a
response to the cognitive element-a
similar concept to that
of "appraisal" in the psychology
of emotion (Lazarus,

Averill

&

opton, 1970)

-but

then emphasizes that

the cognitive process and the
response to it occur

In addition to these two writers,
several authors

incorporate the ego, in one or another
aspect, into their
account of affects. Brierley (1937) emphasized
that affects
are "ego-experiences".
Initially, her statement seems to
refer only to the fact that affects are typically
conscious,
but as she develops her various themes (which
are reviewed
above, in the sections on metapsychology and unconscious
affect, and in the Appendix) it becomes evident that she
has
in mind a richer thesis, namely that affects encapsulate

aspects of one's identity or self, and that to experience an

affect is to acknowledge that part of oneself.

Since for

Brierley, the ego or self develops out of relationships,

affects are by the same token internalized relationships.
Novey (1961) advances many similar points to

Brierley

's;

he, too, regards affects as reflecting aspects

.
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of the self and of internalized
relationships. Like Brenner
and schur, he stresses
that no rigid distinction
should be
drawn between affect and cognition,
since every

affect

involves processes that are
ordinarily considered cognitive.
Lewin (1965), too, argues forcefully
that no affect

can
exist without cognition, and
extends this argument to cases,
such as meditative ecstasy, where
cognitive content seems to
be absent.

Rapaport's (1953) metapsychological
propositions
include a type of affect he calls "completely
structuralized".

By this he means an affect that
involves

no consideration of psychic energy but
which is entirely
under the "command" of the ego.
In this formulation, he
implies an identification of physiology with the
id.

Schafer (1964) emphasizes the adaptive potential
in affect,
particularly when adaptation is construed in broad terms,

as

referring to effectiveness, fulfillment, and
meaningfulness

Rapaport (1953) also stressed the adaptive importance of
affect in reality testing, arguing that without affect,
one
cannot have reliable knowledge about the external world.
(Unfortunately, he does not elaborate this claim.)
(1980)

Emde

places very great emphasis on the adaptive importance

of affect, although approaching the issue from a very

different perspective than Rapaport or Schafer.

perspective on affect, as noted above

Emde's

(in the section on

biological theories) is essentially biological, and this

excludes his concept of affect

f rom

m ost psychoanalytic

conceptions of the ego, though
certainly not all. Finally,
Bowlby (1969) also connects
enotion with adaptive processes,
again in a biological vein.

CHAPTER

iv

A PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OP
EMOTION

Introduction

In the present chapter,

I

offer a theory of emotion.

The theory's main purpose is
to throw new light on old
questions, mostly psychoanalytic ones,
it employs some
psychoanalytic concepts, but defines
these in broader terms,
because using psychoanalytic terms without
defining them
makes a theory psychoanalytic in the
narrowest and most
sterile sense— meaningful only to the true
believer.
This
theory is meant to be psychoanalytic
in a broader sense, and
so addresses issues that are meaningful to
a wider audience,
in terms which this audience uses or
could use.

The theory concerns only some of the phenomena that

have been studied under the term "affect" in the psycho-

analytic literature.

This theory does not purport to

explain all affective phenomena; some of these it merely
classifies in new ways, and it ignores some altogether.

Psychoanalysis has sought in vain for

a

unitary theory of

affect, without recognizing that it had set itself an

impossible task.

Like Rapaport (1953), theorists of affect

have often noted the heterogeneous phenomena that

psychoanalysis calls "affective", then pressed ahead with an
attempt to unify them under one theory.
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One can only devise

113

a

unitary theory for unitary phenomena.

Therefore, the present theory's
domain is restricted to
emotions. Moreover, I am using the
term in a specific
sense.
Like "affect", "emotion" has
been used in a great
variety of senses (Rorty, 1980). it is
used here to refer
to a complex and relatively well
formed entity, with certain
special components; emotion is further
defined
in the

discussion below.

The theory will have its clearest

application to emotions in this sense; these
will be its
paradigm cases. However, it will have
something to say
about related phenomena, in particular about
how they

approach and differ from full-fledged emotions.
The most important single influence on the present

theory is Averill's social constructivist
view of emotion
(Averill, 1976, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1982, 1983,
1984).

Many of its propositions are drawn from Averill's

work, and most,

I

believe, are in harmony with it.

No

single psychoanalytic theory of affect has exerted a

predominant influence on the present theory.

It resembles

Brenner's (1974b) in the emphasis on the ego in emotion, and

Bowlby's (1969) in its approach to components of emotion.
In most respects, though, the present theory is a departure

from previous psychoanalytic approaches to affect.
end of the chapter

I

discuss the reasons

I

At the

believe the

present view constitutes a psychoanalytic theory despite
having few conspicuously psychoanalytic features.
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First, the theory is stated and
an overview is given of
the basic propositions.
Then -emotion" is defined,
and the
concept of the ego is defined as
used here.
Then the
concept of emotions as
organizations is explored in detail,
and elaborations and implications
of these views are
described. Finally, the place of
the present view in
psychoanalysis is discussed.

Statement of Theory

The core of the present theory is the
view that an
emotion is a schematic organization
contained in the ego and
activated by the ego, of psychological, physiological,
and
social responses, according to individually
adapted,

socially based rules.

The basic propositions are that

emotions include different kinds of responses, and
that is

a

mistake to argue that one type is "the emotion" and that the
others are appended to this.

Although some previous

theories have recognized this, very few have then addressed
emotions at the level of a whole made up of parts.
most have merely addressed the parts.

Instead,

In the present

theory, emotions are addressed as organized wholes.

The

concept of a schema is employed as an aid in conceptualizing
emotions as organized wholes.
The correspondence between emotions viewed in this way
and psychoanalytic theory is developed from two directions.
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The concept of the ego is used
in an explanatory context.
Other concepts in psychoanalytic
metapsychology are used
informally to structure aspects of
the discussion, but are
not accepted as explanations,
instead, I argue that the
present view of emotion entails
certain fundamental psychoanalytic assumptions and is at
least compatible with all the
fundamental assumptions of psychoanalysis.

Emotion Defined

In the present section the term
"emotion" is defined,

as it is used here.

specialized one.

For the theorist, the definition
is a

That is, it is restricted to a small

subset of the phenomena that have been
studied under

theories of affect or emotion.

For the layperson, though,

it is not really a specialized
definition, or at least is

not intended to be, because it is guided by common sense
and

ordinary language.

Ordinary language is the authoritative

reference for the present definition, and the definitions of

emotion and related concepts are accurate insofar as they
reflect the distinctions and usages of everyday life.

Of

course, ordinary language is not always internally

consistent, and it lacks answers for some of the questions a
theorist must ask, so there are points where it must be

supplemented or refined.
Occasionally, ordinary language has been explicitly

taken as the standard for the
psychoanalytic definition of
emotion (e.g..
Alexander 1935).
i q-5c
M
y., Alexander,
More
commonly, theorists
have relied on the common-sense
definition without
\

recognizing or acknowledging it.

Freud, as Lewin (1965)

argues, let the common-sense definition
stand by default.
This is clearest in the clinical
writings, but is true even
in the metapsychological works,
where the notion, for

example, of "discharge" is never
clearly defined and rests
in part on an "appeal to common
sense" (Lewin, 1965, p. 28).
Often, psychoanalytic theorists have
begun with a commonsense definition, then gradually altered
it over the course
of a theoretical exposition, ending
with an entity that

corresponds to theoretical imperatives but not
necessarily
to a phenomenon that exists outside of
that theory.

Jones

(1929) concept of aphanisis is a good example; some
phases

of Freud's work, such as the discharge
theory, also fit this

description.
Once this route has been traversed, one no longer
has a

theory of emotion, but instead

a

theory in which emotion (or

some hybrid entity which carries the name) serves

supporting function for other propositions.

a

The greatest

advantage of maintaining a common-sense definition, and
doing so explicitly, is that one's theory then concerns an

entity that most people, whether as laypersons or as

theorists, would recognize as emotion.
No theory can cover all the many phenomena that are

called "emotional".

Only a body of theory could
do that.
The present theory takes for
its focus a class of entities
that a layperson would identify
clearly as emotions.

It is
a fairly homogeneous class,
so it is relatively
manageable.

Also, it is representative of the
phenomena that have been
studied as emotions by psychoanalysts,
psychologists, and
philosophers.

Consider the following: anger, fear
sadness,
r
disappointment, pride, shame, guilt, grief,

envy, jealousy,

remorse, regret, indignation, annoyance,
gratitude, hope,
pity, resentment, contempt, dread, shame,
and embarrassment.
What are their defining characteristics?

States
First, they are all states.

Despite the prevalence of

state concepts in psychology, the conceptual category
has
not been clearly defined.

Webster's Dictionary defines

"state" as
a set of circumstances or attributes characterizing a
person or thing at a given time; way or form of being;

condition.

This definition points to the temporal dimension of states—
a state

is present at a given time, which is to say, for

some definite and limited period of time.

"characterizes" a person or thing.

A state also

Beyond this, though, the

dictionary definition is not especially informative.
It may be most helpful to consider states in contrast

)
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with a related category, traits.

One difference between

them is duration,

states characterize a person
only at a
given time, traits for much longer
or permanently.
Beyond
duration, though, one can identify
two other important
differences.
(For further details, see
Fridhandler, in
press.
First, there is a difference in
the frequency of
manifestations. A trait may not demonstrate
its existence
over a very long period of time
without raising doubt about
whether the trait is still present, so
long as circumstances
do not warrant a manifestation. A
genuinely cheerful person
may not look, feel, or act cheerfully
for many months after
the death of a loved one, say, without
calling the trait
into question. A state, on the other hand,
must show itself
frequently or we are apt to assume it has ended,
it is hard
to conceive of someone being in a happy state
yet not

looking, feeling, or acting happy for hours at
In fact,

a

stretch.

it is most typical for one or another aspect of a

state to be manifest for the entire duration of the state.
Second, states are more concrete than traits.

States

imply some tangible, palpable referent; a quality of

immediacy is implied.

Traits are thought of as more complex

and inferential entities.

Intentional Objects
In all these respects, emotions are like sensations,

.
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which can also be states.

The resemblance is so strong
that

emotions are often called
"feelings" and are thought of
as
if they simply were sensations.
Theorists make this mistake
with dismaying frequency, and
laypersons make it as well.
However, there is a clear distinction
between emotions and
sensations in everyday linguistic
usage.
Emotions differ from sensations in
that they require
intentional objects (Pitcher,
1965). [ 4 ]
An emotion is
about something, and logically has
to be, in order to be an
emotion. A sensation may or may
not refer to something in
this sense— may or may not have an object—
and yet
still

count as a sensation.

Being about something is part of what

makes a state an emotion, and part of what
makes it whatever
particular emotion it is.
order for a state to count as
anger, for example, one must be angry at someone
about

m

something, but one could have

a

headache without it

referring to anything beyond the sheer sensation,

in order

for a state to count fully as anger, it
must have an object.

An emotional object is a complex of particulars.

The

object of anger is not only a person, but some act that

violates some principle of right and wrong and for which the

person can reasonably be held responsible (i.e., it was done

knowingly or with culpable carelessness).

Averill (1982)

divides the object of anger into the target (e.g., person),
instigation (e.g., wrongful act), and aim (e.g. redressing
grievance)

a
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Emotional objects are called
"intentional- objects
because the objects of emotions
are mental, not physical.
(The term was promulgated by
the philosopher Franz
Brentano,
who took it from the medieval
scholastics.)
The fact that
an emotional object is mental
is clearest when it does
not
correspond to objective reality.
x can be angry at John
stealing my car even if he was
not the one who stole it or
f
if it was not stolen at all
but towed away,
order for me
to be angry, it is only necessary
that I believe John stole
the car. John stealing the car
is the intentional object of
my anger , but it never happened.
Even when an emotional
object corresponds to objective reality,
it is

^

m

the

intentional object that helps constitute
the emotion, not
the physical things and events that the
intentional object
refers to. Psychoanalytic theory knows the
concept of an

intentional object under the term "mental
representation"
(cf., Beres & Joseph,

Rosenblatt, 1962).

1970; Novey, 1958; Sandler

&

Freud may have been influenced in his

use of the concept by his studies with Brentano
while a

medical student (Jones, 1953).

Emotions are Understood to be Involuntary
Emotions are interpreted by the emotional person and by
others as involuntary.

Without this feature, they cannot

count as emotions (Averill, 1980a, 1982).

This does not

mean that emotions are in fact voluntary, and that
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portraying them as involuntary is
a deception (contrary
to
de Rivera, 1984).
Emotions are an organization
and
interpretation of a number of elements,
some of which are
readily interpreted as voluntary,
some as involuntary, and
some not clearly as one or the
other. The organization and
interpretation themselves, which
constitute the emotion, are
ambiguous regarding volition, and this
is the reason to
apply the concept of the ego to them.
The interpretation of emotions as
involuntary is a
distinct issue from the "facts" of the
matter,
in this
interpretation, the involuntariness is
highlighted. The
question of volition actually arises only
rarely for psychological processes. When one "uses one's
intelligence" to

solve a problem, one does so neither voluntarily
nor

involuntarily.

It just happens, usually, without conscious

intent to be intelligent, but on the other hand,
one would

never say, "I couldn't help it."

Emotions wear their

involuntariness on their sleeves, so to speak.

Other Affective Phenomena
The significance of the preceding attributes of

emotions should become more apparent when we turn our

attention to the affective phenomena that are excluded.
The list of emotions presented above omitted several
items that have been widely and routinely discussed as

emotions or affects in the psychoanalytic literature.

Of

these omissions, probably the
most glaring is anxiety.
Anxiety differs from the items
on the list because it lacks
a clear object.
According to the present definition,
then,

anxiety is not an emotion.

Anxiety has been the focus of more
psychoanalytic
theoretical study than any other affective

state, but the

present theory does not apply directly
to it.
it does apply
indirectly, though.
In the next chapter, I argue
that
anxiety has been so intractable in
part because it is like
an emotion (in the present definition)
but is not exactly
like one, and I argue further that a
better understanding of
anxiety can emerge from a consideration of
its differences
from emotions.

Defining emotions so that anxiety is excluded
may
depart from lay usage.

If asked, most people would probably

say that anxiety is an emotion.

Yet most people would

probably acknowledge a difference between anxiety and most
other emotions, even if they were unable to
articulate

that

difference.

We know that we cannot say what we are anxious

about as clearly and specifically as we can say what we
are

angry about or proud of.

Sometimes when we try to say what

we are anxious about, we point to what is making us anxious

rather than what we are anxious about; that is, we point to
a

cause rather than an object.

(The distinction between

objects and causes is discussed later in the present
chapter.)

when anxiety acquires

a

clear object, when one
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"figures out- what one is anxious
about, the anxiety becon.es
an emotion fear.

—

Two other omissions from
the list of emotions may
be
conspicuous-love and hate. These are
omitted because the
terms refer to both emotions
and sentiments-more commonly
to the latter.
Sentiments can be distinguished from
states,
in the sense defined above.
Sentiments do not come and go
like states, and do not have their
palpable immediacy. One
can love or hate someone without
feeling it at each and
every moment. More formally, sentiments
are made up of a
complex of acts, feelings, and commitments,
extended over
time (Brierley, 1937; Novey, 1961; Shand,
1914).

Finally, moods are excluded from the
present definition
of emotions, because they, like anxiety,
lack clear objects.
Moods are dispositions to see, feel, and
act in certain ways

toward everything and everyone.

The distinction between

emotions and moods has often been observed in
psychoanalytic
theory (Brierley, 1937; Jacobson, 1971a).

Ego

The only term of the theory that is specifically

psychoanalytic is "ego".

For psychoanalytically oriented

readers, the term will provide a context for addressing the

major psychoanalytic controversies about affect.

psychoanalytic readers

— that

For non-

is, those who do not make

psychoanalytic theory their world
view-the term reouires
definition in order for it to
add to the statement of
the
theory.
The concept of ego r although
it has differentiated and
broadened vastly since the beginnings
of psychoanalysis,
remains true to its origin as the
repressing side of the
personality in conflict, when it was an
id-psychology,

psychoanalysis investigated principally
forbidden impulses;
the ego comprised the acceptable parts
of

oneself, and also

was the agency of repression.

Consciousness was centrally

involved in the distinction, also.

The impulses were

unconscious, and the ego (by default, as it
were) was
conscious. The distinction between logical,
rational,

"secondary process" thought and illogical -primary
processwas also added relatively early to the central
dualism
(Freud, 1911).

In its beginnings, psychoanalytic theory and
treatment

paid relatively little attention to whatever was responsible
for repressing impulses, for the therapeutic technique
was

simply to expose these impulses to the patient,

in

principle, the "split" was thereby undone, that is, the
impulses had become part of the conscious system and had
lost their pathogenic force.

As long as therapeutic success

was thought to be so straightforward, the parts of the

personality apart from the impulses seemed not to require
investigation.
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When psychoanalysis began
to study the test of
the
personality, the ego was defined
as the -agency- responsible
for negotiating rational
"secondary process" solutions
to
the problems presented by
impulses, on the one hand, and
by
people and things in the environment,
on the other (Freud,
1923).

m

other words, the ego was
defined as the agency of

adaptation.
To speak of emotion as being
"in the ego"

make a claim that emotions are
adaptive.

,

then, is to

It does not

specify what emotions help one adapt
to, who or what
benefits from emotions and at what
cost, or whether emotions
are the best possible way of adapting,
it says, mainly,
that emotions have predominantly
positive results for the
individual.
Emotions serve a variety of adaptive
functions.

Socially, they aid in societal integration,
and specific

emotions serve specific societal functions
(Averill, 1982).
Emotions may also be helpful in an individual's
social
relations.

Interpersonally , they may benefit the individual

(for example,

through

a

clearer communication of needs), the

other in a dyad, or a family or small group.

The focus of

the present theory where functions are concerned, though,
is
on functions for the individual.

These functions can be

divided, heuristically at least, into promoting good

outcomes and minimizing disruptive effects of other

psychological entities.

Emotions gain these benefits by
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integrating disparate elements.

(These functions and the

means of achieving them are
discussed later in the present
chapter and in the following one.)

There is a second connotation
to the statement that
emotions are in the ego.
addition to being the adaptive
part of the personality, the ego
has also been, from the
beginning of psychoanalytic theory,
that part of the
personality which develops in response
to the environment.
The theoretical precursor of the ego
was the "system CsPcpt", standing for Conscious-Perception

m

(Freud, 1895e,

Freud "located" this system at the
periphery of the
psychic apparatus, where it supposedly
developed
1900).

as a "cap",

due to its "contact" with the environment.

He retained this

notion when, much later, he introduced the
concept of ego
(Freud, 1923).
In the later work Freud specified that the
ego's

development is based on
significant others.

[5]

a

series of identifications with
This concept, which formed the

basis for the object relations school, emphasizes the ego's
social nature, its dependence on interactions with others
for its content,

in addition to the British object

relations theorists, Erikson (195

9)

and to some extent

Kernberg (1976) have developed this theme.
In the present theory of emotion, the social nature of

the ego occupies a central place.

The theory holds that

emotions are based on social rules, as adapted by the
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individual.

Since the ego is primarily
social, the
statement that emotions are in
the ego is consistent with,
and already argues, the claim
that they are socially-based.
My statement is not only that
emotions are in the ego
but also that they are activated
by the ego. This clause is
in particular need of elaboration.
To say that emotions are
in the ego gives them a
metaphorical location (in the manner
of Freud's "topographical point
of view"), which in turn
asserts that they have certain
characteristics,
it

describes them.

The latter statement, that they
are

activated by the ego, speaks to the issue
of what causes an
episode of emotion, and is in an active voice.
The ego,

then, is doing something when we have an
emotion.

What does

it mean to state that the ego does
something?

Some authors have rejected such theoretical
statements.

Schafer (1976) has criticized the notion of the ego
doing
anything, arguing that such statements are nonsensical,
since only persons can do things.

Hartmann (1964), too, has

objected to the anthropomorphic nature of this concept, and
has sought a more consistently mechanistic scheme.

Waelder, however, (1967) takes an equally incisive but
more sophisticated view.

He, too, notes that the concept of

ego is of an entirely different order than that of the

drives; he draws the contrast in terms of "teleology" versus

"mechanism", that is, explanations based on goals and

purposes versus ones based exclusively on efficient
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causality.

He states that Freud became
progressively more

acceptant of teleological concepts,
but nonetheless never
relinquished his preference for
mechanistic concepts,
this, waelder writes, Freud
was consistent with the dominant
trend in Western scientific thought.

m

Waelder sees in modern analysts'
acceptance of the
concept of ego an acceptance on an
equal footing of both
mechanistic and teleological models of
explanation.
Although in Waelder 's view it remains
an open question
whether this situation is ultimately
satisfying from a
scientific point of view, he states, he believes
this
duality necessary for psychoanalytic theory
at present and
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
He argues
that psychoanalytic theory is not the only
scientific area
to accept teleological models, pointing to
Darwinian

evolutionary theory and American behaviorism.
Like many other issues in psychoanalytic theory, the

problem at hand calls for
explanation.
is,

a

teleological model of

In the present theory, an episode of emotion

in part, a means of achieving certain goals

described later)

.

(to be

The general character of an emotion is

based on a pre-existing pattern or schema, but having an

emotion on a particular occasion and the details of the

episode (who is the emotion's target, the intensity of the
emotion, how lnong it lasts and what is required to

terminate it, etc.) coincide, to

a

considerable extent, with
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current goals and with many aspects
of the current situation
which relate to these goals. A
coherent account of these

relationships requires

a

teleological mode of explanation,

and in psychoanalysis, teleology
is the province of the ego.
The classification of emotion or
affect as an ego
function has a long but irregular history
in psychoanalytic
theory. Freud at one point (Freud,
1923) stated

dogmatically that anxiety, and by extension
all affects, are
situated in the ego. His reasons for
stating this seem to

have been, first, that affects are conscious,
and

consciousness is restricted to the ego.

Second, and more

important, Freud was in the process of developing
the signal
theory of anxiety, in which anxiety is functional
and is

under the ego's control,

other analytic theorists, notably

Brierley (1937), Schur (1969), and Brenner (1974a, 1974b,
1975) have classified affects in the ego, for similar

reasons and due to the involvement of "cognition" in affect.
In other cases, affect has clearly not been included
in

the ego.

theory.

This was true for Freud, prior to the signal

Other early theorists, such as Landauer (1938) and

Jones (1929), saw affects as more or less automatic
reactions, closely tied to the drives.

Fenichel (1941/1954)

understood affects in terms very similar to the classical

psychoanalytic view of drives, and opposed them to the ego.
Some recent theorists take a view that cannot be easily

classified, but in any case do not view affects as ego
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functions in the sense of the
ego which is being employed
here.
Emde (1980) is an example.
He regards affects as
organizing entities, and thus they

are "on the side" of the

ego f so to speak.

But he, like Basch (1976)

,

regards

affects as essentially automatic,
biological entities, and
such entities, if they are ego
functions, are so in only an
extended sense. Finally, there are
mixed models, such as
Blau's (1955). Blau holds anxiety to
be simply a biological
function, but describes other negative
affects as secondary
and tertiary elaborations, on the basis
of cognitive ego
functions.
In the present theory, the classification
of emotion as

an ego function refers to the cognitive,
synthesizing

activity involved in emotion, to the elaboration
beyond

physiological givens, to the adaptive significance of
emotion, and to the importance of

a

teleological model of

explanation.

Emotions as Organizations

In psychoanalytic and psychological theory, emotion has

been identified with biological, psychological, and

occasionally social entities.

Even within a relatively

homogeneous field such as psychoanalysis the dispute over
whether emotion is essentially physiological or cognitive
has continued to repeat itself, without signs of resolution
or even progress.

In the field of psychology, viewpoints
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are If anything even more
polarized, and the opposing camps
predominate successively, in the
continuing s«ing of a
pendulum (Aver ill , 1983).
The study of emotion in both
fields has been the victim
of a category mistake. The search
for a single nature of
emotion is misguided, and when we
engage in the search we
are "barking our way up the wrong
gum tree" (Austin,

1950/1979).

Ryle (1949) explicated the concept
of a
category mistake. He defines a category
mistake
as

representing something of one logical
type or category as if
belonged to another (Ryle, 1949, p. 16). He
gives as an
example a foreign visitor to Oxford who,
after being shown
the various colleges that make up Oxford,
said, "This has
been very nice, and now I would like to
see the University
itself." The visitor made the mistake of thinking
that
the

University was another entity like the colleges,
when in
fact it is the collection of colleges, an entity of a

different logical category.
Emotions are physiological entities, and they are

cognitive entities also.

They contain elements of both

these types, but they cannot be reduced to any single

element.

To some extent, the story of the blind men and the

elephant provides an analogy.

(Several blind men confronted

by an elephant set out to discover what an elephant is like.
One says it is cold, smooth, and tapers to a point; another
says it is like a wall made of leather; another says it is
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round like a tree trunk and
must be glued to the ground
as
it cannot be lifted, and so
on.)
Emotions contain many of
the elements that have been
attributed to them, but no one
element is the emotion to which
other elements are

accidental accompaniments.

Emotions are superordinate

organizations of their elements.
There have been a few theories which
regarded emotions
as superordinate organizations,
but only
a few.

in the

field of psychology, Leventhal
(1979), de Rivera (1977),
Schachter (1964) have been among the few
to define emotions
as organizations, prior to Averill
(1980a).
psychoanalytic theory, Freud (1916) originally
described affect as
being made up of distinct components.

m

[An affect] is in any case something
highly composite.
An affect includes in the first place
particular motor
innervations or discharges and secondly certain
feelings; the latter are of two kinds— perceptions
of
the motor actions that have occurred and the direct
feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say,
give the affect its keynote.
(Freud, 1916, p. 395)

This view was in keeping with Freud's view of instincts as

made up of constituent parts (Freud, 1905).

However, Freud

did not hold to a concept of affect as a composite entity.

A few psychoanalytic theorists since Freud have

endorsed a view of emotions as composites, and some others
have favored some related (and usually ambiguous) view.
Zilboorg

(1933) broke emotions down into components as an

aid in understanding his patient's "anxiety without affect".

Blau (1°55) proposes

a

view of affect as made up of three
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major classes of components,
although he offers no account
of how these components are
united. Bowlby (1969)
implicitly advances a similar view
when he argues that
emotions are unfolding behavior
systems that are felt, since
these behavior systems are composed
of multiple elements.
Brenner (1974b) advocates a view
of emotions as composites
of id and ego components (in this
case meaning, biological
and cognitive) . He argues that the
two classes of
components are both essential. Other
theorists have been
less clear.
Pine (1980) in effect uses a composite
concept
of emotion, but nonetheless attempts
to separate a pure
"psychobiological" emotion from ideas and verbal
labels, and
Pulver (1971) perceptively enumerates important
components
of emotion, only to exclude most from the
"pure feeling".

Although some psychoanalytic theorists of affect
have
suggested that affect is composed of distinct components,
only Emde (1980) seems to have realized that this requires

addressing affects or emotions as superordinate

organizations of their components.

Of these theorists,

most, like Blau (1955) and Brenner (1974b), have enumerated

affective components but have given no account of how these
are unified.

In fact, they have thus failed to given any

theory at all of affect or emotion; at best, they have given
a theory of affect's components, or a catalog of items to be

accounted for by a theory.
is characteristic.

Blau's begging of the question

a

We are all familiar with the
difficulty of

STSSS3
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The neglect of the emotion
itself in favor of its
components is a symptom of the
category mistake which has
vitiated the study of emotion. Blau's
impotent perplexity
in the face of "elusive" affect
reveals his assumption that
affect or emotion is of the same
logical category as its
components, and that one experiences
affect in the same
sense as one experiences the "visceral
reactions" that he
considers among affect's components. The
affect,
he

assumes, is simply a more subtle, ephemeral
experience—

more ghostly one, as Ryle (1949) might have
said.

theoretical dead end.

This is a

One cannot build a theory of an

entity that has no possible logical existence;
one can only
invent a myth or elaborate a reification.
The present theory of emotion explicitly adopts a
view
of emotions as organizations of component responses.

This

view is taken from Averill, who calls the organization of

components a "syndrome".

Within such a view, it is possible

to accommodate the various biological, psychological, and

social responses that have been identified by psychoanalytic

theories of affect, and to then address the virtually
ignored issue of how these elements are unified into some

entity which we can refer to as an emotion.
In the following section, some specific components of

.
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emotions are discussed, and in
the subsequent section th e
logic and implications of emotions
as organizations are
further examined.

Component Responses
There are many components in
emotions.

They can be

roughly broken down into biological,
psychological, and
social ones, at least for purposes
of exposition.

(Often,

the difference between these
categories is only a matter of
the point of view one adopts. See
Averill, 1982, on "levels
of analysis".)

The biological, nativist theories of
emotion have
produced many hypotheses about the nature of
emotion. The
physiological theories (e.g., Wenger, 1950) have
favored

autonomic nervous system functions and the associated
end
organ changes. The James-Lange theory included such
autonomic functions, but implicitly also included
instinctive motor action.

More recently among psychologists

and a few analysts, innately patterned facial expressions

have been cited as a basis of emotion (Basch, 1976; Ekman,

Friesen

&

Ellsworth, 1972; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962,

1963)

There is no reason that any such biological responses
cannot be components of emotion, assuming they conform to
the general features of emotion.

None of them constitutes

the emotion, but they may surely be included among the

elements.

Biological responses that are
automatic and
noticeable are especially well
suited to become elements of
emotions. Automatic responses
provide an experience
of

palpable, literal passivity, which
helps to establish and
confirm the theme of involuntariness
in emotion.
Responses
that are noticeable to the emotional
person or to others
e «g./ gastric activity, uxufaning;
...
blush-inn^ aid the communicative
functions of emotions and make the
evidence
(

of

involuntariness more compelling.

(See Averill

r

1984 for an

example, drawn from Bateson, 1976, of
the use of reflexes in
the socialization of trances in a
Balinese society.)
The role biological responses play will
vary in

different emotions, persons, and occasions.

For a

particular emotion, a particular response (e.g.,
sympathetic
activation or a facial expression) may be essential,
optional, or even proscribed,

it may be emphasized by a

particular person and not by another.

A person may include

it on one occasion and not on another, and the
meanings of

the response may vary from one person, dyad, family, or

group to another.
In short, one can affirm the reality of biology and

provide an important place for biological responses in

a

theory of emotion while still denying that emotions are biological .

There are as many different psychological elements
involved in emotions as there are biological ones, perhaps
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-any more.

No a priori classification
of these elements can

be given, since they include
representatives from all
categories of psychological contents,
such as thoughts,
beliefs, desires, intentions, images,
needs, and memories,
as well as psychological reflections
of physiological
processes, such as sensations and
perceptions, in the narrow
sense.
Psychoanalytic theory has developed
conceptual

categories for these psychological contents;
the principal
such categories are id, ego, superego,
and self and object
representations.
(The concept of mnemic trace was
important
in Freud's metapsychology , but has mostly
been abandoned in
favor of self and object representations).
Unlike biological elements, which are rarely if
ever
essential to an emotion, certain psychological components
are necessary constituents of emotions.

must have intentional objects.

First, emotions

Emotions as

a

class are

partly defined by having intentional objects, and particular
emotions are partly defined by having particular intentional
objects.

These objects are made up of various thoughts,

beliefs, and intentions.

Second, emotions are experienced

with a special sort of involuntariness , and this is another

necessary psychological component.
Because of the regularity in intentional object,

generalizations can be made about some psychological
elements of particular emotions.

consider guilt.

As a first example, let us

Guilt depends on internalized prohibitions
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and other principles

(Pine, 1980), and the
experience of

guilt involves a number of
psychological elements related to
such principles. Among these
are belief
that one has

violated such principles, anticipation
of disapproval from
some legitimate authority should
he or she learn of the
violation (a disapproving internal
object, in psychoanalytic
terms), perhaps memories of such
disapproval
in the past,

and an intention to atone and
regain the anticipated

approval of the internalized object.
To take another example, consider
disappointment.

This

involves memory of a desire, a belief that
this desire will
not be fulfilled, and a further belief
that one's efforts
could not lead to the fulfillment of the
desire.

Anger will serve as the final example.
anger involves internalized principles.

Like guilt,

In anger, there is

belief that someone else has violated these principles,
an
image of the other person as being disapproved of by

a

legitimate authority (which psychoanalytic theory considers
often a projection of one's own guilty self representation;
see Bychowski, 1966), and an intention to "set things right"

either by forcing a change or by counter-aggression.

Apart from these universal elements, the types and
particular psychological contents vary, just as biological
ones do.
The social components of emotions include what psycho-

analytic theory refers to as relations with the "external

world-

These would include ones that
have been emphasized
by some theories, suoh as facial
expressions, and also
include elements that are not
specifically emotional but can
be contained in emotions just
like "non-emotional.

psychological components.

These latter social elements

include such things as verbal
formulas and conventions,
enactments of hierarchical relations,
conventionalized
management of interactional episodes,
and so on. These
social components are to be distinguished
from the socially
based rules that guide the integration
of all the elements
of an emotion.

Schematic Organizations
Once one speaks of components of emotion, the
emotion
per se is at the level of a superordinate organization
and

must be addressed at that level.

Organizations, though, are

extremely difficult entities to conceptualize.

For whatever

reasons, we are accustomed to thinking of far more concrete

entities.

When we refer to an "it", as we do with an

emotion, we expect to be able to point to it, in some sense.

Emotions are not elusive experiences
think of more compelling ones
to.

— but

— it

is difficult to

they elude being pointed

One is little helped by the concept of a superordinate

organization.

It does not offer familiar possibilities for

comprehension and elaboration.

If one is to advance beyond

the previous efforts to comprehend emotions, one requires
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conceptual tools for address
no <-v™
aaaressmg
them as organizations.
The concept of a schema
offers such a tool. This
concept, introduced into psychology
by Bartlett (1932) , has
in recent years received
growing attention as part of
the
interdisciplinary field of "cognitive
science",
i

of the

several computer-influenced metaphors
that have been so
widely applied in the past two
decades, such as control
systems (see Bowlby, 1969) , plans
(Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram, 1960), and scripts (Schank
& Abelson, 1977),

schemas are perhaps the most general
and therefore the least
tied to engineering and computer
programming. Bartlett
(1932) used the concept to combat the
concretistic

understanding of memories as "traces" of
previous experience
stored somehow in the brain (Paul, 1967).
In its
more

recent applications, the concept of a schema
has been

applied to knowledge in general (Rumelhart

&

Ortony, 1977)

and, most broadly, to all mental phenomena
(Mandler, 1984).

Here, it offers a means of conceptualizing emotions
as

subtle, dynamic organizations.

Despite its wide use, the concept of schema has rarely
been defined.

The meaning has usually been allowed to

coalesce out of a series of applications (in fact, in just
the way schemas themselves are said to develop)

.

It is used

to mean several different kinds of frameworks or skeletal

organizations which bring order and relationship among
elements.

When applied to memory, it suggests that memories
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are stored as abstract forms or
outlines. Most uses of the
concept imply that schemas may
be viewed in both static and
active aspects. They are spoken
of as being -stored" , but
also as doing things ("performing
cognitive operations")
once they are "activated".

The concept's usefulness in the
present context derives
from the fact that it is a
conceptualization of a superordinate organization, which has been
applied and elaborated
in a variety of settings.
It offers some precedents
in

comprehending and using

a

notion of a psychological

organization of elements— some footsteps to follow,
so to
speak.
Rumelhart (1980) has offered an introduction

to the

current uses of the concept of schema in cognitive
science
in which he attempts to convey the major
features of
the

concept and to define some of the major associated
terms.
He provides no single definition of schema, but
instead

gives a series of analogies.

Rumelhart first likens schemas to plays.

The chief

analogy here is that both schemas and plays have component
parts that have stable general definitions but which, on

given occasions, can be filled by different specific items.
In a play, these are the roles and the actors.

In a schema,

these are commonly termed the "variables" and their
"values".

Rumelhart gives the example of the schema for

purchase, that is, the concept of purchasing or buying.
know that a purchase involves a buyer,

a

a

We

seller, some medium

of exchange, and merchandise.

These are the variables.

On
any given occasion, they can
be filled by any of a
large set
of items.
The schema gives the relation
among the items,
which imparts the meaning to
the series of events, or,
to
put it another way, the schema
gives the set of instructions
for accomplishing an act of
buying.

Although each of the "variablesin
filled by any one of a number of
items,
what can fill the variable.

a

schema can be

there are limits on

These limits, according to

Rumelhart, are usually called "variable
constraints",
in
buying, the buyer and the seller are
typically persons and
the medium of exchange is typically
money. These "values"
for the "variables" are prototypical,
and they suggest that
there is a prototype for each schema. As
more and more
divergent items fill the variables or roles of
a schema,

schema fits less and less well, and at

a

the

certain point,

ceases to be an instance ("instantiation") of that
schema.
For example, in buying, generally, the merchandise
and the

medium of exchange covary in value; that is, the more one
buys, the more one must pay.
not absolutely essential.

the schema of buying.

building from

a

This is typical of buying, but

Nominal payments fall just within

If a non-profit institution buys a

philanthropic corporation for one dollar,

this may qualify as a purchase for some purposes (corporate

taxes, perhaps), but it is far from the prototype for

buying.

Examples like these suggest that variants of the

ideal instance of a prototype
can still be recognized.

Rumelharfs second analogy for

a

schema is a theory.

Schemas provide a model of a
situation that may aid in
comprehending that situation,
depending on how well the
model fits, as with a theory,
Rumelhart proposes, one tests
the fit of one's schemas with
the current situation, through
making observations, when some
critical number of
observations fit, the schema is accepted,
and from that
point guides assumptions about the
situation.

Once accepted, a schema not only
provides assumptions
about what further observations would
reveal, but also
provide a course of action, and this feature
leads
to

Rumelharfs third comparison, to the procedures
programs.

in computer

Like such procedures, schemas are sets of

instructions that, once activated, provide
actions oriented to some goal.

a

sequence of

The goal Rumelhart specifies

is evaluating the "fit to the available data",
but in other

uses, schemas have been described as having a variety of

goals.

(Rumelhart need not have turned to computer programs

for the feature of prescribing a course of action, since a

play also does so.)
Of the features of schemas highlighted by Rumelhart,
the four of most interest here are: they are organizations
of elements; they are frameworks that fit situations more or
less well; they are organized by an ideal instance or

prototype; and once they are accepted, they organize
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perception and guide action.

Eac h of these features is

useful in conceptualizing emotion.

Rumelhart and others who

employ a concept of schema (e.g.,
Mandler, 1984) speak of
the "activation" of schemas and
by implication of two
possible states for schemas, active
and inactive.
This
feature is also useful for the
present discussion. Of these
five features of schemas, the
importance of the concept in
conceptualizing emotions as organizations
has already be,?en
described. Let us review the remaining
four features as
they apply to emotions.

Emotions fit situations more or less
well.
clearest with regard to the object of emotion,

This is

when one

levels an accusation in anger, the accusation
is well or
poorly justified, the target of anger is or is
not the

guilty person, and the redress one seeks is either
suitable
or not.

The relevant situation includes many other factors

than these, however.

It includes also the internal

situation, what Freudian theory calls the state of the

psychic apparatus.

This situation can be broken down into

current needs and goals (in Freud, drives in

a

state of

cathexis) and the degree of current conflict between

impulses and prohibitions.

In ways that are detailed below,

all these factors are part of the situation that an emotion

fits more or less well.

Rumelhart and others consider schemas to be organized
around

a

prototypical case; for each schema, there is in

145

principle a "classic" example,
although this classic example
may never have actually existed
and may never exist.
De
Sousa (1980a) suggests a similar
and very useful notion for
emotions-the "paradigm scenario",
such a scenario
specifies characteristic objects and
responses in emotion,
and one learns these scenarios
as children through personal
experiences (as one is led by adults
to understand
them) and

through cultural products, such as
stories and fairy tales.
Paradigm scenarios lend themselves to
a very similar line of
reasoning to the one being advanced
here in connection with
schemas.

Learning to "gestalt" situations in terms
of such
scenarios is learning to attend differentially
to
certain features of an actual situation, to
inquire
into the presence of further features of
the scenario,
ano to make inferences that the scenario
suqqests.
(oe Sousa, 1980a, p. 143)
Emotions, once activated, organize perception
and guide
action.

Rumelhart's comparison of schemas with theories is

germaine.
Once we have accepted a configuration of schemata, the
schemata themselves provide a richness that goes far
beyond our observations. On deciding that we have seen
an automobile, we assume that it has an engine,
headlights, and all of the standard characteristics of
an automobile.
We do this without the slightest
hesitation. We have complete confidence in our little
theory.
(Rumelhart, 1980, p. 38)
It is a commonplace that emotions influence the way one sees

things.

For the most part, the everyday assumption is that

emotions tend to distort perception of events, that is, to
introduce irrationality.

Equally often, emotions highlight

valid perceptions and lead to
a deepened, *ore complete
view,
in either case, emotions
lead beyond the "observable"
and the already known.

Many emotions do more than
influence perception of the
external situation; they lead to
action. These actions have
an intricate structure.
In anger, for example,
it

Is

possible to isolate patterns of
aggressive and nonaggressive
action organized toward solving problems
(Averill, 1982).

An emotion plays a role, potentially,
in everything one does
and says while in its "grip", and one's
actions and words at
such times are not disorganized. They
cohere around the

theme of the emotion, around its structure.

The schema-

concept helps to conceptualize this organization.
Finally, we need a way of referring, in the
language of
schen&s, to the state of having an emotion. The
concept of
the activation of a schema establishes this link.

If we

employ the concept of schema for emotions, we can speak of
being in

a

emotional state as having an active schema, and

the analogy inclines us toward conceptualizing an

organization that has pervasive influence during distinct
periods of time.

The "operations" and directions in

a

schema correspond to the set of dispositions that make up an

emotional state (Fridhandler

&

Averill, 1982), which can

also be described as a set of rules (Averill, 1982, 1984;

Cornelius, 1984).

A note on origins of emotions.

The issue of the
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origins of emotions is largely
outside the scope of the
present effort. This theory takes
up primarily at the point
where emotional schemas are available
for the ego's use,
having been acquired over the
course of development,
it is
assumed, though, that emotions are
cultural products, as
proposed by Averill.
In his "social constructivist"

perspective, as just noted, emotions are
thought to be based
on- socially developed rules.
These rules include rules of

interpretation (constitutive rules) and rules
of procedure
and action (regulative rules), which
parallel the meanings
and procedures included here as part of
emotional
schemas.

The schema-concept used here and the
concepts of rule
and role in Averill are parallel terms for
roughly the same
entities.

The concept of schema is chosen here to

emphasize: the presence of prototypes for each emotion;
the

possibility of variations on, and distortions of, this
prototype; the evaluation of the internal and external

situation vis-a-vis the activation of emotion; the imposing
of the intentional object on external reality; and the

organizing functions of emotion.

The assumption that

emotions are sociocultural products is more strongly

connoted by the role-rule terminology, but it is accepted
here as well.
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Some Elaborations and
Implicat ions

Objects, Causes, and Activation
An important aspect of this
view of emotions as
schematic organizations is that the
object of an emotion is
part of the emotion, rather than
simply its cause. Among

psychoanalytic theorists, only Bowlby
(1969) has explicitly
espoused such a view, in his discussion
of emotion, he

argued, on the basis of Ryle
(1949), that the intentional
object of an emotion should not be
considered its cause, but
should instead be considered one part
of the emotional
state, alongside all the others,

m

Bowlby's account, the

emotional state is part of an activated
behavioral system.
In the present account, the emotion is
itself a schematic

organization.
With this view of intentional objects as a constitutive
part of an emotion, rather than its cause, some
tradition-

ally difficult problems become far less meaningful.
instance, it has long been

a

For

difficult problem for theories

of emotion to account for the fact that one's emotional

state seems to effect the way one perceives the situation
that underlies the intentional object.

For example, in the

usual view, one becomes angry when someone has done

something wrong.

However, often one's anger makes an act

seem to be a wrongful one, so that the anger causes one to

misperceive the act.

In fact,

in all episodes of anger, the
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wrongful act comes to seem more
clearly and thoroughly
wrongful. Therefore, if the
wrongful act, or even the

perception of the wrongful act is
considered to be the cause
of the anger, we have the
difficult situation of something
(the anger) causing its own
cause.

However, if the

intentional object (the wrongful
act as perceived, in its
perceived context) is part of the
schematic organization,
this problem is much less meaningful.
This feature of the present theory—
that the
intentional object is part of the

emotion-provides

a

new

understanding of an old and central theme
in psychoanalytic
theory of affect. Freud often considered
affects to be
inherently justified, as discussed above in
Chapter II.
order to account for this, he had to assume
an unconscious
object, which could be "replaced- by another

m

in

consciousness.

Freud had difficulty providing a grounding

for this assumption about emotion.

At one point (1915d) he

abandoned it, and when he moved to restore it
(1923), he
could give it only an awkward and provisional account,

referring to a "something- in the unconscious.

Chapter II, "The Signal Theory of Anxiety".)

(See above,

m

the present

view, affects or emotions are inherently justified because
an intentional object is part of the emotion; they are

inseparable.

Thus, the present theory incorporates one of

Freud's central views of affect, and provides a new account
of it.

15 0

If the object does not
cause the emotion-if the

wrongful act does not cause the
anger--*, are left with the
question of what causes an emotion,
since the term "causeis so ambiguous,

referring to many factors besides
the
immediate efficient cause, it may
avoid confusion
to

substitute the term "activate".

This latter term also fits

well with the concept of a schema.

The question, then, is

what activates an emotional schema
on a given occasion?
It is the ego.
The ego activates an emotion when
it
"judges" the situation to be right for
that emotion.
The
"situation", in this case, includes the
internal, psychological situation, as well as the external,
interpersonal
and social situation.

Many factors go into this "judgment".

The internal factors can be roughly grouped
into, first,

needs and goals, and relevant aspects of the
external

situation, and second, internal dangers and potential

disruptions.

The external factors are the ones more

commonly thought to cause an emotion, and include everything
referred to in the intentional object, and much else.
in the ego's "judgment"

When,

(which is fallible), enough factors

indicate that an emotion would be adaptive, it is activated.

Certainly, the concept of the ego judging factors and

activating

a

schema is a theoretical convenience.

It is a

metaphor, drawn from psychoanalytic metatheory, for complex

processes of monitoring and self-monitoring.

We have no

"literal" way of describing these processes, yet we have no
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choice but to assume that some
such processes take place;
in
other words, we have no choice
but to assume that something
analogous to conscious monitoring
underlies all the

accomplishments of human intelligence,
from reading a word
to following a map to having an
emotion,
it becomes a
question of choosing the best metaphor
for the purposes.
In
the present case, the judgment of
the ego becomes the
metaphor of choice because it resolves
some difficulties and
because it is a familiar part of psychoanalytic
theory.

The needs and goals monitored by the
ego are numerous.
A comprehensive accounting of them would
require a theory of
needs and goals, and such a theory would be
cumbersome and

inessential here.

Several theories of needs have been

developed in psychology, some of them with psychoanalytic
inspiration (e.g., Murray, 1938).

Within psychoanalytic

theory, many needs and goals have been recognized, none

unanimously.

Some have derived from concepts of instinct,

but only Freudians have insisted that all needs and goals be

traced to instincts.

In ego psychology, the concept of

conflict-free parts of the ego opens the way to needs and
goals with no relation to repressed instincts, and various
special needs and goals have been formulated, such as

Sandler's goal of safety (Sandler, 1981) or Kohut's need for
admiration (Kohut, 1971).

For the present purposes, the

best approach is an pluralistic one; that is, there is no
need to restrict the list of needs and goals which are
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relevant to emotions.

Instead, we can clarify
the rolg Qf
needs and goals in the present
view of emotion by surveying
examples.

Regarding the internal dangers
and potential
disruptions that emotions help to
contain, the traditional
division of the ego's adversaries
provides a useful guide.
That is, we may usefully divide
the dangers and disruptions
into id and superego factors,
id factors are chiefly
unacceptable impulses, whereas superego
factors involve
primarily self-criticism and "attacks"
on oneself.
The
concept of the ego using emotions to
help it deal with
dangers and disruptions includes the concept
of emotions
acting as defenses.
A good example of this process can be
drawn from
Freud's paper on jealousy and other topics
(Freud, 1922).
Freud describes three forms ("layers") of jealousy:
normal,

projected, and delusional.

In projected jealousy, one

projects one's own unacceptable impulses toward unfaithfulness.

In this way, one disowns the impulses and escapes

from damaging self-reproaches.

In "delusional"

unacceptable homosexual impulses are expressed.

jealousy,
"As an

attempt at defence against an unduly strong homosexual
impulse it may, in a man, be described in the formula:
^Indeed

I

do not love him, she loves him!'"

Freud regards

this as a defense, but in fact it is better characterized as
a

defended expression of the impulse, since it provides

a
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license to dwell on thoughts
of the other man, including
sexual thoughts.
To take another example,
it is customary to think
of
the aggressive impulses of
anger as caused by the anger.
From a psychoanalytic perspective,
though, one is more
inclined to think of aggressive,
destructive impulses as
existing prior to the anger and
using the anger as a
rationalization. This assumes a
displaceability of
impulses, and assumes psychoanalytic
concepts of

transference as well,

m

other words, it is possible for

distorted destructive impulses to have
an active existence
while remaining unconscious, and to be
activated in complex
ways. When such is the case, the ego
can make use
of anger

to provide a structured and more
acceptable vehicle for the

destructive impulses, which can then be expressed
with less
disruption and less self-criticism.
In the detailed example below, a further instance
of

the ego's use of an emotion in adapting to internal
dangers
is presented.

Here, we turn to an exploration of the

special adaptive value of emotion, and to the related issues
of irrationality and maladaptiveness.

Adaptiveness and Irrationality
Psychoanalysis has not been particularly successful in
treating the question of the adaptiveness of emotions.

On

the one hand, most of the major psychoanalytic theories of

.
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affect have considered affect
to be adaptive to internal
circumstances. In Freud's discbarge
theory, affect provides
a "safety valve" when more
direct drive gratification is
impossible,
his signal theory, anxiety
serves the
crucial purpose of signalling a need
for defensive efforts,
and Brenner (1975) has carried
this analysis over to other
affects. Rapaport (1953) retains the
discharge

m

understanding of the function of affect,
and Jacobson
(1971b)

adds an account of affects mediating
interactions

between the ego, id, and superego that
parallels the one
presented here. Some other theories have not
attended to
the question of functions, while at least
one has attributed
practically every imaginable functional benefit to
them
(Emde, 1980)

On the other hand, although no theorist has
explicitly

argued that emotions are entirely maladaptive, psycho-

analytic theory has not been particularly comfortable
with
the notion of emotions holding a unique value.

Intellect-

ualism and high regard for rationality pervade the logical
structure of psychoanalysis, through the basic dualities of
conscious and unconscious or ego and id.

Within this

structure, it has been difficult to give a theoretical value
to affect.

Thus, Schur

(1953)

finds himself compelled to

reserve his theoretical endorsement for the most thoughtlike affects, and neither Fenichel (1941/1954) nor Rapaport
(1953)

can formulate good theoretical reasons for their

155

conviction that there is an optimal
degree of affectivity
and that affect has crucial
roles
to play.

In the present theory, the ego
activates an emotion
when it considers that this

particular emotion will further

its own adaptive efforts.

The adaptive efforts to which

emotions may contribute involve a
wide range of internal and
external ends. Perhaps the most inclusive
of these is

increased understanding and organization,
which is primarily
an internal end. A need for increased
meaningfulness and

organization arises when situations,
particularly
interpersonal situations, are evidently important
ambiguous.
as:

yet

Such situations present one with such
questions

what is the meaning of this occasion?

impact on me and on others?

what will be its

Of the different aspects of

this situation, which are the more and less important?

are the best things to do and say?

what

How do

I

know whether

others are participating in the same event

I

am, and if they

are not, how can

I

best communicate

a

wish that they do so?

Emotion-schemas offer answers to such questions.
provide

They

coherent set of interpretations and instructions,

a

connecting the present situation with other situations and
social institutions, so that one's own understanding is

increased and so that one may make oneself understood to
others.

To take one example, a wedding is an ambiguous

situation.

The emotion of happiness can provide

a

unifying

theme, allowing coherent shared understandings and a shared
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construction of an event with
implications.
An increase in the
comprehensibility

and organization

of ambiguous situations, then, is
one of the goals toward

which the ego employs emotions,

m

the previous section,

the major factors in the ego's
decision to activate an

emotion were described, and each
of these corresponds to
further adaptive goals. Needs and goals
in the common-sense
definitions are included, when the ego
is relatively free
of constraining demands, in relation
with its capacities
(concepts to be elaborated on at various
places below)

,

it

may employ emotions toward any of one's
ordinary needs or
goals.
In the example provided later in the
present
chapter, these are chiefly prestige, autonomy,
self-respect,
and interesting work.

Reduction in disruption from id-impulses and superego
criticisms constitutes the final major class of functions to
which the ego applies emotion.

Id-impulses press toward

consciousness until some form of gratification for them is
found; the ego sometimes uses emotions to provide the

required masked gratification, as described in the previous
section.

Superego criticisms can lead to depression,

"pursuit of unhappiness"

(Schafer, 1984), exceedingly

painful attitudes of self-hatred, and so on.

Emotions can

be of use in avoiding these outcomes by providing other

targets for the criticism, as in anger or contempt, by

sheltering the self-image from criticism through affiliative
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emotions such as happiness, by
providing a structured means
of repairing the damage the
superego accuses one of causing
or the inadequacies it accuses
one of having, as in
disappointment, gratitude, and some
instances of guilt, and
so on.
some instances, these id and
superego pressures
continue over time and the ego
continues to employ the same
emotions against them, leading to
chronic emotions.

m

[6]

Emotions may or may not lead to
success in the efforts
in which they are employed, and
even when they lead to
success in one context, this may mean
adaptive failure in
another setting. For example, the ego may
activate guilt as
a means of finding suitable penance
so that the superego (as
the parents* representative) offers
forgiveness, but the
superego may prove obstinately harsh and the ego's
efforts
to avoid the criticisms may fail.

Or the emotion may

succeed in its primary, intrapsychic aim but
disrupt

functioning in the external world, as when guilt leads to

excessive passivity in the face of aggression.
Beyond these functions, and partly on the basis of
them, there are the benefits of emotion that common sense

would point to.

Emotion imparts meaning and sense, brings

vitality to endeavors, consolidates commitment to activities
and to people, and is the substance, guide, and goal of

relationships and of much else that essential to
life.

a

Emotion provides conviction and energy where

intellect might yield only passionless and dreary

fulfilled
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obligation.

Emotion sweeps aside constriction
and restraint
and allows the boldness of
creativity,
intellect provides
means; emotion holds promise
of ends.
in the present theory, a more
complete theoretical

account can be given to these values
of emotion than has
previously been possible in the
psychoanalytic literature of
affect. The account is based,
first,
on the fact that

emotional schemas derive from the
past, generally in
childhood; second, from the fact that
emotions are schematic
organizations; and third, from the
constitution of emotions
by social rules, particularly the socially
sanctioned

interpretation of involuntariness.
Emotion carries forward some of the characteristics
of
childhood, through the schema and the interpretation
of

involuntariness.

Among these characteristics are the sense

of urgency and un-self-conscious investment in
relationships

and activities.

Emotions can also impart childhood's

readiness to change and grow— that is, to review and alter
some part of one's identity, if perhaps only a small

part—

and the concomitant readiness to risk personal failure.

these characteristics lead to an unhesitancy,
doubt.

a

All

reduction of

They lead, too, to a sense of meaningf ulness and

importance of the moment, in itself, with little reference
to its outcome.

Emotions carry these features of childhood, in part, in
the same way memories do.

In fact, they are memories of
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childhood, although they are
condensed memories, not unlike
Freud's concept of screen
memories (Freud, 1899/1962).
There is nothing new, obviously,
in suggesting that a schema
can constitute a memory, since
the concept of schema was
introduced into psychology to understand
memory
(Bartlett,

1932).

when an emotional schema is
activated, these
characteristics of childhood are, by the
same token, reawakened and available.
These characteristics of emotions
are also produced in
part by the fact that they are schematic
organizations,
regardless of whether the schemas date
from childhood.
Schemas impart clarity and certainty, and
these can
constitute a sense of meaningfulness
in de Sousa's (1980a)
terms, emotions are "determinate patterns of
salience" which
can lead to choices where logic is inadequate,
where logic
.

is indeterminate, choice is difficult and
conviction is

impossible.

Emotion can bring both choice and conviction,

yielding meaning.
The possibilities offered by these characteristics
of
emotion are realized, in part, through the socially

sanctioned interpretation of involuntariness

.

Choice and

conviction can be obstructed by obsessive demands for
"rationality", demands imposed by oneself or others.
of "responsibility", too, can re-introduce doubt and

obstruct forthright action.

The interpretation of

involuntariness, when successfully made and "played"

Norms
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CAverill, 1982)

,

offers

a

means of protecting conviction

from doubt and protecting
coherence from analytic
dissection,
if the many aspects

of an emotion-its

interpretations, expressions, and
actions-are understood to
be involuntary, then voluntary
choices are not being made.
If voluntary choices are
not being made, then doubt
and the
more restrictive norms of responsibility
cannot take hold.
Emotions can miscarry, however.
Many of the same
features that lead to the adaptiveness of
emotions can lead
astray. One can embark with clarity
and conviction in what
is at least in some respects the wrong
direction. Though
the ego activates an emotion for
reasons, it is fallible in
its judgment; that is, it is misleading to
conceptualize the
ego as infallible and omniscient,
in principle, emotions

can be activated when they serve the goals of internal

adaptation only poorly.

Since it is impossible to observe

these internal interactions—or rather, since these internal

interactions are purely conceptual constructions— there

is

no independent way of judging when an emotion serves

internal adaptation well or poorly.

Matters are different regarding the external situation,
where it is possible to form

emotion fits.

a

judgment about how well an

Most conspicuously, an instigation of an

emotion can fail to fit the facts of the matter.

One can be

angry at an imagined wrong, jealous over trivial flirtation,
hopeful without reason, and so on,

De Sousa (1980a)
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provides a useful framework for
comprehending the fit and
failure of fit between the
intentional object of an emotion
and the real external situation,
when the fit is good, we
call the emotion "appropriate",
and de Sousa terms this the
form of rationality in emotion,
when the
fit is poor, the

emotion is inappropriate, and we
have irrationality in
emotion. And if emotions guide action
as well as organize
perception, a poor fit can lead to
action that is misguided,
misplaced, or destructive, and which is
impervious to the
lessons of experience.
As Handler
a

(1S84)

notes, the concept of schema leads to

Freudian notion of transference,

if understanding is

based on schemas, then we tend to understand
current

situations as reproductions of past ones.

Under the present

view of emotion, emotions are one kind of
schema that

carries forward the perceptions and reactions of the past.
The interpretation of involuntariness reinforces
emotional

transference reactions by undermining appeals to norms of
rationality.

Such preservation of the past, and therefore

the possibility of irrationality, is inherent in the make-up
of emotions, and the liability to irrationality in emotion
is strengthened by the internal, psychological factors in

their activation.

Repression
Under the present view, emotion can have two relations
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to the repressed unconscious.

First, it can be used by the

ego as part of its repressive
operations, and second, it can
itself be repressed. The first of
these has already been
implied by the proposition that
the ego incorporates idimpulses into emotions when these
impulses threaten to
disrupt functioning. These
impulses press for some kind
of
expression, and the ego can adapt to this
by incorporating
them in emotions, where the
specifics that make the impulses
unacceptable can be disguised. Examples
were given above of
sexual and aggressive impulses
incorporated, respectively,
in jealousy and anger.
The liability to transference just
discussed also can serve the repressive
role of emotion, by

transfering impulses directed at forbidden objects
to
contemporary ones.
For Freud, a central instance of emotion's
involvement
in repression was provided by the emotions in
obsessive-

compulsive neurosis, particularly the self-reproach
over
trivial matters (e.g., the "Rat Man's" self-reproach ever
leaving a rock in a path, since his fiancee's carriage might
hit it).

In Freud's account, the emotions "belong to"

unconscious impulses— in the Pat Man's case, to sexual and

aggressive impulses toward his fiancee and his father.

In

the present terms, this would be a case of the ego

misrepresenting in consciousness the object of the emotion,
with the result that the emotion is malformed, that is, it

departs substantially from the paradigm scenario or ideal
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case of the schema, although
it is still structured by
that
schema.
in Freud's account, the
emotion is generated by the

unconscious impulses, and is then
split off from its
ideational content as part of
the repressive operations
directed at that ideational content.
(These aspect of the
account were instrumental in the
development of the concept
of libido as a displaceable energy.)
the present

m

account, too, the impulse plays
a role in the generation
of
the emotion, but in a mediated way.
Certain configurations
of impulse and prohibition place
severe restrictions on the
ego and virtually require it to activate
a certain emotion.
When the Rat flan had his particular
impulses in the presence
of strong prohibitions against them, an
emotion of shame or
self-reproach was virtually required in order
to accommodate
them. By the same token, under such conditions,
the ego is

unable to include the impulse itself in the
instantiation of
the schema, since this would imply conscious acknowledgment
of the impulse.

Therefore it selects a substitute object

and produces a distorted instantiation, that is, one that is

quite different from the prototype of the schema.
In this way, emotions can be caused by conflict.

Instead of the more mechanistic account of Freud's discharge

theory and similar theories (e.g., Jacobson, 1971a;
Rapaport, 1953), the present account centers on an ego whose

choices are drastically narrowed by internal conflicts.

In

principle, emotions caused by
conflict are produced in the
same way as other emotions,
as adaptive organizations.
They
preserve the element of teleology
in this account.
However,
the more the ego-s choices
are narrowed by conflicts,
the
more it is possible
to speaK
sr>Mir of an
f
emotion caused by
conflict.
The topic of unconscious emotion
in the present theory
is considered in the next
chapter,
brief, emotions in
the present view are conscious
or preconscious.
However,
these emotions may be substitutes
for others which would be
more consistent with circumstances
and needs but are being
defended against.

m

An Example

An example may illustrate the range of
possibilities in
the composition of an emotion and the type of
organization

provided by the schema.

The example is designed to be

detailed enough to approximate the complexity of an
everyday
emotion.

Like everyday emotions, it involves other

emotions, within the broader episode of

a

single emotion— in

this case, disappointment.

Alex has been hoping for a promotion.

He works in a

business consulting firm, where he handles statistical
analysis.

He got the job after graduating from college,

with a major in economics; he had a general familiarity with
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the kinds of statistics he
handles, but he learned most
of
what he needs to know for his
job in this office.
He

handles the mechanical aspects
of the projects of his
immediate superior, and he has
been in the same position
since joining the firm three years
ago.

Alex's superior, Harry, announced

few weeks ago that

a

he would be taking a partnership
in another firm.

There had

been rumors for some weeks that
he had been offered this
position, which represents a substantial
advance
in his

career.

A week before he made the public
announcement,

Harry told Alex that he would be leaving,
and said that he
hoped Alex would be selected to
replace
him;

further, he

told Alex he would be recommending this to
the firm's

managing director.
excited.

Alex was surprised and enormously

Harry had an MBA and had gotten his position after

two years with another company.

Alex had imagined from time

to time taking Harry's position, but had never thought of it
as a realistic possibility.
In the days following Harry's announcement,
the

director conferred with him about a replacement.

Harry had

cultivated a set of accounts that he was highly familiar
with, and these companies had remarked to the director on

how valuable Harry's familiarity with their operations was.

Harry pointed out that Alex was also familiar with these
companies' needs, and that anyone from outside the firm

would require many months before he or she had comparable
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knowledge.

The director agreed, but
noted that the position
had always been filled by
an MBA.

Some days before Harry was
scheduled to leave, the
director spoke
n fl said u
with Alex.
aipy
v *e witn
He
he assumed Alex was aware
that Harry was leaving, and that
he had suggested Alex as
his replacement. Ee had given
careful consideration to this
possibility, the director continued,
and he was genuinely
impressed with how quickly Alex
had learned and how well he
did his work. But he had decided
that it would not be
feasible to have Alex in Harry's
position. He felt that the
position required broader familiarity with
business

practices than Alex could have without
more experience, and
ideally an MBA. Father than bring in someone
from outside
to replace Harry, the director said
he intended to

restructure the position's responsibilities, distributing
Harry's accounts among other account managers
but farming

out greater responsibility for report writing and client

relations to subordinates, particularly to Alex.

This would

involve a pay raise for Alex and a chance to learn new

aspects of the business.
Alex felt deeply disappointed, more so that he expected
he might feel.

His wife had told him to try not to get his

hopes up too high, and he had thought he had been realistic,
but now he felt so crestfallen and discouraged that he

realized he'd almost become confident he would get the

promotion.

In his meeting with the director he had said
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almost nothing, mai nly nodding
and at the end saying he
understood the director's
reasons. He'd wanted to
argue, to
point out how much he knew about
Harry's accounts, but he
had stifled the impulse, when
he left the director's
office, he went back to his desk,
but his cubicle was open
to view, so he went across
the street to a restaurant
where
he could be more or less alone.

Sitting in a booth, he started
to cry.

only a few tears fell.
and dreary.

Not copiously;

Continuing in his job seemed futile

He realized he was not proud
of his job r and

that he had been picturing telling his
wife and his parents
exuberantly about his promotion. He
saw himself
as a

failure— incapable, undeserving, and inconsequential.

He

felt disgusted with himself, or with
his job; he wasn't sure
which. He breathed in deeply, and for a moment
thought he

might begin to sob.
Alex cried for a time.

Then he smiled, a bit.

Smiling, for a while, he cried more, but as he smiled and
cried a tightness in his chest relaxed, and he felt
better.
He dried his eyes and his cheeks, took a few more deep
breaths, and started back to the office, a little

embarrassed about not ordering anything and turning to see
whether anyone might have watched him drying his tears.
Later, he spoke briefly to the director, to let him

know he hadn't meant to seem angry and that he appreciated
the new responsibilities and the raise.

The director said
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he hoped Alex wasn't
disappointed; Alex laughed and
said,
"I'll get over it."
In the afternoon, Alex
took a long break and went
to a

college nearby where one of his
friends had gotten an MBA.
He checked into course
requirements and loans. He began
working out in his head how long he
would have to go to
night classes until he could afford
to quit work and finish
up during the day. He had never been
sure he wanted an MBA,
and he still wasn't, but he felt
practically buoyant when he
went back to work.
Let us first examine the intentional
object in this
emotional episode, then turn to the other
elements and their

organization.
The example is an episode of disappointment.

Its

intentional object— what Alex is disappointed about— is that
he will not be promoted to Harry's position.

It is an

intentional object (i.e., mental, representational) in that
Alex is not disappointed about "objective" external events,

which consist only of the managing director deciding not to
give him

a

job.

Rather, his disappointment depends on an

interrelated set of personal meanings, some of which were

longstanding (e.g., Harry's job was "better" than his own),
some of which were recent (he might be able to get Harry's
job)

,

and some of which were partly created in the course of

the emotion itself (his own job was dreary and possibly

humiliating).

A better approximation of the intentional
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object would be "not getting
Harry's job which it seemed he
could conceivably have gotten
and having to stay in his
current job which now seems much
less desirable".
The objective event-the
director's

decision-is the

occasion for Alex's disappointment,
but it is not the cause.
The schema for disappointment
is activated on the basis
of
the ego's assessment of current
needs and goals (vis-a-vis
the external situation), the
status of internal conflicts,
and the range of intentional objects
the current external

situation could support,

in the case of Alex's disappoint-

ment, the needs were for mastering new
skills and knowledge,
for praise and pride from his
wife, his parents, and Harry,
and for "prestige", which is perhaps the
admiration of a
generalized other. In keeping with these needs,
Alex's

current goals include professional advancement.

(For

present purposes we are not required to settle
the complex

question of whether these needs and goals are based on
infantile needs of the past or on "deeper" current
needs.)
The most prominent inner danger seems to be an

intensification of punitive criticism from the superego.
Among the elements in the emotion apart from its

intentional object, one cluster involves another emotion,
namely hope. Hope itself is not an element in Alex's

disappointment (although emotions can be elements in one
another); it is a causal precondition.

Alex would not have

been disappointed by not getting the promotion if he had not
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been hoping for it.

This hope itself can be
broken down
into elements in a specific
configuration. These elements
include Alex's beliefs regarding
work and accomplishment,
his desire to advance and to get
praise and appreciation
from his wife and parents, the
value he places on money and
position, his assessment of his
own and Harry's job and of
his chances of promotion, and so on.
Alex's hope had placed
these elements in a state of
flux and uncertainty; they
had
been static and now they were active.
These same elements
formed part of the disappointment.

Self and object representations, in
the psychoanalyt icsense, form another, overlapping
set of elements.
The self

representations include an ideal one (having obtained
Harry's job, successful, capable, deserving)

and a now-

devalued actual one (incapable, undeserving, inconsequential).

Object representations might include

a

rejecting, attacking director and a more realistically seen

accepting director.

Numerous memories are involved in the episode of

disappointment.

Among the more recent ones would be

memories of hopes, of his wife telling him not to be too
hopeful and of his own thoughts at that time, of Harry's
encouragement, and so on.

More distant memories of earlier

disappointments, including childhood ones, would also be
involved.

These more distant memories would include images

of depriving and crue] persons, comforting persons, shameful
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self images, and memories of
how he had "gotten over" the
disappointments, that is, how the
sense of an irreplaceable
loss had faded, together with
the accompanying sense of

worthlessness or deprivation.
Among the desires involved
in the disappointment are
the desire for the promotion, the
desire ("impulse")
to

argue with the director, and the
desire to be alone after
speaking to the director.

Several physiological events form
elements of the
disappointment. These are created, in a form
in which they
can be incorporated into the disappointment,
by complex
processes of initiation of reaction patterns,
self-

interpretation, and social self-consciousness.

Some of

them, such as the deep breaths and smiles,
are often

interpreted as voluntary, although Alex must not.

Others,

such as the tightness in his chest, are readily seen
as

self-interpretations.

Some, such as his tears, are

generally seen as involuntary, as Alex must see them in
accord with the schema, but from a theoretical viewpoint
one
must assume that they are generated by the operation of the

schema, through complex processes.

These many elements must be organized into

a whole,

if

they are to be other than an assortment of unrelated items
in the context of many other unrelated items

(such as what

Alex had for breakfast, what color his director's eyes are,

whether Alex sat at

a

booth or at the counter in the
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restaurant, whether he had any
asthma attacks that day,
etc., etc.).
This is provided by the
schema, which is
employed by the ego to this end.

The schema provides a set of
legitimate causal
assumptions, such as that the tears were
caused by the
director's decision. It provides
justification for

recovering memories of old, surmounted
disappointments and
using these to replace images of
worthlessness and

dreariness,

it provides a template of the course
of such

emotions-one "gets over" them, i.e., the elements
form
new and less painful alignment,

a

it provides a particular

meaning to the memories of hopeful anticipations,
namely
that one is suffering a painful process that cannot
be
evaded.

Finally, it offers

a

conviction of lasting internal

change, as the elements of hopeful anticipation, altered

personal values, more conscious values and beliefs,
and the

knowledge of the director's decision combine to lead to
new set of possibilities (an MBA,

a

a

new job), which Alex

begins to pursue with an increased sense of autonomy.

In

these various respects, the schema helps provide coherent

organization.

Beyond the general need for coherence, the ego in this

example is confronted with

a set of

problems, to which it

applies the emotion of disappointment.
problems.

acquired

There are two chief

First, Alex, in the context of his hope, has
a

new set of active needs and goals, and this has

.
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created a situation in which
he cannot return to his former
adjustment around his job. His
needs for mastery, praise,
and prestige now have a new job
as their object, and the
previous adjustment in which
these needs were deployed
elsewhere or defensively avoided has
been disrupted. The
problem is how to continue in his
current situation when his
needs are focused on what he does
not and will not have.
The second problem, suggested by
psychoanalytic assumptions,
is that superego criticisms have
become more intense.

This

may have been due to the possibility
of new gratifications,
if these possibilities activated
self-punitiveness and the

"unconscious sense of guilt" that Freud referred
to.

The

intensified superego criticism emerges most directly
in the
conscious self-image as incapable, undeserving,
and

inconsequent ial
The disappointment helps resolve these adaptational
problems.

It provides a template for "getting over it",

that is, re-orienting needs and goals to renew the

possibility of their satisfaction,

in Alex's case, the new,

tentative focus is an MBA and other jobs.

This new focus

helps restore a livable degree of favorable self-regard.
But such a resolution could be readily undermined by the

strengthened superego criticisms.

These are workably

resolved through the shifting of criticisms from the self to
the job, which then seems disgusting.

The disappointment-

schema offers the possibility of this shift, and makes it
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more successful through the
interpretation of involuntariness, which neutralizes the
criticism that Alex might
otherwise direct at himself, to
the effect that he is making
excuses and that the problem is
not with his job but with
himself.
The schema provides the outline
or set of
possibilities. The individual, through

a set of ego

processes (self-ref lection, action and
interpretation
according to the internalized rules),
puts these
possibilities into effect, toward the primary
goal of
forming a meaningful, organized integration
of elements and
the secondary one of achieving some greater
satisfaction of
strivings toward an ideal self, personal integration,
or

desired relationships with external or internal
objects.

How is the Theory Psychoanalytic?

Of the terms of the theory, only ego is drawn from

psychoanalytic theory.

Certain of the conceptions in the

theory can be found in previous psychoanalytic affect
theories, but not exclusively there.

On what grounds, then,

can the theory be called psychoanalytic?

necessary to consider what it means for
psychoanalytic, and for

a

First it js
a

theory to be

theory of affect to be psycho-

analytic.

Psychoanalytic theory has undergone several radical
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transformations during its history,
and it has spawned other
schools of thought and therapy.
At times, there has been
bitter controversy over whether
new approaches were
genuinely psychoanalytic (Fairbairn,
1962; Freud, 1914;

Guntrip, 1961; Kohut, 1977).

it becomes clear in the course

of such controversies that there
is no universally accepted
definition of psychoanalysis, and that one
is not likely to
be devised.

Even within orthodox circles, firm
definitions are
elusive. The issue of psychoanalysis versus
psychotherapy
is instructive.

In the early 1950's, American analysts

became particularly concerned to distinguish
psychoanalysis
proper from psychoanalytically informed psychotherapy
(Gill,
1954; Fangell, 195 4; Stone, 1954).

The concern derived, at

least in part, from the increasing number of psycho-

therapists who were not trained in psychoanalytic
institutes, and in many cases were not physicians.

Analysts

sought to clarify their professional identity, both to

orient themselves as to the particular value of their

arduously acquired method, and to reinforce their preeminence

.

In the course of this discussion, Merton Gill

formulated

a

(1954)

distinction between psychoanalysis and psycho-

therapy which has become the most definitive (Kernberg,
1984).

Gill's definition of psychoanalysis rested on the

analyst's neutrality, on the techniques designed to induce

a
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-regressive transference neurosis",
and the "resolution of
the neurosis by techniques
of interpretation alone"
(p.
This definition remains the
most widely agreed upon
(Kernberg, 1984). Gill himself,
however, now dissents,
fact, he has completely reformulated
the distinction, as a
consequence of his new positions
on psychoanalytic technique
(Gill, 1984).
He has come to view each of the
main elements
of his earlier distinction
differently, and no longer
regards all of them as essential or even
desirable.
775).

m

The uncertainty of definition that
attaches to psychoanalytic treatment is much surpassed by the
difficulty in
defining psychoanalytic theory,
the early decades of the
movement, this task was carried out by Freud,
who maintained

m

rigid control over the definition of
the truly psycho-

analytic, and employed this authority in excluding those

whose ideas challenged his own conceptions
(Freud,
1914/1957, 1925/1959) even when he eventually incorporated
these heterodox propositions (e.g., Freud, 1933/1964,
p.
87).

In effect, Freud's authority substituted for

principles of definition.
Initially, the most important authors whose work was

expelled from psychoanalysis by Freud, such as Jung and
Adler, did not dispute the issue, but instead developed
their thought and technique outside of orthodox

psychoanalysis.

Later, as Freud's predominance over the

movement waned and after his death, advocates of various
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schools of thought made claims
on the title of psychoanalytic theory (Fairbairn,
1952; Kardiner, Karush
Ovesey, 1959; M Klein,
1975; Kohut, 1977; Homey,
1937;
.

Sullivan, 1953).

m

some cases (e.g., m. Klein,
1975) the
originators of these schools felt
themselves to be directly
extending Freud's work --although
these claims were often
rejected by others (Kernberg, 1980)
-whereas in other cases,
schools of thought emerged in
spirited opposition to Freud
(Fairbairn, 1952; Kardiner, Karush &
Ovesey, 1959).
The profusion of different schools,
differing over
fundamental issues and yet all considering
themselves

psychoanalytic, raised in a new and deeper
way the question
of what could be identified as the
essence of psychoanalytic
theory.
In the context of such differences, one
can attempt to

identify guiding principles and assumptions underlying
most
or all of the schools which identify
themselves as psycho-

analytic.

This approach avoids sectarianism,

authoritarianism, and the arbitrary reliance on peripheral
features of theory.

On the other hand, it is a highly

subjective approach, and one that is more likely to generate
disputes than to resolve them.

Still, there are no

alternatives if one wishes to arrive at

a

meaningful

definition which is not determined by sectarian commitments
or by loyalty to inessential ideas.

similar argument.)

(Schafer

[1976] makes

a
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in my own view,
psychoanalytic theory can be defined
by

the proposition that adult
thoughts, actions, and feelings
are ordinarily based in large
part on potentially distorting
interpretations and coping strategies
of which one is
unaware. Seemingly senseless
thoughts, actions, and
feelings become comprehensible
when the underlying
interpretations and coping strategies
are known.
These
interpretations and coping strategies
derive from childhood,
which included both distorted and
accurate interpretations
of significant others.
The lack of awareness of irrational
interpretations and coping strategies is not
accidental, but
is explained by the personal
unacceptability
of

alternatives.

Certain kinds of irrationality are striven

for, for reasons which are themselves
out of awareness.

Symbolism and interpretation are crucial in all these
processes.

Finally, the of irrationality can be reduced, in

ways which involve becoming aware of these processes in some
coherent set of terms.
I

think this definition captures essential elements in

the various schools of psychoanalysis

—Freudian,

ego

psychological, object relations, interpersonal,

culturalist

—without

depending on features not shared by all

genuinely psychoanalytic perspectives.

For example,

concepts of instinct and of the fundamental importance of

sexuality are not shared by most schools.
schools share

a

However, all

concept of unacceptable parts of the self
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which have a crucial and
problematic impact.
schools, this unacceptability
is due

For Freudian

to the involvement of

infantile, perverse, or incestuous
sexuality, other schools
attribute unacceptability to
other factors, but the logic is
parallel, and is essential to a
psychoanalytic theory.
If a body of theory is
defined as psychoanalytic by
these features, it remains a separate
question what defines
an affect theory as psychoanalytic.
Three possibilities can
be isolated:
1)

An affect theory is psychoanalytic
if it is drawn

from established psychoanalytic theory and
metatheory.
2)

An affect theory is psychoanalytic
if it is

consistent with the essential features of
psychoanalytic
theory and can be readily applied to psychoanalytic

issues.

3)

An affect theory is psychoanalytic if it

specifically entails the essential features of psychoanalytic theory, so that adopting that theory of affect
entails adopting the essential features of psychoanalytic.
The first possibility has perhaps the greatest

simplicity and the most immediate appeal, but it can be
readily eliminated by two considerations.

The first has

just been discussed, namely, that most specific theoretical

terms, and all metapsychological terms, are tied to specific

versions of psychoanalytic theory.

Secondly, the history of

psychoanalytic affect theory strongly suggests that psychoanalytic theory does not provide an affect theory but, on
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the contrary, needs an affect
theory. Host of Freud's
affect theories, for instance,
were either borrowed from
elsewhere (or from assumptions
originating elsewhere).
Despite repeated efforts over
several decades, attempts to
devise an affect theory based on
metapsychology produced
almost universally dissatisfaction
(Brenner, 1974b; Green,
1977).
It would be unwisely restrictive
to confine the
title of psychoanalytic affect
theory to theories based on
established terms.
The second of the three possibilities
specified above
for determining whether a theory of
affect is psychoanalytic
is more meaningful and holds more
promise for a satisfying
affect theory.
In this definition, an affect theory
is

psychoanalytic if it is consistent with the
essential
features of psychoanalytic theory and can be readily
applied
to psychoanalytic issues,

in favor of this definition, one

may note: first, in order for a theory of affect to be

adequate to the needs of psychoanalytic theory it
need only
be compatible with the basic tenets of psychoanalysis;

second, if it can be readily applied to psychoanalytic

questions, it can be recognized as an especially useful
theory; and third, if it is not drawn from metatheory , it

does not depend on inessential components of one or another
school, and does not suffer from the vitiating effects

Freudian metapsychology has had on affect theories.
The shortcoming of this definition of

a

psychoanalytic

^

affect theory is that it includes
too much; it makes no
distinction between psychoanalytic
affect theory and a nonpsychoanalytic affect theory that
can be applied in psychoanalysis. This is a worthwhile
distinction to be able to
draw, even though it has often
been ignored (cf. Basch,
1976;

Emde, 1980).

if we seek a way to make
this

distinction in meaningful ways, without
resorting to
arbitrary and restrictive
metatheoretical connections, we
arrive at the third possibility described
above.
In this third possibility, an
affect theory is psycho-

analytic if it specifically entails the
essential features
of psychoanalytic theory.
i n other words, there would
be a
close logical correspondence between such
a theory
and the

basic assumptions of psychoanalysis.

This would include

compatibility, but would go beyond it, so that the
affect
theory would be most coherent and most compatible
within

psychoanalysis, and would tend to be incompatible with other
viewpoints.

In the strongest version of this way of

defining psychoanalytic affect theory, an affect theory
would only be psychoanalytic if it logically entailed all
the essential features of psychoanalytic theory, so that

adopting that theory of affect would require adopting some

version of psychoanalysis.
The present affect theory,

I

now argue, qualifies as

psychoanalytic under this third definition.

It does not

meet the strongest requirements of this definition, but jt
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is not clear that any
affect theory could;

that is, it may
not be that any affect theory
would logically require all
the essential features of
psychoanalytic and be incompatible
with any viewpoint that did
not include all of these.
However, the present affect theory
does, as I attempt to
show, imply some crucial
aspects of the essential psycho-

analytic assumptions, and is compatible
with all of them.
Some of this discussion is
undertaken in the next
chapter, in conjunction with the
discussion of specific
issues in psychoanalytic theory,
particularly the

discussions of unconscious emotion and
emotion in therapy.
For the moment, let us return to the
issues discussed above
in "Some Elaborations and Implications".
The
first

subsection there dealt with the ego's role in
the causation,
or activation, of emotion, and also
addressed the

implications of inclusion of the intentional object
as

a

constitutive part of an emotion (rather than as its cause).
On the basis of these views, one is led to the
psycho-

analytic proposition that interpretations of external
reality are based on many factors which are not a part of
that current reality, and that therefore interpretations of

external reality are readily distorted.

The objects of

emotions are imposed on external reality when, in the ego's
judgment, that emotion is needed, and often the emotion is

needed for reasons that have little to do with the real

current situation.

Like psychoanalytic theory in general,
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the present view of emotions
sees the possibility for many
degrees of validity in interpretations
and of adaptiveness
in coping strategies,
when internal conflict is
relatively
low and superego prohibitions
are less stringent, these
factors impose fewer constraints
on the ego in activating
emotions, and the ego is then free
to form emotions in close
accord with current reality and with
current needs and
goals, in the highest degree of
adaptiveness.

The factors in the ego's decision
to activate an
emotion include repressed impulses, and
this means that
emotions are partly in the service of such
impulses.
Irrationality, then, in the form of divergence
of emotion
from external reality and from other needs
and goals, is a

systematic part of emotion, in the present account.

Part of

the character of repressed impulses is to
demand loyalty, so
to speak.
That is, one acts as if no satisfaction could

substitute for the satisfaction of these impulses, clinging
to them and retaining them in repression.

Freud called this

the "conservative character of the instincts" or the

"repetition compulsion" and it was one of the factors that
lead to the formulation of the death instinct.

Emotions

serve this process of conservation of repressed impulses by

providing them with some limited expression and with

a

continuing disguise.
Emotions, in the present theory, contribute to the

preservation of more than impulses.

As discussed above,
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they help preserve, in active
forms, some features of
childhood, such as the sense of
urgency of the moment and
the un-self-conscious investment
in relationships and
activities. They help preserve,
too, images of self and
others formed in childhood. As noted
above, this aspect of
emotions can be derived from
conceptualizing them as based
on schemas which are formed, for
the most part, during
childhood. The lasting influence of
childhood, of course,
is a key notion of psychoanalysis.

The concept of repression, or
purposive unawareness, is
not specifically entailed by the present view
of emotion,
but we have seen how emotion as understood
here can play a
role in repression, and in the next chapter a more
detailed
account of repressed emotion is given in terms
of the

present theory.
In short, some of the essential features of
psycho-

analysis are entailed by the present theory, and some,
though not specifically entailed, can be accommodated.

The

former include the vulnerability of distortions in

interpretations of current reality and in coping strategies,
the preservation of repressed impulses, and the pervasive

influence of childhood.
repression.

Among the latter are concepts of
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Summary

A theory of emotion has been
proposed, which takes
emotions to be schematic organizations,
in the ego and
activated by the ego, of physiological,
psychological, and
social responses, according to
individually adapted,
socially based rules. Emotions were
defined as states to
which intentional objects are essential
and in which an
interpretation of involuntariness is
highlighted. The
psychoanalytic concept of the ego was discussed
and its

central role in the present theory was
described.

The

conceptualization of emotions as schematic organizations
was
explicated. A number of elaborations and
implications were
presented, including an account of the factors involved
in
the activation of emotion and the functions of
emotion

vis-a-vis these factors, a discussion of adaptiveness and
irrationality, and an initial discussion of repression.

detailed example was given.

Finally, the relation of the

theory to psychoanalytic theory in general was explored.

A

CHAPTER

V

DISCUSSION OP ISSUES IN PSYCHOANALYTIC
AFFECT

Introduction

in the second and third
chapters,

I

reviewed many of

the major statements on affect
within psychoanalytic theory.
Freud's work took pride of place,
as is traditional.
Later
authors, reviewed in Chapter III, addressed
a variety of
issues, some of which Freud had been
concerned with and many
of which he had not.
the present chapter, we return to
this history of affect theory in
psychoanalysis. We turn to
each of the themes that emerged in the review
and bring to

m

bear on each the original conceptions of
emotion just
outlined, in an effort to determine what degree of

clarification and further insight these conceptions
can
offer.

The chapter closes with

a

consideration of two

topics, anxiety and psychotherapy, which although they
were
not selected as major themes in my review of theories, are
of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion here.

Freud

In the review of Freud's theories, his views in the

context of the theories of hysteria and "anxiety neurosis"
were considered first.

Then the "discharge theory" and the
186
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"signal theory- of anxiety were
reviewed, and finally
Freud's clinical theories
were sampled. Here, this

succession of topics

win

attempt to see how Freud

pr0 vide the organization as we

-s

theories appear in the light of

the present conceptions.

Hysteria
"Strangulated affect" was the cornerstone
of Freud and
Breuer's theory of hysterical neurosis,
in Chapter II i
surveyed the many implications for
affect theory in their
conception of hysterical symptoms. To re-state
these in
summary form, the theory of hysteria depicts
affect as
energy with quality. The theory holds that
this energy is

created when a person meets affect-provoking
situations, and
that normally it moves through the psyche and is
expressed.
However, on occasion the energy is not released in
this
immediate, optimal way, but is retained in the psyche, most

often because

a

person finds expression unacceptable and

defends against it.

This situation produces disturbances of

functioning, typically including physical functioning, until
such time as the energy is released in the optimal way, that
is, until it is "abreacted".

A clear divergence of the present views from Freud's

emerges immediately in connection with the concept of
energy.

Energy, in Freud's sense, has no place in the

current understanding of emotion.

Freud explained an
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enormous range of phenomena with
his successive variations
on the energy concept,
but for many theorists it has
come to
be a hollow concept, certainly
unable to bear the weight
Freud and his direct successors
placed on it (Holt, 1976;
Klein, 1973b; Schafer, 1976;
Swanson, 1977). David Hume
said of explanation that it is
a place where the mind
comes
to rest; it is a rare mind today
that finds rest at
the

concept of energy.

Few would be inclined to offer a
simple

reference to energy as the explanation
for the manifold
patterns of thought, memory, perception,
sensation, action,
and interaction that we class as emotional;
it would seem,
to most, an unenlightening tautology.
Even though the
related concept of id-impulses pressing for
gratification is
retained in the present theory, the core of
Freud's energy

concept— hypothetical energy as explanation— is not
employed.
What, then, becomes of the concept of abreaction
in the

context of the present views?

Freud and Breuer's conception

of the central role of abreaction in treatment collapses

without their specific concept of psychic energy.

Freud

himself would not have regretted the loss of the concept of
abreaction, since he abandoned it as

a

therapeutic technique

and developed other explanations for the therapeutic

successes it had seemed to provide.

However, not all of his

followers shared his attitude (Reich, 1933/1949) and some

current non-psychoanalytic figures continue to argue the
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therapeutic and theoretical value
of abreaction (Jackins,
1965; scheff, 1979).
Are aspects of the concept
tenable,
and can these be rendered in
terms of the present
conceptions?
Reduced to its basic elements,
the concept of
abreaction supposes that certain
situations and events"emotional" ones-produce some kind
of disequilibrium, and
that this state lasts until the emotion
is energetically
expressed.
Until the abreaction is accomplished
the

accumulated emotion has untoward effects of some
kind;
conversely, energetic emotional expression
has direct
benefits. According to the view of emotion I
have proposed,
emotions offer answers to questions or
solutions
to

problems.

I

have asserted that emotions, in most cases,

leave things better than they were, or simply, that
emotions
are efforts toward adaptation.

My view, then, offers

a

parallel to viewpoints advocating abreaction.

In both, the

emotion-inducing situation presents

and an

a problem,

emotion contributes to its resolution.
Certainly, though, the differences outweigh the

parallels.

First and foremost, in the present view, nothing

is expelled in the expression of emotion.

Abreaction

theories have not always been specific as to what is
expelled during emotion, but the implication is that
something detrimental is cleared from one's system.
the present theory, emotions are organizations, not

Under
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substances or energies that
could be excreted or discharged.
Second, in the present view,
it is not the expression
of the emotion that is
beneficial, but the entire emotion,
of which expression is a part.
The possible benefits of
emotion are too varied to be
attributed to emotional
communications alone. Advocates of
abreaction, moreover,
are referring to something
apart from the values of
emotional communication.
Expression, for
them, has some

direct benefit, not mediated by
the responses of others.
The closest parallel within the present
view is the benefit
in approximating the prototypical
instance of an emotion.

Schemas for emotions include prototypes.

Many of these

prototypes include energetic expression,
at least within
most cultures and subcultures. When one has an
episode

of

an emotion that is close to the prototype
for that emotion,
one is well understood by others, one knows what to do and

how each element is related to the other
elements, and one

does not feel chaotic, nor does one suspect that other
people are likely to see one as "crazy" or "falling apart".
In episodes of emotion that are far from the prototype, one
is on uncharted territory, with the concomitant

unpredictability and need for improvision.

For such

reasons, approximating the prototype for an emotion carries

direct benefits, and emotional expression, where it
completes an emotion in the sense of bringing the episode
closer to the prototype, is directly beneficial, as the
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concept of abreaction implies.
Freud's theory of hysteria
incorporates the view that
affect is generated, automatically
in a sense, when one
encounters an affect-pr evoking
situation. Though this
assumption may appear tautologous,
there are many views of
affect that have not shared it,
among them most of Freud's,
with the exception of those in
the theory of hysteria and
in
his later -clinical- writings.
The present theory shares
the seemingly tautologous view
only to a limited degree.
That is, the theory retains the
common-sense view that
emotions are typically occasioned by
certain corresponding
situations, but interposes an intermediary
set of factors
(i.e., the ego and the bases for
its decision to activate an
emotion-schema), allowing for inappropriate
or irrational
emotions.
Two remaining central propositions in Freud's
theory of

hysteria— the possibility of suppressing affect and the
pathological effects of suppressed affect— are discussed
later in the present chapter, in the discussions of
defense
and therapy.

Anxiety Neurosis
Freud's theory of anxiety neurosis assumed a very

different route for the production of affect than was
posited in his account of hysteria.

In the theory of

anxiety neurosis, anxiety is produced by the blocking of
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"somatic excitation" at the
"scna-psyche" barrier. The
excitation then proceeds
along paths that do not
involve
connections with ideas, and a
normally somatopsychic process
becomes an abnormal, somatic
one.
this view, affect can
result from a purely physical
process and does not

m

necessarily bear the marks of
ideas or of the external
situation.
in my view, physiological
processes may predispose,

perhaps strongly, toward emotion,
but emotion is never the
direct product of such processes.
Emotion, in the
restricted definition applied here,
always involves complex
interpretations, to which physiological
processes often lend
themselves. The construction of an
intentional object, the
setting up of various dispositions
to action and expression,
the adoption of conditions for ending the
episode, the selfreflective construction of relations
between these aspects
of the emotion and one's physiological state—
in short, all
the things

I

have attributed to the operation of the

emotion-schema— require an elaboration beyond physiological
givens.

Some emotions, such as the sadness and despair in

apparently biological depressions, suggest that physiological processes can strongly predispose to emotion, but
even in these instances elaboration is required.

The Discharge Theory
In the discharge theory of affect, as it emerged
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between 1900 and 1915, affect
was described as a discharge
of psychic energy, a
-safety valve" employed when
more
complete discharge was impossible.
The discharge theory is
thus a conflict-based theory;
under it, affect is only
produced under conditions of
conflict between impulse and
prohibitions,
it is also a theory in which
affect is based
on energy without quality, so
that the qualities of

affect-

everything that differentiates one
affect from another-are
determined by chance associations
with conscious ideas,
in
other words, the quality of affect,
and thus affect itself,
was regarded as relatively inconsequential.
By the same
token, since the energy underlying
affect was considered to
have no quality, affect could no longer
be repressed or be

contained in the repressed unconscious,

when a person is

not in an emotional state, only the potential
for affect

exists, and defense against affect can only mean
prevention
of the development of affect, not repression in
the Freudian

sense of confining existing entities in an unconscious
domain.

Certain of the tenets of the discharge theory are
rejected in the present conceptions.

The concept of energy,

as noted already, does not appear here.

Second, emotions

are viewed here as far more consequential than in Freud's

discharge theory.

In the present theory, a wide variety of

interpretations and dispositions are attributed to activated
emotions.

In Freud's discharge theory, emotion has only
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indirect influences on
interpretation and action, and the
experience of emotion is
determined by chance connections
with ideas. Third, the present
theory differs from Freud's
discharge theory in its treatment
of defense and affect, and
of unconscious affect (both to
be discussed later.)
However, some important
assumptions from Freud's
discharge theory appear, in altered
forms, in the present
theory. These assumptions concern
the relation of affect
and conflict.
Although in the present theory, emotion
does
not depend on conflict to the
same extent-conflict is not a
necessary condition of emotion, here— I have
described

emotions as frequently consisting of
attempted resolutions
of internal, psychological conflicts
involving either idimpulses or superego-criticisms.
Emotions can contribute to
such resolutions by providing more acceptable
routes for the

limited satisfaction of id-impulses.

For example, anger

forms a convenient vehicle for the expression of destructive

impulses, and jealousy can provide some satisfaction
of

homosexual interests.

The more an episode of emotion is in

the service of such impulses, though, the less appropriate
it becomes to the evoking situation

(in de Sousa's

[1980a]

phrase) and the less it is possible for the emotion to serve

less conflictual needs and goals.
Thus, the present theory incorporates from the

discharge theory the view that the concept of emotion may
indirectly satisfy id-impulses, although it provides

a
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different account of the
process than Freud did. For
Freud,
the satisfaction took the
form of releasing energy,
which
occurred along somatic discharge
"channels",
the present
view, no energy is invoked
(although a parallel concept of
impulses pressing for satisfaction
is perhaps implied.)
Instead, the account turns on
the notion

m

of the ego

incorporating impulses in emotions,
and activating emotions
partly to satisfy impulses (making
some episodes of emotion
"compromise formations"), whereas for
Freud, conflict was a
necessary condition for all affect,
it is here only one of
the possible factors that leads the
ego to activate an
emotion. Moreover, conflict can be
involved to many
different degrees in a particular episode
of emotion,
in
some episodes, the ego's need to provide
satisfaction for an
impulse or to contend with superego criticism
may be so

dominant that the emotion is grossly inappropriate
to the
external situation, impervious to influence, and
contrary to
other personal needs and goals.

In other instances these

influences may play only a small role, or no role at all, in
the choice of emotion.

The Signal Theory of Anxiety

According to the view introduced by Freud in his 1926
book Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety, anxiety is a signal

given by the ego when it recognizes

a

danger situation.

This signal provides an indication that defense is needed
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against an external or internal
danger, and the anxiety, or
the unpleasure associated
with it, provides the motive
for
defense.
The present theory is in
a sense, founded on the
r
signal theory of anxiety, or
rather on a specific aspect of
it.
One of the central tenets
of the present theory is that
emotions are activated by the
ego in the service of its many
adaptive goals. The signal theory
of anxiety introduced
such a notion into psychoanalysis.
The notion was a break
with Freud's previous thinking
and with the assumptions of
psychoanalysts in general, without
it, the present theory
would have far less precedent in
psychoanalytic theory. In
short, the present theory is an
expansion of Freud's signal
theory. First, of course, Freud's theory
is expanded to
apply to all emotions, not just anxiety.
(Actually, anxiety
is a special case for the present
theory, and will be

discussed below.)

Second,

I

have claimed that emotions can

serve many functions, where Freud only postulated
one.
fact, the signal function is not among the functions

I

In

have

described.

Freud's "Clinical" Theory
Two of the themes covered under the heading of clinical

affect theory figured prominently in the theoretical

presentation in the last chapter, and therefore require no
further exploration here.

Freud's view that affect is
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inherently justified was
discussed in the course of
Presenting the schema-concept
and its relation to psychoanalytic principles. The relation
between the present
theory and the issue of
transference in emotion was also
treated briefly there, and was
further discussed as an

aspect of irrationality in
emotion.
A further theme of interest here
arises in some of
Freud's clinical discussions of
affect. We encountered it
in his comments on normal and
pathological jealousy. Though
he never formalized the
distinction, in such places Freud
distinguished between normal or rational episodes
of affect
and abnormal ones. Only abnormal,
irrational affects, he
stated, required psychoanalysis to understand
them.
Freud
follows common sense in identifying normal
affects as ones
which are "derived from the actual situation" and

proportionate to it.

He adds that these affects are "under

the complete control of the conscious ego"

1922/1955, p. 223).

(Freud,

In these comments, Freud exhibits some

of the early and most characteristic assumptions of psycho-

analysis as an "id-psychology".

He assumes, that is, that

irrationality is the province for psychoanalysis, and that
what common sense calls rational is under the control of the

conscious ego, meaning not that everything rational is based
on conscious reasoning but simply that it is not part of the

special province of psychoanalysis, the repressed

unconscious.
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The present theory is
intended to apply equally well to
rational and irrational
emotions, and to provide a
framework
for discussing this
distinction and the underlying
determinants,
this theory, rationality
in emotion is
understood to include appropriateness
to the external
situation, just as Freud and
others have understood it (de
Sousa, 1980a), but it also includes
instrumental
rationality; that is, emotions
can serve the needs and goals
of the individual and can serve
adaptive interpersonal
functions, and the rationality of
emotions can be assessed
also in terms of how well they serve these,
any case,
the present view is that both
rational and irrational
emotions can be subjected to explanatory
efforts,
in this
respect the present theory is closer to
the spirit of

m

m

American ego psychology than to the early Freud, with
respect to the former's interest in developing
a "general

psychology- on the basis of, or at least in accord with,

psychoanalytic theory.

The present theory, too, seeks to

frame explanatory principles for all the phenomena within
its domain, not only the irrational ones, and like
ego

psychology, the present theory is based in part on previous

psychoanalytic theory but is drawn from other sources as
well.
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Post-Freudian Affect Theory

As in the previous section,
the structure of the
literature review
eview win
will provide
nr/\«i"^« *.u
the organization here.
the themes of the discussion
are

Thus,

.etapsychology , defense and

affect, unconscious affect,
biological theories, and ego and
cognition.

Metapsychology
The major post-Freudian metapsycholog
ical treatments of
affect have turned on two related
issues, psychic energy and
tension versus discharge conceptions
of affect.
The
rejection of psychic energy in the present
theory has

already been discussed.

The discussions of energy and

affect in the major metapsycholog ical papers
are difficult
to translate into other terms, and indeed
are generally

quite insular, that is, they have meaning only
in connection

with this assumption.

Jacobson's (1953, 1971a, 1971b)

papers are the principal examples.

The second issue to

arise consistently in the metapsycholog ical discussions, the

question of whether affect represents "tension" or
"discharge", can be given more meaning.

Of course, the

question is framed in terms that are drawn from the economic
language, that is, from the concept of psychic energy.
However, discussions of this issue seem to have been

animated by more than

a

desire to coordinate assumptions
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about hypothetical energy.

This si gni ficanoe has
already

been touched on at several
points,

it is the difference

between affects as
epiphencnena, implied by the
discharge
view, and affects as
consequential entities, corresponding
to the tension view.
The correspondence of the
present theory to the tension
view in this regard has already
been noted. However, the
relation between this theory and
the tension view of affect
can be elaborated somewhat beyond
this, along lines that are
relevant to the next topic to be
considered, defense and
affect. The essence of the tension view
is an assumption
that an affective state is an
indication that there is some
sort of pressure for something (further)
to take place.
A

felt affect, according to this
assumption, reflects a
process that is building up to something, rather than

playing itself out and running down, as the
discharge view
holds.

(The same would be true for un-felt affect, although

this raises difficult complications for both the
tension and

discharge views.)

In the present theory of emotion, an

activated emotion represents, in part, a set of
dispositions, that is readinesses to respond in certain
ways.

For example, anger represents a readiness to speak

loudly, to make accusations, and so on.

Disappointment, at

least for Alex in the last chapter's example, includes

a

readiness to withdraw and to weep, but also to re-organize

goals and make new plans.

An emotion has a temporal course
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(Fridhandler

Averill, 1982), and in the
present theory the
episode begins with the
activation of a schema; at that
point, much remains to unfold,
including even the
construction of the emotion's
object.
This beginning point
of an episode of emotion is
a theoretical construction,
though, so it may be less obscure
to refer to that point in
the episode when there has
been enough organization of the
emotion's object and of its
dispositions to other responses
that the emotion can become an
object of reflective self.

awareness-that

is, when the emotion can be
felt.

At this

point, too, much remains to unfold.

Defense and Affect (and Unconscious Affect)
Three topics come under the heading of
defense and
affect. First, affect can be used defensively.
Of the

post-Freudian works reviewed, Jones'

(1929)

paper and

Schafer's (1976) book dealt with this function of
affect.
The place of this function in the present theory
has already

been discussed in several places, although in terms of the
ego's internal adaptive efforts vis-a-vis the id and the

superego, rather than as "defense".

defended against.

Second, affect can be

Zilboorg's (1933) and Fenichel's

(1941/1954) papers addressed this topic.

Third, unpleasant

affect can be a motive for defense (against conscious

acknowledgment of id-impulses and superego criticisms,
against activation of self- and object-representations,
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etc.).

Jones (1929) describes this,
and there are
references to it throughout the
psychoanalytic literature.
The latter two topics are
the subjects of the present
discussion,
particular, consideration is
given here to
the questions of how defense
against emotions is best
described within the present theory
and why emotions are
defended against if they are part
of the ego's adaptive
efforts. These topics lead to
an account of unconscious
emotion.

m

One may ask whether in fact emotions
are defended
against at all, or whether this topic may
be dispensed with.
I think the answer is that
emotions are indeed defended

against.

One often encounters defense against emotion
in

psychotherapy, which is to say that conceptualizing
a

situation in terms of emotion and defense against
it is
often extremely natural and useful for both patient
and

therapist.

Among psychoanalytic writers, Fenichel

(1941/1954)

is unusual in affirming the phenomenon in formal

theoretical terms.

In clinical writings, however,

references to defense against affect are ubiquitous.
Emotion has been described here in highly favorable
terms, and yet evidently there are things in emotion that we

often wish to avoid.

There have been many psychoanalytic

hypotheses regarding the motive for defense.

Most often,

these have been based on the perfectly intelligible notion
that defense is implemented in order to avoid unpleasant
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affect.

This notion is well-founded
for defense against
emotions themselves. We avoid
emotions that are painful,
most of all. we also avoid
emotions that are embarrassing,
and, with less awareness,
ones that would be shameful.
In
each case, the motive for
defending against an emotion is to
avoid another, unpleasant emotion.
This logic, though,
leaves us with the question of what
makes an emotion
unpleasant, and sometimes intolerable.
This difficult

question cannot be given an adequate
treatment here. Any
explanation of the unpleasantness of some
emotions would
have to accommodate the fact that we
often
seek out

unpleasant emotions in esthetic or entertainment
contexts.
It may be that the emotions which provide
the motive
for

intra-psychic defense are unpleasant for special reasons;

possibly these are emotions that re-create, internally
and
perhaps externally, the painful situations of childhood,

situations which most often have to do with separation and
loss, with rejection, or with blows to self-esteem.

[7]

In some people, defense extends to virtually all

emotions.

All emotions are treated as a threat.

This is

particularly likely to be the case among what have been
called "compulsive characters"

(Reich, 1933/1949).

For such

people, it seems to be something in emotions in general that

calls for defense, rather than unpleasantness of particular
emotions.

Shapiro (1965) points to the spontaneity in

emotion as the motive for defense.

He describes the
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rigidity and tense deliberateness
characteristic of
obsessive-compulsive style, and notes that
these fundamentally conflict with emotion.
It must be admitted that this
account of the motives

for defense against emotion leaves
something to be desired
in terms of simplicity, since it
assumes two steps: certain

emotions at times occasion unpleasant
emotions, and these
unpleasant emotions in turn provide a motive
for defending
against the original ones.
(The account is simpler for the

unpleasant emotions themselves, which are defended
against
due to their own painfulness.
Moreover, a more substantive
)

objection could be raised on the basis of these steps in
the
reasoning.

If emotions depend on the ego's decision to

activate them, what is the need for defending against
unpleasant emotions, and against other emotions that would
lead to unpleasant ones, when the ego could simply not

activate these emotions?

The ego, though, does not have

absolute freedom of choice in its decision to activate
emotions.

At times, it is virtually compelled to activate

one or another emotion.

This may be due to the character of

id-impulses or superego-criticisms present, or perhaps to
the nature of current needs and goals vis-a-vis the external

situation.

On occasion, the external situation may conform

so closely to an emotion's object that activating the

emotion is virtually required if the coherence of the social
rules constituting emotion is to be preserved.

Moreover,

.
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the repertoire of possible
emotions from which to choose is
finite, we rely on "received
culture" for this repertoire,
and cannot devise the structures
and rules out of whole
cloth. Emotions are learned
so early and through so many
avenues, and they are integrated
into so many other social

institutions and psychological entities
that vigilance is
required if specific emotions or
emotions in general are to
be avoided.
in short, the ego's choices
are restricted, and
emotions carry a certain force that
sometimes requires
resistance.
When the ego is in the position of resisting
the

activation of an emotion, it may arrive at

a

compromise.

It

may activate the emotion, but in a version different
enough
from the prototype that painful emotions are avoided.

Probably the ego most often alters the object of the emotion
in connection with these defensive efforts.

For example,

anger that is occasioned by an act of one person or by

unconscious impulses toward one kind of person can take as
its object another act or another person.

Resentment can be

directed toward someone besides the "original" target, or an
offense can be fabricated to cover the shameful inadequacy
of the original.

Guilt and self-reproach can be given

a

trivial object rather than an all-too-weighty one (Freud,
1894/1962, 1896/1962); that is,

degree to which guilt re-creates
childhood

trivial object reduces the

a

a

painful situation of
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in such cases, there is
a tension, so to speak,
between
the object of the emotion and
what

the object would be

without the ego's defensive
distortions,

it would not be

severely misleading to refer to
this would-have-been object
as the real object of the
emotion in the unconscious. The
factors in the activation of the
emotion, together with the
schema, press for this "real" object,
and demanding efforts
are required to devise and maintain
the substitute.
All
these considerations apply equally when
the distortion is in
terms of other aspects of the emotion
instead of, or in
addition to, the object. [8]
Thus, unconscious emotion in the present theory
is an

emotion toward which many factors compel the ego but
for

which the ego substitutes

a

distortion, one which resembles

the avoided emotion but occasions less pain.

Biological theories
The present theory is hardly likely to be thought of as
a

biological theory.

It does not use physiology as an

explanation of emotion, as Blau (1952, 1955) did explicitly
and as many psychoanalytic theorists have done implicitly.
Nor does it make any reference to evolutionary biology, as

Landauer (1938) did so freely and as is also quite common
among other psychoanalytic theorists.

In view of the degree

to which the present theory turns away from biology, the

close correspondence to two of the biological theories
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reviewed in Chapter III is
perhaps unexpected. Yet, in
different respects, the present
theory closely resembles
Emde's (1980) and Bowlby's
(1969).

Emde (1980) calls his theory
an "organizational" view
of emotion.
The essential difference
between Emde's view
and most previous psychoanalytic
theories lies in Emde's
conviction that emotions organize
behavior and thought,
rather than the opposite. This
view, of course, is central
to the present theory.
The major difference between Emde's
assumptions and those of the present
theory is in Emde's
belief that emotions derive from
biological evolution and

genetic inheritance, in contrast with my
assumption that the
schemas for emotions are acquired during
development and
derive from cultural and subcultural sources.
This

difference in assumptions has such

a

pervasive effect on the

tone of our respective theories that it might be
possible to

overlook the underlying similarity.

Regarding Bowlby's (1969) account of emotion, the

similarity lies in our both viewing an emotion as relating
closely to

a

structured pattern of perception and action.

Terminology makes the similarity somewhat obscure.

Bowlby

considers emotion to be the felt awareness of an unfolding
"behavior system"; in the present theory, the concept of

emotion is more inclusive, since the emotion

activated schema.

is the

In both views, though, emotion is based

on the activation of a pre-existing pattern, so the
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structure of the respective
theories and the handling of
causation is similar.
As with Emde's theory,
a major difference
between the
present theory and Bowlby «s
lies in the

assumptions

regarding the origin of emotion.

However, whereas Emde is

clear in his implication that
emotions derive from evolution
and heredity, Bowlby allows
for other possibilities.
He
adopts Hinde's (1959) continuum
between "environmentally
stable" and "environmentally
labile" behavior systems,
instead of the more traditional
distinction between innate
and acquired.
Highly environmentally labile patterns
correspond to acquired behaviors, since
behavior patterns
may be highly dependent on the
environment in which an
organism is reared and lives, socially based
behavior

patterns, as posited in the present theory,
can in principle
be accommodated by Bowlby' s system.

Ego and Cognition

The role of the ego in the present theory has been

discussed in some detail, and the present section is

accordingly brief.

In previous psychoanalytic

considerations, the ego in affect has arisen most often in

connection with cognition.
(1969)

Both Brenner (1974b) and Schur

focused on this issue.

Although both these authors

were emphatic in their belief that cognition was essential
to affect, neither made a clear statement on the exact
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nature of the relation.

Brenner's examples carry

mixture
of implications, and Schur
is limited to general
references
to processes such as
comprehension and evaluation. The
a

present theory shares the view
that cognition, broadly
defined, is essentially involved
in emotion.
The account
here is more specific than those
provided previously.
First, the ego processes considered
here to underlie the
activation of emotion— i.e. , the evaluation
of the relevant
internal and external factors and the
generation
of a

possible adaptive integration of these in
the form of an
episode of emotion— are cognitive in the
same sense as other
forms of decision-making are cognitive.

Second, the

intentional object of emotion has been emphasized here,
and
this is a cognitive entity.

Another theme has run through psychoanalytic

commentaries on the relation of affects and the ego.
Numerous authors have stated or implied that affects can
come under the increasing domination of the ego.

Freud

implied this in speaking of "normal" jealousy (Freud,
1922/1955) and in many other connections.

Fenichel

(1941/1954) was explicit about this possibility, although

providing no theoretical account of it.

Rapaport (1953),

too, was explicit about the possibility of affect being

"completely structural ized"

,

which meant that it no longer

resulted from movements of psychic energy and was thus under
the ego's exclusive command.

In the present theory,

emotion
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is regarded as the
exclusive province of the ego.

Nonetheless, the theory recognizes
different degrees of ego
autonomy in emotion.
the previous section, the
various
factors that may limit the ego's
autonomy in activating
emotions were described. Under
the conditions described
there, the ego is constrained to
act as the agent of factors
over which it exercises little
control. The ego in the
present theory is as Freud (1923/1961)
described it-faced

m
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with an array of adversaries which are
often its master, but
capable of expanding its autonomy through
development.

Anxiety

Many specific topics could be taken up beyond the ones

discussed to this point.

Two which have been of particular

importance are selected: anxiety, discussed in the present
section, and psychotherapy, discussed below.

Anxiety has been discussed in the psychoanalytic affect

literature more than any other single topic.
repeatedly returned to

it

Freud

(Freud, 1895/1962, 1915/1957d,

1923/1961, 1926/1959, 1933/1964), and his final theory of
affect was in fact

a

theory of anxiety.

Virtually all later

writers have given at least some consideration to anxiety,
and for several years in the early nineteen-f if ties anxiety

became almost the only issue addressed in the literature
(see Appendix)

.

This disproportionate attention can be
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accounted for, in part, by the
particular importance of
anxiety in neurosis, as a
symptom itself and as a factor

in

the maintenance of other
symptoms (Glover, 1939). Another
factor has been Freud's extensive
attention to it and his
changing views, which stimulated
further debate. An

additional factor, though, is the
special nature of anxiety.
In certain respects, anxiety
is an anomaly
among the

affective phenomena to which psychoanalysts
have addressed
themselves,
it has no evident object,
the role of

expression is unclear, it is hard to
distinguish decisively
from purely physiological phenomena, and
it often seems
arbitrary or meaningless when compared with
other affects.
In their discussions of the topic,
analytic theorists have

wrestled repeatedly with these features of anxiety.
In keeping with its special nature, anxiety
is not

considered an emotion within the present theory.
does not conform, in

a

Anxiety

crucial respect, to the definition of

emotion employed here— it has no object, or its object is

incomplete and poorly defined.
emotion, namely fear.

Anxiety is related to

a

true

As the object of anxiety becomes

progressively better defined the state grows to resemble
fear, and eventually merges with this emotion.

In other

words, to be anxious is be afraid without knowing of what
one is afraid or with what justification.
It might be argued that one often knows what one's

anxiety is related to.

In one instance it might be an
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examination, in another it might
be a stage performance, or
one could be anxious about a
project or about an awaited

response to some project.

I

suggest that such situations,

insofar as they are more than simply
part of the causal
conditions for the anxiety, can be
viewed as rudimentary
object-precursors. To be nervous before a
performance
implies little or nothing about what
one might fear; one is
simply anxious about the performance,
not afraid that one
will forget one's lines, miss cues, be
received badly, etc.
As these objects are specified, the
state is transformed

into fear.

An emotion-schema, once activated, exerts an
organizing

influence, tending to construct perceptions and responses
in
line with its own structure.
not take place.

In anxiety, this process does

The schema for fear is activated but

prevented from completing itself.

Anxiety is thus another

of the affective phenomena which, like unconscious emotions,

are the result of disruptions in the process of constructing
an episode of emotion.

One way this particular distortion

can be introduced into fear is through defensive processes.

This is the "neurotic anxiety" Freud (1926/1959) described.

Because of how intolerably threatening certain fears would
be, one stops short of the full construction of fear, which

would include the natural and well-defined object toward
which one's perceptions, impulses, goals, and needs lead.
In addition to defense, there is another basis for the
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distortion of fear into anxiety or
the failure of anxiety to
develop into fear. The cognitive
capacities necessary to
develop a complete and coherent
emotion such as fear are

subject to disruption by any number
of factors, principal
among which are psychotic disorganization
and organic brain
deficits (dementia, head trauma, toxic
delerium, etc.).

Anxiety is common when either of these
conditions is
present, and this may be due to their
interference with the
complex process of organizing an intentional
object.

Psychotherapy

One hardly needs to argue the importance of emotion in

psychotherapy.

Affect and emotion are integral to almost

every phase and aspect of psychotherapy.

Affect is

virtually always involved in the reasons people seek
treatment, and patients and therapists both chart

therapeutic progress, or lack of it, by looking to the
feelings that brought the patient to therapy and new areas
of feeling that neither specifically anticipated.

In

addition to being one of the goals of psychotherapy, affect
is among its tools.

Although abreaction has long since lost

the place it held in Freud's original technique, affect and

emotion are critical in the practice of psychoanalysis and

psychoanalytic psychotherapy.

Despite the evident importance of the issue, the
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psychoanalytic affect literature
has had relatively little
to say about affect in
therapy. Periodically,
theorists
have remarked on this omission
(Brierley, 1937; Schafer,
1964), but affect theory has yet
to attempt a thorough

account of affect in treatment.

In recognition of this

state of affairs, a convention
of the International PsychoAnalytic Association was organized
around the theme of
"affect in the psychoanalytic
situation"
(Green, 1977), but

so far the meeting has not
stimulated sustained efforts in
this area.

To give a full consideration to emotion
in psycho-

therapy would require

a

lengthy treatment.

One would want

to provide a theoretical understanding
of the accepted role

of emotion in therapy, but since no consensus
exists on

exactly what this role should be,

a

full discussion of

emotion in therapy would itself have to take a position on

a

wide range of issues in therapeutic technique and in the

theory of therapy.

The effort would carry important

practical implications, perhaps so many that it would amount
to an advocacy of a new variant of psychoanalytic treatment.
In comparison with such a comprehensive treatment, the

present discussion must be relatively short.

It aims only

to give an indication of the direction a full consideration
v/ould take.

Several topics within the broad area of emotion in

therapy suggest themselves for attention.

On the one hand,

215

there are issues relating
especially to technique. Such
issues include the use by
the therapist of the patient's
and
his or her own affective
changes to select and time
interventions, follow the course
of the therapeutic
interaction, and so on. A related
issue is the use of
affect, as it occurs both within
and outside the therapeutic
sessions, as a guide toward insight.
Other issues pertain
more to the outcome of therapy.
Affective changes are among
the most important results of a
successful therapy. These
include changes in the set of affects
a person tends to

have— who

does not want to feel better as

a

result of

therapy?— and perhaps, more subtly, the acquisition
of new
emotions.
Turning first to the technical issues, we may ask
how

affect guides the form and content of therapy.

From the

present point of view, the central proposition is that

emotions represent the outcome of
process.

a

complex integrative

If one assumes that this process has products

throughout its course, then there exist

a wide range of

emotion-precursors, or emotion-fragments.

Suc.i

2..

cities

are, so to speak, on their way to becoming emotions, but

have not yet reached that level of coherence or completion.

Anxiety is one such entity.

A whole variety of feelings,

intuitions, fleeting affective convictions, moods, affective

memories, vague impulses, and so on, may be considered in
the same light.

To be sure, a full account would require

a

classification of these disparate
phenomena as they relate
to emotion proper.
For the present purposes
the important
point is that there are many
way-stations on the way to
fully formed emotion, consisting
of some of the components
of emotion in partial
integrations.
These partial integrations
constitute developing
solutions to conflicts, or reflect
steps in this process.
They may or may not be fully
successful solutions, and they
may eventually be superseded, but
they are in any event the
patient's current solutions. By following
these feelings,
then, a therapist can gain an indication
of what solutions a
patient is testing and how successful an
integration he or
she has found.

The therapist, of course, wishes to do
more

than observe this process of developing solutions;
he or she
attempts to contribute to it. One form these
contributions
take is interpretation.

Many interpretations involve

pointing to evidence of transference, which can be defined
as perceiving and responding to oneself and current figures
in one's life

(including, of course, one's therapist) as

though they were reproductions of figures in unconscious

fantasies deriving from childhood.

Emotions and emotion-

fragments are the best indicators of active transference

derivatives, since they integrate memories, self- and
object-images, actions, and dispositions to actions.

Thus,

they provide crucial guidance to the therapist's efforts to

interpret the unconscious and to understand the patient's
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response to these efforts.

One important factor in formulating
and delivering
interpretations is the therapist's
empathy, which has been
defined as temporarily feeling the
same feelings
as the

patient currently feels, usually to

a

lesser degree, with

the motive of achieving a greater
understanding (Greenson,
I960).
Feelings provide such an important route
to

interpretive understanding because they
encapsulate so much.
The empathizing therapist c«n reconstruct
the factors

entering into a feeling by following the patterns
of
salience and attention (de Sousa, 1980a)

in the feeling,

as

well as the patterns of disposition to action and

expression.

The reconstruction by the therapist amounts to

an understanding of the inner world of the patient at
that

moment, which provides the basis for

interpretation,

a

transference

when such interpretations are couched in

terms of feelings, patients are often readier to accept them
and find them more useful.
a

This may be because referring to

feeling implies an acknowledgment that the patient's

current solutions are, or at any rate were at one time, the
best he or she was capable of.

Couched in this way,

interpretations can promote, in addition to insight, the

therapeutically useful self-acceptance which Schafer (1964)
aptly termed empathy with oneself.
The above considerations have reflected the principal
that feelings which emerge during therapy are not so much
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discovered as newly created.

Discoveries are certainly

involved in therapy, and the
"archaeological" assumption
that therapy uncovers a hidden but
present reality (Spence,
1982) has a basis, but feelings in
therapy can be best
understood as reflecting progressive
integrations,
in light
of this principal, it is natural
that a patient's affective
life changes in the course of therapy,
it is not that the
components of emotion are discarded during
therapy, but
their integration is changed in ways that
provide greater
freedom and effectiveness, or greater adaptiveness
,

broad sense (Schafer, 1964).
a

m

in a

recent years there has been

dispute over whether therapeutic change results from

awareness of the contents of the (infantile) unconscious
or
from the creation of

a

coherent personal narrative,

integrating personal history and disov/ned impulses and

desires (Schafer, 1983; Spence, 1982).

From the present

perspective, changes in affective life may reflect both
these processes simultaneously.

In particular, new emotions

may appear that integrate, in consciousness, formerly splitoff desires and beliefs.

Such emotions reflect greater ego

autonomy, not only in the awareness of formerly denied

material but also in the ability to incorporate infantile

desires and images into current activities, without being
controlled by them.

CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSION

A theory has now been presented
and some of its

implications spelled out.

In this closing chapter,

reflections on the theory and its
context are offered. The
theory is in an unfinished form; thus
the "outline" in the
title.
Further development will inv.x.
,th refinements
and new applications, and some preview
of
these can be

here.

•

i

It is possible, too, to comment on the
place this

theory occupies in psychoanalytic theory and
practice.

Turning first to areas where refinements could
be made,
one such area is definition of concepts.

terms

I

The principal

have in mind are schema, prototype, and variant

instantiations of schemas.

In the abstract, the

distinctions among these concepts are reasonably clear.

A

schema is the template for all specific episodes of an
emotion; the prototype of a schema is the classic, ideal

episode of that emotion; and variant instantiations are
episodes of that emotion that depart significantly from the

prototype but not by so much that they are no longer
recognizable as that emotion.

In practice, though, making

these distinctions is difficult, and never more so than when
one attempts to separate one emotion from another or

emotions from related entities.
problems.

I

Anxiety presents these

have argued that anxiety is not an emotion in
219
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view of its lack of an object.

Yet

I

have defined

intermediate cases, where anxiety
becomes progressively like
fear, and finally may be transformed
into fear.
This

account raises the question of where
the line between
anxiety and fear is to be drawn. The
same issue is present
in separating any emotion from
closely related entities,
as

well as in distinguishing two related
emotions.
The schema-concept forces one to deal
with these

problems.

One of the features of the schema-concept
that

makes it useful for understanding emotion is
that it
includes the concepts of prototypes and variants.

Emotions

differ from one occasion, person, and setting to
another,
yet are meaningfully and importantly classed according
to

which emotion a given episode in an episode of.
example, jealousy may differ in any number of

For

v/ays

from one

instance to another and still be jealousy (and still not be
envy, anger, or resentment).

These distinctions of one

emotion from another are not post hoc discriminations; the

episode is a product of some central set of specifications.
If one is to accommodate these features of emotion, a

concept that describes variant instances of
pattern is required.

a

central

But as soon as one adopts such

a

concept, practical problems arise in defining the boundaries
of the category.

In order to satisfactorily deal with these

problems, the present theory will need to return to the

literature of the schema-concept, where efforts have been
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made in this direction (e.g.,
Rosen

Rumelhart

&

&

Mervis, 1975;

Ortony, 1977).

A related problem is how
emot ion-schemas develop in
the
useful forms I have described for
them, and in particular

how it is that they alone, among
affective entities, have
the property of actively organizing
and assimilating
elements into a pattern.
in the present account, emotionschemas actively construct emotional
episodes,
and this

property has been restricted to emotions
proper (for
example, when it was argued that effort and
vigilance are
required to defend against painful emotion,
but not against
emotion-fragments). Since I argue that emotions have
greater adaptive potential than related entities,
this

property of actively constructing episodes coincides
with
the requirements for adaptive usefulness.

An account of

this fact v/ould usefully refine the present theory.

The

problem is at bottom the same one encountered by functional
sociologists and evolutionary biologists, namely, how do
practices, institutions, bodily organs, physical features,
etc., evolve in forms that meet the requirements of the

relevant situation?

Another avenue for extending the theory would be
through

a

more detailed account of the logical relation and

dynamic interaction between the ego and emotion-schemas.
Regarding the logical relation, it seems that emotionschemas must be described as structures available to the

,

ego.

They are part of the ego, in
that they are at its
disposal and allied (for the most
part) with its adapt lve
purposes, but a distinction is
required between the sohema,
per se, and the part of the ego
which activates it. It may
be that a distinction between an
executive ego and its store
of adaptive tools would be suitable.
In elaborating any
such a psychic anatomy, though, one
would want to avoid

reification by keeping one eye, as it were,
on the origins
of these concepts.
Regarding the dynamic interaction of ego (or
executive
ego) and schemas, one might begin by noting
that activity in
the construction of an emotional episode
has been ascribed
to both the ego and the schema.

The schema, it has been

said, guides the development of a suitable object
for the

emotion, sets up dispositions to action and expression,
and

guides interpretation of component responses as elements of
the whole.

The ego has been described as instituting

specific details in emotional episodes, whether in the
process of defense, in employing emotions toward needs and
goals, or in incorporating the characteristics of the

external situation.

Roughly speaking, the schema provides

the pattern and the ego fills it in.

However, the

interaction has another dimension, as there

between emotions and the ego that
for by id and superego factors.

is not

is a

tension

entirely accounted

At times, there is conflict

between the activities of the ego and of emot ion-schemas

.
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and the details of these
conflicts could be profitably
explored
A particularly central area
that remains to be given

sufficient attention is consciousness
and emotion.
The
exposition of the theory has led far
afield from the aspect
of emotions that, for many,
give them their claim on our

interest, namely, that they are
feelings.

The word

"feelings" defies definition (Schafer,
1976), but it is used
here only to point to the fact that
emotions often occupy

consciousness or it least make their presence
felt there,
and that this is basic to their common-sense
definition.

Though this issue has received only passing
attention to
this point, the foundation has been laid for
a coherent
account of consciousness and emotion.

First, active

emotions as defined here are always accessible to
consciousness; in psychoanalytic terms, they are conscious
or preconscious.

Whether they remain only potentially

conscious or become conscious depends on whether there is
occasion for self-awareness during the course of the episode
or afterv/ard.

Emotions have sometimes been defined as

conscious phenomena (Freud, 1915d)
route taken here.

,

but that is not the

Instead, they are depicted here as

processes that may or may not receive the kind of reflective

attention that common sense calls feeling.
Although an emotion remains an emotion whether or not
it is conscious, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon with
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regard to emotion.

On the contrary, there is
every reason

to suppose that emotion and
consciousness interact in
consequential ways, and most
pertinently, that emotion is

changed when it becomes conscious.

The details of these

changes, and the process through
which they are effected,
would have much to tell us with
regard to the action of

psychotherapy, the interpersonal
negotiation of emotional
episodes, and many other issues.
It has been assumed here that
emotion-schemas are

acquired in the course of development and
derive from
sociocultural sources. Both these areas offer
immensely
fertile ground for further study, studies of
childhood

development of emotion have lacked

a

theory of emotion that

could properly accommodate their results (e.g.,
Pine, 1980),
since few previous theories, and no psychoanalytic
ones,

have described emotions as true developmental products.

A

constructive interplay could occur between the present
theory and such studies.

An equally useful adjunct would be

considerations of the roles and genesis of emotions
cultures and societies.

in

If emotions derive from

sociocultural sources, they could not exist if they did not
serve social and cultural imperatives.

The study of these

imperatives would do much to illuminate emotion, not only by
giving an account of their sources but by deepening our

understanding of their ultimate consequences.

Moreover,

such investigations could contribute to the psychoanalytic
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recognition of social factors in
the development and
functioning of personality (e.g.,
Kovel, 1982).

These are some of the refinements
that could be
introduced into the present theory
and
a

directions that further study could
take.

few of the

But what is the

significance of this theory for
psychoanalysis? what role
might it play in psychoanalytic theory
and practice?
Psychoanalysis continues to search for
a satisfactory
theory of affect, and much turns on
the result.

First, good

theory can illuminate clinical material
and orient the
therapist.
It does not do so directly, for

the most part.

A therapist does not rehearse the theoretical
principles of

psychoanalysis as he or she listens to

a

patient, as a means

of developing clinically useful understandings.

Theory

comes into play outside the therapeutic hour, in
the

therapist's training and continuing reflection.

Coherent

theory can gradually form the framework for one's listening,
and from that point it exercises

a

powerful influence over

the connections one draws and the significance one imposes
on material.

Just as good theory can promote the treatment

process, bad theory can disrupt it.

Incoherence in theory

contributes to incoherence in practice, and theoretical
reifications can distort the practice and goals of psychotherapy over the course of decades.
The present theory,

I

believe, avoids many of the

shortcomings of previous psychoanalytic affect theories.

The relocations attendant
on the concept of
psychic energy
are, I believe, excluded.
There is little danger, on
the
basis of the present theory, of
coming to regard emotion as
the outward manifestation of
the vicissitudes of an
elusive
quantity. As a result of the
present emphasis on understanding emotions at the level of
organizations, there IS
less danger of seizing on some
particular fragment of an
emotion and assuming it to be the
essence, thereby losing
sight of many connections,
a clinical hour, one aspect
of an emotion may come forward at one
point, and another at
a different point.
A theory should support the clinician's
assumption that a complex but coherent whole
is present, and

m

it should

guide the elucidation of that whole and its

connection to other aspects of the patient's past and
present,

in fact,

it

is up to a theory of affect to

highlight the many roles emotion may play in psychotherapy.
Few clinicians doubt that affect occupies

a

central role in

the process and outcome of psychotherapy (Arlow, 1977;

Valenstein, 1962), but at present psychoanalysis as

a

social

institution lacks a theoretical buttress for this intuition.
The present theory, with its emphasis on emotions as

attempted adaptive solutions distilling unconscious
contents, needs and goals, and current coping strategies,

offers such a framework.
P^odell

(1973)

has aptly referred to affects as the pre-

eminent route to psychoanalytic knov/ledge, and Rangell
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has characterized them as
"the human core".
There is
a glaring gap between
these views of affect and
the current
affect theories. Current theories
are either rudimentary
(Brenner, 1974b) or see in affect
a biological product
(Basch, 1976; Bowlby, 1969; Emde,
1980).
These theories are
not commensurate with the task
they face, which
(1966)

is to

accommodate the special psychoanalytic
view of the person.
However important a role biological
considerations may play,
this view is not guided by the logic of
biological
mechanism.

ef

Psychoanalysts have never been content to confine
their
>rts to treatment, but continue to
attempt to expand

knowledge about motivation, development, and "the
workings
of the mind".
Affect has been left by the wayside

in these

efforts, because psychoanalysis has never had

a

way of

conceptualizing them which firmly connected them to the
issues of enduring interest.

This is all the more true

since the demise of drive concepts, which despite their

problems could be essentially connected to affect theory.
The present theory is offered as

a

contribution tov/ard

integrating emotion into the central considerations of

psychoanalysis.

FOOTNOTES

James Strachey, editor of the
Standard Edition of
Freud's work, assumed that Freud
adhered to the discharge
view of affect throughout his
writings until 1926 (Freud,
1926/1959), and that the energy in the
unconscious was
considered from the start to be
quality-less (see Editor's
appendix to Freud r 1894/1962,
pp. 66-68).
Strachey's
reading is a minority one on this
1.

point, and it is not clear

KThat

grounds he had fo; d«ying

a

change in Freud's thought.

However, it is true that even from very
early, Freud
(1895/1966b)

employed

a

concept of quality-less mental

energy (called "Q" for quantity).

Thus, the shift in

Freud's views that was completed by 1915 was
in the nature
of an integration of previously un-synthesized
concepts.
2.

Schafer

(1976)

and others have posed the question, to

whom or what is the ego signalling if
the danger?

Schur

(1953)

it

already recognizes

proposed an elaborate model of

this, involving successive stages of recognition and

signalling.
mind.

Freud, though, clearly had no such model in

Rather, he seems to have divided the ego, in this

formulation, into two parts, one capable of signalling with

anxiety and the other capable of initiating defense.

He

v/rote that the ego makes use of the anxiety signal to

mobilize the pleasure principle on behalf of defense.

In

later terms, this meant that anxiety was seen as the motive
228
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for defense.

The death instinct has not
arisen in the course of this
review of Freud's metapsychological
writings on affect, it
Played little part in these writings.
After Freud
introduced the death instinct his
metapsychological
interests in affect were confined to
anxiety.
Insofar as
instinct and energy remained relevant
to anxiety during that
final period of Freud's work, it
continued to be libido that
Freud cited.
3.

As far as other affects are concerned,
Freud assumed

a

close correspondence between the death
instinct and hate
(Freud, 1923/1961).

in contrast to love, which Freud

explored on several occasions, he subjected hate
to little
study, regarding it essentially as destructive
impulses

directed toward

a

particular person.

The death instinct

also entered indirectly into Freud's account of guilt,

especially unconscious guilt.
is

Freud held that the superego

based in part on the death instinct, directed toward the

parents and then re-introjected (Freud, 1923/1961).

The

"tension" between the ego and superego, on which guilt was
based, was derived from the energy of the death instinct.
4.

There is

objects.

a

large philosophical literature on emotional

Some representative v/orks are Gordon (1974),

Gosling (1965), Kenny (1963), and Wilson (1972).

The

present discussion is drawn from Averill (1982) and Solomon
(1976).

.

.
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The superego, too, is considered
to be based on
identifications.
in Freud's account, the
identifications
that help resolve the Oedipal
complex form the superego.
The concept of the internal,
6.
psychological adaptiveness
of emotions is similar to de
Sousa's (1980a) concept of the
"minimal rationality- of emotions.
De Sousa argues that if
the context of consideration is
sufficiently restricted,
emotions are always rational, which
is to say that there is
always a context in which a felt emotion
is reasonable and
optimal. De Sousa notes the parallels
between his
5.

conceptions and psychoanalytic principles (de
Sousa, 1980a,
1980b)
7.

One could attempt to press the account further
by trying

to explain the -pain"

in the childhood situations.

explanations have to stop somewhere.
reflects

a

But all

Freud's lead— pain

certain accumulation of psychic energy— is not

appealing
8.

way.

Not all inappropriate emotions are explained in this

Many, perhaps most, are more simply the products of

ignorance, confusion, or some other limitation.

,
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Many analytic considerations
of affect had to be
omitted from the reviews in
Chapter III. Following are
reviews of papers of particular
interest or importance that
were judged not to relate directly
enough to the concerns of
the dissertation to be included
in the third chapter.
Four
papers from the thirties and forties
and one from the early
sixties are discussed first, in order
of their publication,
after which is a summary of a debate
over the theory of
anxiety, which turned on issues of
psychology versus
physiology.

Franz Alexander

Franz Alexander's "The Logic of Emotions and its

Dynamic Background" (Alexander, 1935) appeared while

Alexander was engaged (with Thomas French) in investigations
of specific psychodynamic etiologies for psychosomatic

illnesses or "organ neuroses", in Alexander's term,
paper, Alexander describes emotions as adhering to
of logic, like rational thought.

Fie

in the
a

system

argues that this logic

is intuitively obvious owing to repeated experiences of the

"causal relationships" between particular events and

particular emotions.

Alexander calls the logic underlying

an emotional reaction an "emotional syllogism".

self ~ evid ent emotional
connections as "? hi!.
u
hate ^
hlm
because he attacks ne"
'
chin call
?V emotional
t
shall
syllogisms.
.

wS/p!

(Alexander?

Alexander is inconsistent with
regard to whether the
form of emotional logic is the
same in conscious
and

unconscious processes. At first he states
"the fundamental
emotional connections which I call
*the logic of
emotions'

are about the same in consciousness
and in the unconscious"
(P.

401), but shortly he describes unconscious emotional

logic as "strange", "primitive",

and "archaic".

Alexander's concept of the logic of emotions
essentially

a

is

re-statement of the common-sense view that one

feels an emotion in response to appropriate circumstances
or

events.

He contends that psychoanalysis makes "seemingly

irrational psychic process, such as neurotic symptoms,

accessible for psychological explanation" through the
reconstruction of unconscious emotional syllogisms

400).

(p.

This is similar to Freud's inherent justification of emotion
view, which holds that an apparently anomalous emotion is

appropriate to some unconscious object.

Alexander's

argument is that this view represents part of the the
essence of psychoanalysis.
From the "logic of emotions", Alexander turns to

a

"vector-analysis of psychic processes" which has little
bearing on emotions per se.

Alexander proposes three basic

"directions" in psychic
processes-incorporation,
elimination, and retention-and
relates unconscious
reasoning and reactions regarding
such "tendencies" to
psychosomatic conditions. Although
Alexander applies his
term "emotional syllogism" to these
processes, no emotions
are discussed.

Marjorie Brierley

Marjorie Brierley's "Affects in Theory and
Practice"
was mentioned in the review in the discussions
of

metapsychology and the ego.

The paper appeared in the

International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1937, having
been
read before an International Congress the previous year.

Brierley was

a

British analyst, and as such was most heavily

influenced by Jones, Klein, Glover, and Joan Riviere.
her paper, Brierley bids to restore "affects to

a

In

place in

theory more consonant with their importance in practice"
(Brierley, 1937, p. 257).

Though Brierley's explicit

statements retain the primacy of instinct and of ego

development over affect, the thrust of her argument
tov/ard a view in which instinct

is

is of little real concern

and in which ego development is based on affects, rather

than the other way around.

In these and other respects, her

paper anticipates the theories of W.R.D. Fairbairn, and of

Otto Kernberg.

The paper is widely cited

(Ende, 1980;

Glover, 1939; Green, 1977; Jacobson,
1953, 1971; Kernbero,
1976; Novey, 1959, 1961; Rapaport,

1953) and yet its impact

has been limited,

it proposed a revolution,
but the task of

carrying it out was left to others.

Brierley introduces her topic with
the observation that
in the early days of psychoanalysis—
the time of the

cathartic method-affect played the leading
role
as well as practice.
However, by the time

in

theory

of her writing

affect had been almost completely eclipsed
in the realm of
formal theory by the concept of instinct,
while losing
little of its clinical importance.

"Whatever differences of

opinion exist as to principles of technique, no analyst
fails to pay attention to his patient's feelings"
1937, p. 257).

(Brierley,

Affect, she writes, is primary in diagnosis,

prognosis, and in the process and criteria of cure.

theoretical predominance of instinct

is not

The

consonant with

psychoanalytic practice.
Not only was the theoretical neglect of affect

discordant with its practical importance, but this neglect
had left the understanding of affect in

state.

a

highly rudimentary

Analysts would agree, Brierley observes, that

affects are in the domain of the ego yet have "peculiarly
intimate" connections with instincts.

agreement or clearer knowledge

v/as

Beyond this,

lacking.

Brierley then turns to the core of the new psychoanalytic interests

— the

early development of the ego in

.

relation to objects,

she gives an account of the
role of

affect in early psychological
development that closely
anticipates the account developed by
Kernberg more than
three decades later.

Brierley posits that ego-nuclei-

fragments of self-are formed in the
infant when experiences
lay down memory traces.
These experiences are affective in
nature, and the affect at this stage is
a primitive form, in
which sheer sensation is prominent.
two ways.

Objects are involved in

The nature of the sensation-affect is determined

by the caretakers' responses to the infant, and
the nature
of the psychic object formed in the experiences
is

determined by the quality (good vs. bad) of the sensationaffect.

Brierley states that whereas Freud conceived of this
early stage of development as that of the "body-ego", it is
better to conceive of the early ego as

body part-object nuclei".
a

a

series of "part-

Thus, Brierley's hypothesis is of

sequence of sensation-affect-object experiences that lay

down memories and subsequently begin to unify into fragments
of self, or as Kernberg would later describe them, self-

object-affect units.

Of particular note in Brierley's

account is the postulated unity of sensation, affect, self,
and object,

in which affect

is the

primary organizing given.

Affect is thus described as the foundation for all

development
Brierley's suggestion that there are many instincts,

each with its own affect, was
noted in the discussion on

metapsychology in Chapter III.
have been made at

analytic theory.

a

such a suggestion could only

time of profound change in psycho-

The Freudian focus on instincts and
their

vicissitudes was giving way, in theory and
practice alike,
to different interests.
For this reason, and also because
of the decline in Freud's dominance of
the movement, the

definition of the essence of psychoanalysis was
more open to
question than at any time before. Brierley and her
colleagues were in the process of founding the objectrelations approach, in which

a

focus on the early

development of the ego through interactions with real and
fantasied objects replaced instincts as the defining focus
of psychoanalysis.

This new approach, with its new defining

focus, provided the basis for Rrierley's assumption of

multiple instincts.

Only if psychoanalytic theory was

defined by something apart
such

a

front

dual instinct theory could

move be made.

In the remainder of her paper, Brierley touches on a

variety of issues raised by the theory she had advanced.
First, she notes that affects not only underlie ego

development but are influenced in turn by development.

In

particular, as ego development proceeds through Klein's

phase of the "depressive position" with the development of
whole, coherent self and objects, enduring attitudes of love
and hate are formed.

Brierley recognizes (as many analytic

theorists have not) that she is
describing qualitatively
different phenomena under the general
heading of affect, and
she proposes a classification scheme
and terminology,
she
suggests that the earliest sensation-affects,
lacking
objects "in the adult sense", be distinguished
by the term
"feelings".
She suggests "emotions" as the term
for affects
tied to objects.
Finally, she correctly notes that
love and

hate "are not in themselves emotions, but...
are dispositions
to experience certain emotions about certain
objects"

(Brierley, 1937, p. 264), and suggests adopting the term

"sentiments" from Shand (1914).

Edward Glover

In 1939, another British analyst, Edward Glover,

published a theoretical paper on affect, "The Psycho-

Analysis of Affects".

Glover begins by describing

psychoanalysis as being in
development, due to

a

a

"fallow period" in its

relative neglect of affect.

Accordingly, he seeks to re-stimulate psychoanalytic

progress with

a

fundamental study of affect.

Only if such

study is added to the Kleinian investigations of "early
stages of ego organization [and] early ideational content"
(Glover, 1939, p. 299), he implies, will psychoanalytic

theory continue to move forv/ard.

Glover ascribes the neglect of affect to

a

variety of

a
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sources.

These include the greater difficulty
in
comprehending affects, as compared with
ideas, and the
greater "subjective resistances" aroused by
the study of
affect.
He also cites the focus on anxiety, at
the expense
of other affects.
Finally, like Brierley (1937) before him
and Fenichel (1941/1954) after him, he notes
that the study

instinct— in particular, the "ideational derivatives" of
instincts— had supplanted interest in affects, despite the

of

fact that "tilt is to the actual dfiiisaiiMfi
q£ iDstiosi-

Sii^SS [and not to the abstract concept of instinct] that
must look for an explanation of mental behavior"

v/e

(Glover,

1939, p. 300, emphasis in original).
A clearer understanding of Glover's objectives in this

paper can be gathered from an annotation he wrote for
later

(Glover, 1956).

it

There, he describes his objections to

the practice, at the time the paper was written, of

attributing adult phenomena to infants.

He suggests that

the attribution of adult affects to infants

v/as

a

product of

the absence of mental contents, through which psychoanalytic

theorists

v/ere

accustomed to tracing developmental stages;

that is, without the guideposts of ideas, analysts fell back
on an assumption that what

from the beginning of life.

v/as

present in adults

v/as

present

Glover argues that this

assumption cannot be sustained for affects any more than

it

can be for ideas, and states that the purpose of the 1939

paper was to provide an example of

a

method for deducing the

nature of an infantile affect.

He describes the method as

one of drawing deductions from
metapsychology and

"psychobiological possibility-

,

and then refining and

extending these through an examination of
clinical evidence.
Glover's turn to the "primary affects" of
infancy
carries the implication that it is through
an understanding
of the earliest, and thus the most basic,
affects
that

knowledge can be gained of their nature and
significance.
Since earliest experience cannot be directly studied,
Glover
reasons, the nature of primary affects must be deduced

through one or several classification schemes derived from

metapsychology. He notes, with varying degrees of approval,
several such possible bases of classification.

"Pleasure

vs. pain" he rejects as too simple to have much value.

Somewhat more promising is classification with respect to
instinct or component instinct.

draws

a

(In this connection, Glover

striking equivalence between physiological processes

and instinctual energy, linking affective experience and the

"distribution" of libido and aggressive energy among body
organs, and tracing both to sensory stimulation and the

action of the sympathetic nervous system.)

Glover cites

with still more approval the classification of affects

according to whether they are "simple" or "compound", and
argues for the importance of differentiating mixture,
fusion, and simultaneous experience of different affects.

Finally, however, Glover rejects these candidates for basic

classification in favor of

a

distinction between tension

affects and discharge affects.
In the remainder of the paper,
Glover develops a

hypothesis of an early, basic tension affect.
a

He refers to

broad variety of clinical phenomena, derived
from

conditions including hysteria, depression, and
psychogenic
impotence.

In reviewing these phenomena, he equates

sensations of tension, the metapsycholog ical concept of
tension, and unconscious fantasies of fullness and bursting.
He concludes that the original essence of this affect
is a

"psychic feeling of disruption", which progressively assumes

different forms during the course of development.
Glover concludes with

a

comparison of his tension

affect with Jones' concept of aphanisis, which it closely
resembles.

Glover states that his tension affect is

developmentally earlier, more basic entity.

a

It is doubtful

that Jones would have accepted this claim, as he believed

aphanisis to be the earliest and most fundamental affect.

Gregory Zilboorg

One of Gregory Zilboorg' s papers was reviev/ed in the

discussion of defense and affect in Chapter III.

Another of

his papers, "Affects, Personal and Social", was read before
the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1944, and it was

published the following year.

The tone of the paper is

remarkable.

Unlike the great majority of
theoretical
psychoanalytic papers, it is written
in a vigorously
polemical key. zilboorg 's motive in
writing the paper seems
to have been an urgent impulse
toward social commentary,
together with a desire to comment
on—decry, in fact— the
dominant trends in psychoanalyt ically
informed social
thought.
The theory of affect was apparently
a secondary
concern, a vehicle for treating other issues,
and Zilboorg
gives less attention to affect than to his
other concerns.
When he does turn to affect, it is not clear
that the

phenomena he discusses are actually affects rather
than
related entities.
In this paper,

Zilboorg seems to be responding

primarily to the psychologizing of society, which he
maintains is rampant in psychoanalytic social thought and

psychoanalytically informed sociology.

in

He criticizes models

of society which are based on the individual, objecting that

these models fatuously assume that the v/orkings of social

structure are based on identical principles as the

psychological or biological functioning of an individual
person.

He argues that society operates on entirely

different principles, particularly cultural and economic
ones, and that therefore the comprehension and amelioration
of social ills such as "inequality, hatred, crises, and

slavery of man at the hands of man"
along psychological lines.

(p.

45)

cannot proceed

Zilboorg has much criticism to
offer of previous social
psychology, accusing Freud of
"flagrant mistakes" in the
area and describing pre-Freudian
social psychology as
subjective and psychologically naive,
when he points to
Marx as a much undervalued and inadequately
understood
source of social analysis, and one begins
to suspect that
Zilboorg was becoming more disturbed by
the injustices and
philosophical shortcomings of liberal humanism, of
which

psychoanalytic theory was

a part,

vanquishing of fascism in Europe.

as he witnessed the

That is, as the end of

the enormous social evil of Nazi ism came into view,

socialists— and Zilboorg' s citations of Marx and adoption

of

some central Marxian tenets makes one suspect he was

sympathetic to socialism at that time— may have looked with
renewed alarm at the injustices and distortions in

democratic societies, which had subdued fascism and which
would prevail afterward, at least in the West.
Zilboorg, it becomes clear, had deep misgivings about
the dominant trends in his

ov/n

and other societies, and

about the forces that control the functioning of societies.

When he describes social affects (which are really
sentiments, or complexes of attitudes and tendencies to

experience affects)

,

he points to such phenomena as

persecution of outgroups, idealization of unrealistic goals
and of leaders, and abstract love of fellow members of the

group or class combined with rigid intolerance of deviance.

He argues that these phenomena
establish that societies do
not function on the basis of
libido, at least not in its

mature (genital) form, contrary to
Freud's position (Freud,
1921).
Personal affects, on the other hand,
Zilboorg

considers to be based on libido, a position
he justifies
only scantily.
Pegarding the question of what social affects
are based
on, if not on libido, Zilboorg proceeds
in two directions.
On the one hand, he states that social affects,
and

therefore the functioning of society, derive from
aggression
and from "partial" or "pregenital" instincts.

This, he

maintains, accounts for the pr imitiveness and

destructiveness of society, and for its hostility to loving,
concrete mutuality.

On the other hand, he states that

social affects spring not from instinctual sources at all
but from "the cultural, economic determinants which capture
the psychobiological apparatus of man"

Zilboorg'

s

purview in this paper

(pp.

42-3).

is sweeping,

and is in

exhilarating contrast to the typical psychoanalytic
theoretical discussion.

But despite his title, the paper's

strengths are not in the theory of affect.
Zilboorg does not address

a

In particular,

central question, one which,

given his Marxian interests and his appreciation for

distinct levels of organization, one might have anticipated
he would discuss.

This is the question of the role of

social structure and the principles that organize it in the

s

formation of affect.

Zilboorg discusses only the
influence
in the converse direction,
namely the ways that affects
organize both the individual and
society.

Samuel Novey

Samuel Novey wrote two papers on affect,
of which only
the second is discussed here.
In this paper, Novey (1961)

brings together affect and object representation,
which had
been another interest of his (Novey, 1958). His
central
points in this paper are that affect plays

a

critical role

in object representation, and that cognition and
affect are

intermingled in object representation and in all other
mental phenomena as well.
Much of the paper is taken up with an elaboration of
the concept of object representation, which Novey (1958) had

drawn from Melanie Klein and w. p. D. Fairbairn, while
rejecting many of their views.

He compares his view of

object representation to the psychological theory of
"apperception", citing Murray (1938), among others.
view of object representation is that

it

Novey'

consists of

interpretations of the concrete behavior of real people, as
these interpretations are remembered and organized.

Novey

emphasizes that all responses to people, and thus all

personality structure (which
others)

,

is based on

internalizations of

depend on such subjective interpretation.

Affect is so much involved in
these interpretations,
Kovey (1961) maintains, that it
predominates over cognition
in the content of object
representations. Not only does
affect control the content of representations
as they are
acquired, but it controls the form taken
by them at any
given time.

Novey was the first writer after Brierley
(1937) to
underline so forcefully the intimate connection
between

affect and object representation.

Unfortunately, he does

not go beyond a statement of the importance of this

connection to
limited to

a

a

theoretical account.

His discussion is

series of observations concerning the frequent

interaction of subjective interpretations of people,

intrapsychic conflict, and emotion.
a

In effect, he advocates

change in psychoanalytic theory but does not offer

a

way

to carry it out.

The Anxiety Controversy

In the early fifties, there appeared a series of papers

dealing with the issue of "automatic" anxiety and the

concomitant issue of Freud's "anxiety-neurosis".

The

contradiction between the psychological formulation of
anxiety as

a

response to perceived danger (Freud, 1926) and

the physiological concept of automatic anxiety could no

longer be ignored, and several attempts were made to resolve

it, with varying degrees of
success.

The issue derived its

urgency from the centrality of anxiety
in psychoanalytic
theory and from the deep divergence
between the two views of
anxiety; the dispute involved the question
of whether

psychoanalysis was

a

biological or a psychological

discipline.
In Inhibition, Symptom, and Anxiety, Freud
had

overturned his discharge theory and had entirely
altered the
psychoanalytic picture of anxiety, where previously,

anxiety had been an "automatic", quasi-physiological
reaction, it became a psychological appraisal of danger,

carried out by the ego.

The earlier theory was not entirely

abandoned by Freud, however, and was maintained by some
followers (e.g., Wilhelm Reich).

Analytic theorists were

thus faced with two formulations of anxiety, one in harmony

with Freud's neurological, physiological model, the other

a

product of the psychological model and an indication of its
growing predominance in psychoanalytic thought.

Elizabeth Zetzel, in "Anxiety and the Capacity to Bear
It"

(1949)

,

advanced a dual scheme that accommodated both of

Freud's conceptions.

Zetzel attributed anxiety to mounting

instinctual tension, in harmony with Freud's early work.
She distinguished between primary and secondary anxiety.

Primary anxiety is the direct consequence of tension that
has risen beyond a certain threshold which is

constitutionally given.

Such anxiety characterizes infants,

.
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adults in

traumatic state, and adults who fail
to develop
and tolerate secondary anxiety.
The latter type of anxiety
is a signal of an "internal
danger situation",
a

prototypically

a

rise in tension (i.e., impulse),

it

requires maturity of the ego, and offers
crucial adaptive
advantages
Zetzel gives the example of facing an examination.

Secondary anxiety, she writes, offers alertness, vigilance
to misleading questions, and heightened mobilization
of

intelligence.

Primary anxiety leads to disorganization,

confusion, and finally panic.

The scheme parallels

Fenichel's (1941) distinction between primitive and tamed
affects, with the difference that Fenichel portrays affects
as a raw source, much like instincts, which the ego

confronts and tries to tame, whereas Zetzel describes
secondary anxiety as

a

product of the ego, created by

it

for

its own purposes over the course of development.

Zetzel's most significant departure from Freud's

conceptions is in her view of the role of biology in
secondary anxiety.

Freud had little to say on this, and one

assumes that biology was of relatively little importance in
his concept of signal anxiety.

Zetzel, however, emphasizes

the biological origins of secondary anxiety, and finds in

secondary anxiety most of the "unequivocally purposive"

psychological and physiological components of fear.

She

mentions the "fight-flight" response, and implies that
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secondary anxiety, despite its appearance
relatively late in
individual development, is an inherited
adaptive response—
what Freud would have called "instinctive"
as distinct from
" instinctual" .

Charles Brenner, in

a

paper delivered in 1950 and

published later in adapted form (Brenner, 1953),
argued

vigorously that Freud's concept of automatic anxiety, and
the related clinical entity anxiety neurosis, could not
be

supported.

anxiety

He asserted that Freud's evidence for automatic

— the

association of anxiety with "unsatisfying"

sexual practices and the "unanalyzability" of the anxiety in

these cases

— had

been fallacious.

He reviewed the

literature on traumatic neurosis in war and peace, and
concluded that it supported

a

view of neurotic anxiety as

dependent in all cases on the mobilization of unconscious
conflicts, never directly caused by the vicissitudes of

"excitation".

He urged the abandonment of any concept of

automatic (physiological) anxiety, and proposed instead to
regard anxiety as "an emotion (affect) which the

anticipation of danger evokes

in the ego"

(p.

22)

.

He

denied that this emotion, and by implication any emotion,
could exist in infancy

— the

state that other theorists had

considered infantile anxiety (Spitz, 1950) Brenner argued
could only be considered global unpleasure,

a

precursor to

anxiety and other unpleasant emotions, which depend on
memory, sensory perception, and other cognitive functions.

Abram Blau, in "In Support of Freud's
Syndrome of
Actual' Anxiety Neurosis" (Blau, 1952),
did

not refer to

Brenner's paper but said anxiety neurosis
was being widely
thought of as "an obsolete concept". Blau's
purpose was to
re-assert the existence of anxiety neurosis as
a clinical
entity distinct from "functional psychoneurosis"
and

psychosis.

Blau believed that "actual neurosis, a

physiological or physiopathological reaction"

363) was a

(p.

real clinical entity, and that Freud's original description
of it was correct,

Blau's definition of anxiety neurosis diverged from
Freud's, however.

Freud defined it entirely on the basis of

its etiology; anxiety neurosis was anxiety with no

analyzable psychological source and caused by physical
factors, specifically unsatisfying sexual practices.

definition is initially obscure.

Blau's

At the outset of the

paper, he indicates he v/ill adhere to Freud's view, and one

anticipates he will follow early Freud in distinguishing
anxiety with psychological and physical causes.

A series of

examples of proposed subtypes of anxiety neurosis including
reactions to trauma, childhood conduct disorders and "habit

disorders", and psychosomatic disorders suggests that Blau's
concept of anxiety disorder was broader than Freud's and
based on different principles.
In the end,

it

is

difficult to know with certainty what

Blau's definition of anxiety neurosis was.

It seems to have

.

,

been equivalent to anxiety itself, with
the added

complication that he believed anxiety could take
many forms.
He regarded anxiety as "biological".
In essence, anxiety is a form of emotion
and a natural
biological phenomenon. To some degree it occurs at
various times in all people. At root, it is a
physiological visceral response to a counterbalance
threats to the basic economy of the organism.
(p. 369)

Blau's central thesis may have been that psychoanalysts
deal

frequently with symptoms that represent an automatic
response, unmediated by psychological conflict.
The clearest insight into Blau's conceptualization is

offered by his recommendations for treatment of anxiety

neurosis as compared with treatment of conflict-based

psychoneurosis
In therapy each requires a diametrically different
approach. For the psychoneurosis, psycho-analysis is
indicated, while the actual anxiety neurosis needs some
reality change either by the direct use of the
transference relationship or an alteration of the
environment.
(p. 371)

For unconscious conflict, Blau made the familiar

psychoanalytic prescription of insight through analysis.
For anxiety neurosis, and for anxiety in the context of

psychoneurosis, he considered insight irrelevant.
in the environment or,

a

A change

failing that, some form of

reassurance and support were the pertinent measures.

Blau

went on to apply standard psychoanalytic formulations about

anxiety to anxiety neurosis (e.g., that anxiety neurosis
should be kept at an optimum level in analytic sessions)
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demonstrating that he regarded anxiety and
anxiety neurosis
as equivalent, and saw both as automatic,
physiological
processes.

Schur's "The Ego in Anxiety"

(1953) did not take

Freud's two views of anxiety as its main focus, but
it
included a detailed assessment of them.

Schur noted Freud's

inability to integrate his anxiety theories.

Freud's difficulty was to reconcile his new findings
with his old theories and clinical observations, his
new approach to anxiety as a psychological problem with
his previous "biological" anxiety theories.
(Schur,
1953, p. 85)

Schur denied that Freud's earlier theory of anxiety as the

direct "toxic" conversion of libido was viable, and pointed
to internal contradictions and the absence of a plausible

physiological mechanism.

He remarked on the "tenacity" with

which Freud held on to the early view.

He then went on to

argue that Freud's clinical observations, which Freud had

advanced to support the toxic view of anxiety, could be

accounted for by the signal theory, if one added to it the
concept that frustration of instinctual wishes produces

a

danger situation, to which the ego responds with the anxiety
signal.

Schur's advocacy of the signal theory was with one

proviso; Schur, like Rangell (1955), objected to the concept
of the ego "producing" anxiety, since anxiety is experienced

passively.

He argued that the ego could create danger

(e.g., through fantasy) as a means of causing a modest

amount of anxiety, which could then be used as

a

signal.

—
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The early 1950's group of papers on anxiety
concluded

with three papers published as companion pieces
in the 1955

volume of the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association; two of these papers (Rangell, 1955; Zetzel,
1955) had been read in a symposium on anxiety the previous

year.

Zetzel (1955) returned to her topic of 1949, but did
not bring her distinction between primary and secondary

anxiety into her discussion.

The attributes she had divided

between primary and secondary anxiety in 1949 appear
together in her 1955 version of the concept.

She reviewed

Freud's changing views, and took his final view of anxiety
as a response to a "danger situation"
for further discussion.

— as

the starting point

She cited some recent biology,

particularly Cannon and Selye, emphasizing the location of
the concept of anxiety at the "borderline" of psychology and

physiology and suggesting that psychoanalytic and biological
formulations converge in this area.
Instead of her earlier distinction between primary and

secondary anxiety, Zetzel (1955) proposed to make the

distinction in terms of the ego's development rather than in
the nature of the anxiety itself.

When the ego is

sufficiently mature, anxiety (an automatic, more or less
biological response to a large variety of dangers) can be
used by the ego as an indication that some coping measures
are warranted.

Rangell (1955) focused on the dual views
of Freud, and
he announced in his subtitle ("A
Statement of a Unitary
Theory") that he intended to synthesize
them.
He reviewed
the recent literature arguing the existence
of actual

neurosis and automatic anxiety, and the overlapping
question
of whether infants experience true anxiety.

He then

proposed his own view, which was that anxiety

is

always a

reaction to some kind of danger, which was to say, it always
has psychological content and is never "automatic" in the

sense in which the term was being used.

Rangell denied that

infants experienced anxiety, calling their response to

unmanageable overstimulation "unpleasure"

.

He called the

theory "unitary" because he felt he had included the

essential element of anxiety neurosis under the heading of

a

"dammed up state", which he described as occurring when
there is an excess of input and restricted possibilities of
output.

In the dual theory, according to Rangell, this was

thought to lead automatically to anxiety, which represented
a

conversion of the excess energy.

In Rangell 's view, the

anxiety in this situation was like anxiety in any other
situation,

a

signal that

a

danger was present

the danger that helplessness

v/ill

— in

this case,

continue or worsen.

In the remainder of the paper, Rangell addressed the

relation of his views to current theory of instinct, affect,
and ego.

He largely rehearsed familiar formulations.

He

felt that anxiety at moderate levels was consonant with the

,
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work of the ego, but had a disorganizing
effect at high
levels, and that a strong ego was able
to "tame" anxiety.

Consequently, he felt anxiety was

disruptive force early in life.
is a

a

more predominantly

He had denied that anxiety

conversion of energy, but inexplicably felt obligated

to discuss the "energy source" of affects; here
he produced

the novel notion that the energy for affects is derived
from
a

pool of energy associated with instinctive defensive

behavior patterns.

Regarding the connection with instinct

in the typical Freudian sense

(libido and aggression)

Rangell agreed with Freud's (1926) final view, that anxiety
tends to appear in conjunction with high states of

instinctual tension because such states represent various
dangers, not because the tension spills over into anxiety,
so to speak.

Rangell

(1968)

later returned to this topic, devoting

his entire presidential address to the American

Psychoanalytic Association to the issue of Freud's dual view
of anxiety.

He reiterated his "unitary" view, repeating

that anxiety neurosis as Freud described it is

a

genuine

clinical syndrome but that

a

different

it

caused by

is not

mechanism than ordinary anxiety.

Pangell repeated at

greater length his argument that "trauma"

unmanageable influx of stimulation,

a

(i.e., an

concept of enormous

generality, encompassing events from an infant's mother
leaving the room to

a

threat of death in battle) constituted

.

danger, and that therefore anxiety in
traumatic situations

represents

a

warning like anxiety in other situations.

In this later paper, Rangell also
emphasized that

signal anxiety is "automatic".

In the literature on

anxiety, "automatic" and "signal" anxiety were
contrasted,
but Rangell argued that this contrast ignored the
fact that

anxiety is experienced passively; he objected to speaking
of
the ego actively "producing" anxiety, and argued that all

anxiety is "automatic".
The third of the three 1955 papers (Flescher, 1955),

despite its title, "A Dualistic Viewpoint on Anxiety", has
little to say about Freud's two views.
v/as

Flescher

's

purpose

to advance a view of anxiety as a direct derivative of

an instinct

(as

in Freud's earlier view), but of the

aggressive instinct, not the libidinal one.

Since Flescher

argued that anxiety derives solely from aggressive energy
(specifically, aggressive energy dammed up due to

environmental or internal prohibitions)

,

one is left

uncertain about why he calls his viewpoint "dualistic".

The

term seems to refer to the simultaneous involvement of
libido and aggressive energy in anxiety; the anxiety itself,
though, Flescher held to proceed directly from aggressive

energ ies

